I was just subjected to the most credible phishing attempt I’ve experienced

https://twitter.com/digitallawyer/status/1181348689756864513

by vinnyglennon • 7 years ago

781 351 7 years ago

carlsborg• 7 years ago

Tldr is: they call him posing as a fraud prevention team, "we are sending you a pin to confirm its you", they trigger the password reset flow which sent him a pin, he reads out the pin, they get into the account and read some recent transactions, but needed another pin to transfer money, he wisens up.

Mitigation: password reset pins should say "this is your password reset pin".

aeonflux2• 7 years ago

If I try to reset my password bank screams at me in every possible way, including the pope calling himself and asking if thats legit. Actually there is a 50% chance I'll lock myself out of the account when doing this, because I misstep at some point. Seriously what year is that?

hmate9• 7 years ago

Seems to me the bank should take more care for resetting a user's internet banking password. For example as far as I know, all banks in the UK need you to call them up and answer a couple of verification questions before reseting any login details.

cyberferret• 7 years ago

Saw this on Twitter this morning. Sounds like they must have engineered it and set things up beforehand because they (a) knew which bank he was with and (b) had everything set up ready to log in when they got his ID number and received the password reset code from his text message.

I guess one thing that could have mitigated this quicker is if the text from the bank had said "Here is the code you requested to reset your online password" instead of a generic "Your authorisation code is..."

mcv2• 7 years ago

Which bank you have is not very secret information. Any payment exposes that information.

It's a very clever scam, but it's also a very insecure bank if this is enough to authorise payment. Get a different bank that uses 2FA, makes it clear what an authorisation code is for, and doesn't call you for this kind of sensitive information.

If they really do need to reach you quickly to stop a fraudulent transaction, a simple "that's not mine" should suffice. They know they're talking to you because they're the ones calling you. If the person making that payment has also stolen your phone (entirely possible) they will not deny they made that transaction, because they want that transaction to stand. That means only confirming it's your transaction in this situation is suspicious, not denying it.

krab2• 7 years ago

Which bank you have is not very secret information. Any payment exposes that information.

Still, it means they had to spend some time to prepare for this specific person.

Aside - here in Europe, the account numbers including bank code is pretty much public information. Something like e-mail address. After all, you can only send something in there. To withdraw, you need login credentials.

sandrobfc• 7 years ago

It sounded sketchy from the moment they asked for a pin code that they sent to your phone. It's easier to talk from the outside, but that should always be a red flag. What exactly would they be confirming by sending a PIN to the same number they were already contacting?

But that's a great heads up. Phishing is not just about obviously fake e-mails to hotmail accounts.

anaisbetts2• 7 years ago

Many actual banks and brokerages do exactly this

aerique• 7 years ago

There's so many outside circumstances that might even make a technically adept person like the original poster fall for this: bad day at work, fight with the girlfiend, getting called in traffic, having loud kids playing at home, not feeling well, etc.

Like you said, spam and phising used to be obviously bad but I'm afraid I'm going to fall for it some day now.

kuu• 7 years ago

I don't see the sophistication of this attack... Just a regular one...

buboard4• 7 years ago

that they had a DB with bank ids<->phone numbers already.

kamban• 7 years ago

I think OP mentioned that the member number was obtained from him.

jgrahamc• 7 years ago

This is very scary for the average person. I've taken to simply not answering any questions (not even to confirm my name) if someone calls me. If my bank calls me then I call them back on a number that's on their web site.

gmac• 7 years ago

If my bank calls me then I call them back on a number that's on their web site.

I'm always amazed at how stupid the security situation is in these cases. Banks, telecoms services, etc. do actually call up and try to 'take me through security', and when I say "tell me something you know about me first so I know you're who you say you are", the best they can usually manage is "well, uh, you bank with [Bank]". It just perfectly trains us to fall for scams.

gnicholas• 7 years ago

I’ve tried getting them to give me a checksum to verify validity. For example, tell me the sum of the last four digits of my card number. They always refuse, so I always hang up and call back. Too bad they don’t understand that giving out a checksum is not insecure.

quickthrower2• 7 years ago

I've even had a bank rep get angry at me for refusing to answer their questions on the cold call. I presume it wasn't phishing because when I called back on the legit number they did want to talk to me. It was a long time ago so I forget but I think they were trying to upsell me so maybe thats why he got angry - i.e. no commission for him.

adrianmsmith• 7 years ago

I've read many articles about people who were scammed, and the bank refuses to give them any money back, on the grounds it was the fault of the customer to get scammed.

So given banks have nothing to lose by scams, I suppose that explains why they just don't care about the fact they're training users to ignore them. The bank just does whatever's easiest for it, which in this case is just to call the customer.

Vinnl• 7 years ago

Being on HN I don't think I'm the average person, but I wouldn't rule out falling for this at some point in the future as well. But doubly so for my non-technical parent or partner, I guess.

gnud3• 7 years ago

I keep getting astonished by how bad online banking security is in the UK and US.

Here in scandiavia, we've had hardware tokens (or phone apps) to offer 2fa for ages. And you need a new token for every transaction. In addition to the password for logging in. When you reset your password, you get an email and an SMS saying that your password was reset.

Last time I needed a new token issuer dongle, I had to actually visit the bank and sign stuff.

highhedgehog3• 7 years ago

This is so true. My wife (US) just needs user+pwd to access her bank. Me (Italy), had physical tokens or at least SMS 2fa for years. Also EU is now going through a major security upgrade for banks with SCA (Strong Customer Authentication)

zmodem3• 7 years ago

My US bank added "two-factor" authentication at some point, requiring both a password and the answer to my secret question :-D

NeedMoreTea3• 7 years ago

Oh it gets worse.

My UK bank had a hardware token for years. They recently "upgraded" my security for online banking, and now use SMS 2FA codes for login and authorising new transfers. The hardware token is now unusable.

I'd change banks, but I doubt the others are better.

edent3• 7 years ago

They are better. One of my banks offer a hardware token which requires my card to be physically present and for a correct PIN to be entered. The other has an app with push notifications which can be used to approve or deny transactions.

Seriously, switch bank.

aclelland• 7 years ago

To send money over £250, RBS still use hardware card readers for their MFA flow. You put your debit/credit card in the device, entry your normal pin and then a code that is displayed on the website. It's a little inconvenient of you don't have the device with you when you need to send large amounts of money but in general it's great to have rather than SMS.

Of course, I expect that eventually they'll move to SMS too since it's easier for them and more on line with the rest of the industry.

SmellyGeekBoy5• 7 years ago

HSBC did this to me as well. The battery had died in my old token so I had to jump through so many hoops as the default assumption seemed to be that the customer would have a working token to set up the 2FA.

tomp4• 7 years ago

I hate hardware tokens. Recently got one from my bank. I'm switching banks. I just don't see any advantage over a phone app (plus a phone app can offer better notifications).

laurent1234562• 7 years ago

Last time I needed a new token issuer dongle, I had to actually visit the bank and sign stuff.

I'm glad UK banks try to avoid physical dongles because having to go to the bank and sign stuff to get one is not always convenient, not to mention you need to carry around the dongle everywhere, and if you lose it while you're in vacation it's yet more troubles.

Phone 2FA would be good but a bit pointless because the 2FA app is on the phone, and so is the banking app. Personally I'm satisfied with the way UK banks handle security - it's secure, they block suspicious transactions, etc. yet it doesn't get too much in your way.

I don't think UK banks are less competent, it's just a fine balance between usability and security.

highhedgehog3• 7 years ago

Phone 2FA would be good but a bit pointless because the 2FA app is on the phone, and so is the banking app.

This is exactly like having a physical token with you. If it gets stolen, they have the tokens. But, at least, having token on the phone app is waymore convenient for customers and also has another layer of protection (think of the fingerprint/passcode ecc you need to access your phone)

gnud3• 7 years ago

The phone 2fa app asks you to verify the action, and you input your PIN.

My banks hardware token also needs a PIN before it generates a one-time code.

Some bank tokens just give you the code when you press a button, though. Those, you have to worry if stolen.

aquadrop• 7 years ago

I don't think having 2FA in phone app is pointless. It's still second factor, if someone got to your bank account. They need to get access to that 2FA app as well. And of course you protect that app with password/ping. Do you know of cases when 2FA app was defeated when someone stole money from bank account?

imtringued3• 7 years ago

Phone 2FA would be good but a bit pointless because the 2FA app is on the phone, and so is the banking app.

Can't you just lock the stolen phone?

navidfarhadi• 7 years ago

As a child in Sweden in the late 90s and early 2000s I recall that my dad had a hardware token to access his bank account. Though nowadays people in Sweden use BankID for the most part which is 2FA in the form of a mobile app. BankID is also used to login to most government websites in Sweden which is nice.

Meanwhile, banking security in the US is stuck in the Stone Age. Last I checked Wells Fargo, one of the largest US banks, still does not allow passwords greater than 14 characters in length and passwords are not case sensitive.

tmikaeld4• 7 years ago

In Sweden we have BankID - a two-factor, two-way authentication using public/private encrypted keys that's bound to a smartphone as a signature.

The process is user-friendly while keeping security high:

- The place where you want to login has to trigger the authentication from their server on every login - and have to be certified for BankID.

- You then have to open the app, enter your fingerprint or 6-pin code before you can enter.

It's available for all state-run services including all banks and post offices.

emilfihlman2• 7 years ago

that's bound to a smartphone as a signature.

Big yikes, that's a no for me.

draugadrotten• 7 years ago

Unfortunately the BankID has been scammed a lot, where fraudsters have simple asked people on the phone to sign BankID stuff for them. It is far from perfect and in fact the scam here would be possible to do with BankID as well.

https://www.expressen.se/dinapengar/sparande/bedragerier-med...

zmodem3• 7 years ago

That's the Mobile BankID, and it gets scammed a lot. The smart-card based BankID is the only acceptable choice IMO

imtringued3• 7 years ago

The EU has made 2FA mandatory for online banking as of September.

OJFord• 7 years ago

I had one of those from a major UK bank nearly 15 years ago.

systemtest• 7 years ago

In the Netherlands we used to have dongles or card-readers for all online banking but we are now downgrading to apps, 5-digit number codes and 2FA without an external device. This is all for ease of use but I think from a security standpoint it's not the right direction to go. For instance, in an app you can't view the certificate and wether or not the connection is secure. If you are in a foreign country with dubious leadership it could be hijacked using a rogue SIM-card or some dictator driven root CA (looking at you Kazakhstan).

The worst offender is ING, you can set a payment limit in the app but then you can also change the payment limit in the app itself. If I take a nap on the train, you can drain my bank account my pressing my thumb on the reader.

distant_hat• 7 years ago

If someone is asking you the PIN so they can confirm it is you, you can ask them to give you the PIN so that you can tell if it matches or not.

mcv2• 7 years ago

That PIN should not even be readable information. It's a password. It should be salted and hashed. It should be useless for any kind of over-the-phone confirmation of your identity.

buboard4• 7 years ago

Who does "Phishing protection as a Service"? Like, a line you can call and ask "Is this legit?" .

edent3• 7 years ago

Your bank. If someone rings you claiming to be from them, you hang up and call the phone number printed on the back of your card.

buboard4• 7 years ago

My bank has terrible call waiting lines and they even overcharge for it! And it's not just banks that are being phished

moodio• 7 years ago

I mean, if they called you why do they need to send you a pin though? Safest way is to just always call the bank back that’s what I do.

aeonflux2• 7 years ago

Be careful with trust if you call them back. There are possible ways to trick you into either staying on line, or just taking over your connection. GSM has pretty shitty security.

Nextgrid• 7 years ago

The "staying on the line trick" is just fear mongering. On any digital phone line (including landlines, which are just SIP with a SIP-to-analog converted) the call is disconnected (as in a call clearing message is sent by the phone or converter) as soon as you hangup (which will make it all the way to the scammer's phone and disconnect the call on his end too). Re-initiating a call after this would involve a call setup message, followed by a ringtone and you'd have to explicitly pick up the phone for it to be reconnected. There's just no way for this to happen on modern phone infrastructures.

maaaats• 7 years ago

One I almost fell for, was a tab that changed to a Gmail login screen in the background. When I switched to it, I thought I had gotten logged out and entered my password. Luckily 2fa saved me. Did not use a pwd-manager at the time, that also would probably have prompted some red flags when it didn't auto-fill.

_carl_jung• 7 years ago

This is partly an issue with phone calls as a medium. If the bank only contacted you through the app, this couldn't happen unless the app itself was compromised somehow.

E.g., the Monzo app has a chat functionality built in. If, upon a fraud attempt, a notification appeared in the Monzo app, it would certainly be legitimate.

If the ease of conversation offered by chatting with voice is necessary, add a link in the chat that has the user call the bank, not the other way around.

You can't easily verify that someone is who they say they are over the phone.

zaarn• 7 years ago

When sending SMS or other notifications, always include the purpose. "You requested a password reset, the PIN to completel the reset is 112938181".

Ideally the pins are also in different formats, so your normal PIN to login is a 6 digit number, the password reset is a 12 digit alphanumeric.

digitallawyer5• 7 years ago

OP here. Just a couple of the things I learned since I posted the Twitter thread:

- The caller spoofed the phone number of the bank. The bank was not in my contacts, so I did not notice. Someone else in the thread noted that they did have the bank's phone number stored, which upped the credibility of the call to them.

- The caller called me twice in rapid succession (First ignore the call from a number you do not know. Then they call back again immediately: "maybe this is urgent / important"). Another person in the thread, who fell for the scam, noted this same pattern.

- It is better if banks include a security warning / specific reason the code is sent with the password reset pins and similar credentials. My bank did not. Another twitter user noted being subject to the scam, and just glancing over the warning copy. So it helps, but it is not perfect. Especially pre-coffee.

- My bank no longer allows me to reset my password without calling them (thanks bank).

When I read the thread now, it's obviously full of red flags. I was successfully manipulated, and whilst I'm certainly not as clever as all the people pointing out they would have caught this from sentence one, I believe I'm also not the lowest hanging fruit in terms of a target :-) Makes you wonder what this will look like when these scams evolve another couple of generations in terms of complexity ...

dcolkitt• 7 years ago

Interesting thanks for the write-up.

One thing that I've frequently heard is that in any type of fraud call you should always hang up right at the beginning and call the bank back.

Seems like no matter how sophisticated the attackers, this defense will always foil anything along the same lines of what happened to you. The only way I can see this countermeasure failing is if the scammers can somehow manage to intercept inbound calls to the bank's customer service number.

digitallawyer5• 7 years ago

There seems to be broad consensus amongst the commenters that this is the most reliable defense against this kind of attack. Makes sense. If they are able to intercept my outbound calls, it's probably an entirely different level of sophistication and targeting.

fauigerzigerk2• 7 years ago

I agree. The same goes for email obviously. But some financial institutions are actively luring customers into doing the wrong thing.

Paypal really stands out on this one. They are regularly sending me emails with a link to their login page to view my recent transactions (regardless of whether or not there are any transactions). This is clearly negligent.

abdullahkhalids• 7 years ago

IMHO this should be the law for financial and medical institutions tc. They should not be allowed to call and ask the receiver to provide verification information.

angry_octet2• 7 years ago

It is a pretty good idea, but only sufficient if you don't have much money. For large balances it might be worth someone's time to bribe your local telco worker or subvert your SS7/Diameter routing so that your calls route via an intermediary (i.e. make your phone a roaming number, route it's calls to an attacker controlled exchange in e.g. India). It is even simpler to listen in to your legitimate call and hear your phone banking password and secret Q&As.

Calling via a landline or via an operator assisted call would make such tricks much more difficult.

Some great papers on Diameter and telco security here: https://www.bell-labs.com/usr/silke.holtmanns

archi422• 7 years ago

It is better if [...anyone...] include a security warning / specific reason the code is sent with the password reset pins and similar credentials.

I think anyone building such systems (either via e-mail or SMS or whatever) should at least remember THIS.

Send something like this via SMS:

The password reset code you requested via our website is 12345. We will never ask you for this code except when you requested a password reset.

1. What is requested 2. How was it requested 3. Is it safe to pass this to some other human being

Okay, 4. in better English ;) As opposed to:

Your caller verification code is 12345, please read this code to your banking agent to verify your identity.

Also, ChipTAN is great: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transaction_authentication_num... If your bank would use this, it would be require extraordinary smart social engineering (or a really naive user).

csunbird• 7 years ago

Hey, this is actually how it works in Turkey. All SMS messages for transaction purposes from banks have a disclaimer, which indicates whether to share the code with customer service representative or not.

For example, for online transactions, the SMS includes a warning to not share the code with anyone, while SMS codes for telephone banking tells you to share the number with the representative.

jedieaston• 7 years ago

BofA gives a disclaimer when you have a 2FA code texted to you (still wish they supported TOTP, but whatever).

iruoy• 7 years ago

The only text messages I get from my bank are descriptive confirmations of actions I did. At the end of every message it says to contact them by phone if you don't recognise the action.

My bank uses a scanner to authorize pretty much all actions. It scans some sort of RGB QR code [0]. When scanned you'll see the IBAN you're sending the money to and the amount you're sending. I think that when the IBAN is in your contacts it shows the name instead of the IBAN.

But most importantly it shows a descriptive message of what action you're verifying. I think the only actions that don't require the scanner are small transactions through their app and marking your card as broken/stolen in the app.

[0] https://www.rabobank.nl/images/how_does_the_rabo_scanner_wor...

roel_v• 7 years ago

Sorry for OT, but I'm Belgian, a software developer, and have a law degree too - can I pick your mind on legal tech in Europe a bit? I can only find your twitter handle, do you have an email address I can reach you on?

digitallawyer5• 7 years ago

Hi Roel, Twitter DMs are open.

rusk6• 7 years ago

It should be noted that Caller ID spoofing is possible with pretty basic equipment. It's illegal in most countries but there's nothing technically preventing you from doing it. Which is crazy IMO.

adwww• 7 years ago

SMS number spoofing is even easier, and available via almost all programatic SMS services. Usually used to set the sender name.

ryanlol5• 7 years ago

It’s illegal in most countries

Would love to see a citation for this.

Roark66• 7 years ago

It is better if banks include a security warning / specific reason the code is sent with the password reset pins and similar credentials. My bank did not. Another twitter user noted being subject to the scam, and just glancing over the warning copy. So it helps, but it is not perfect. Especially pre-coffee.

I'm seriously surprised there are banks that send SMS codes without a reason for the code. All banks I deal with always send the reason for the code. For example: "This is a new payee addition authorisation code. Last 4 digits of the payee's account number are XXXX, the code is: XXXXXX" or "This a transaction authorisation code for the amount of $XX.XX, to an account ending digits XXXX. The number is XXXXXXX."

I would seriously reconsider giving your business to a bank that doesn't do that.

Interestingly there was an EU regulation passed recently that sets certain standards requiring 2FA for certain operations performed by bank customers. Having set up the 2FA auth app on an elderly relative's android phone and having to set up a pin to unlock a device as this is one of the 2FA app requirements and then spending 2 hours explaining how to unlock the phone, how to use it with a tablet to log in, how to authorise payments etc I have mixed feelings. On one side, it is a pretty secure system that will lower the number of victims of fraud. On the other hand it is a massive inconvenience for elderly people. I like the SMS verification system if done right. I think 2FA is a bit of an overkill.

wwn_se• 7 years ago

2FA for banking is not overkill!

You can make 2FA really easy if you want to, now that EU req. 2FA there will probably be more banks with reasonable solutions.

hjnilsson• 7 years ago

Elderly are the most common subject of these attacks. So it is especially important to set strong protection for them. The inconvenience is regrettable but necessary.

jen_h• 7 years ago

I have seriously reconsidered giving my business to a bank that does do that: I'm not a fan of sending transaction amounts or account info via text. My bank does this (and over email!); their security posture is fairly decent otherwise, but why oh why send transaction amounts out into the world where they can be intercepted by anyone between here and there?

Think about the useful information for an attacker in messages like that: Recent transaction details can help an attacker auth on a call, account numbers can do the same. And large transactions are catnip, alerting attackers to worthwhile victims.

mxcrossb• 7 years ago

The best defense against a scam is familiarity. Thanks for sharing this, hopefully it protects someone else.

dkersten4• 7 years ago

I've got a number of calls from my bank over the years (usually the Visa department asking about international charges) and my standard response has always been "I'm sorry, as a rule I do not discuss personal details with someone who called me, since I don't know who you are" and they typically respond with "no problem, please call the number on the back of your credit card". I still wish they wouldn't try to initiate a call (usually they launch straight away into verifying who I am, asking me a ton of personal details before I even know that they're legit... sigh) and would just ask me to call them back on an official number (not one they give me over the phone, obviously) instead. If that were standard practice, I think these kind of scams would be a lot easier to detect.

TheSpiceIsLife• 7 years ago

I always say to them: I can not identify myself to you because I cannot authentic who you are.

And explain to them that we, as a society, need to come up a way of authenticating inbound and outbound calls to ensure we are connect with who the other party claims to be because when you do this it conditions society in to responding and that’s how phishing attacks occur.

londons_explore• 7 years ago

While spoofing numbers on incoming calls is far easier, it is also possible for an attacker to redirect your outgoing calls from the right place in the phone network.

You just shouldn't consider any aspect of the phone network to provide authenticity or confidentiality.

Ensorceled• 7 years ago

My bank always says "There is an issue with your credit card/account, please call the number on the back of the card/your branch as soon as possible." and has for years.

The only time they do otherwise is on very specific instances where they provide the info, "did you just buy something at store XXX for approximately $YYY"

All banks and credit institutions should be required by law to do this.

megablast• 7 years ago

I don't do that. I say "are you crazy, you are a bank and asking me to prove who I am? You called me. You prove who you are first."

lol768• 7 years ago

my standard response has always been "I'm sorry, as a rule I do not discuss personal details with someone who called me, since I don't know who you are"

Amex got quite offended when I did this, and almost chastised me when I got through to an agent after making the outbound call myself. They argued that because they only asked for limited personal information (DOB) it was fine...

I would still do it again!

jimsug2• 7 years ago

I get these calls from time to time, and any bank with proper training should be 100% okay with you questioning their authenticity. There are some replies which indicate that the agent is annoyed... That's just poor training.

As for them initiating a phone call, it still does remain the best way to contact someone urgently, usually falling back to SMS and/or email when/if you don't answer (this was our SOP when I was in a fraud detection team years ago). We'd also usually tell them to call the number on the bank of your card (because not everyone is able to look up the bank's website, shockingly, so this is the most universally applicable way to give people a number) but my usual spiel was "call us on the number on the back of your card or from our website".

There's also no real way for you to know that they're legit, but an interesting reassurance one bank I know uses is to provide your month and day of birth and ask you for the year (as just part of the verification process). The partial info probably helps some people but I still wouldn't go for it - too many people know my birthday.

dwild• 7 years ago

Why would they need to verify you when they call your phone? When I got theses calls personnaly it was a robot voice that was simply asking if a few of my transactions were done by me. It only happened twice, and I feel they make sure to include both actual transactions and a few fake ones to verify your truthfulness because in both case I had one that was clearly wrong that I never saw in my transaction log and they didn't replace my card.

somecanadian• 7 years ago

You should be careful even about doing that if you are on a landline. There is a landline scam where they don't let the call disconnect, so when you hangup and then think you are dialing the bank, you are actually still connected to the scammer.

Always use your mobile phone to make the call (although I'm sure its only a matter of time before even that is compromised).

https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/etobicoke-couple-defrauded-of-mor...

merpnderp• 7 years ago

This. I always tell them I'll call them back if it is someone I don't know who needs to discuss sensitive matters. It's the only way to be sure.

dheera2• 7 years ago

"I'm sorry, as a rule I do not discuss personal details with someone who called me, since I don't know who you are"

Correct. If someone calls me, the onus is on them to prove to me that they are who they say they are.

However, I usually just block ALL unscheduled phone calls, period. Not only do I not have time for unscheduled interruptions, but banks have secure websites and if they can't make proper use of them, too bad, they aren't going to reach me by trying to call me. They should know that phones are easy to phish with, and stop using phone calls to initiate communication.

Ideally what I want is an e-mail saying "we saw some suspicious transactions, please /log in/ to check that there is no fraudulent activity" or even a more general "please log in for an urgent message" with a suspend button in the online interface.

tinus_hn3• 7 years ago

My bank no longer allows me to reset my password without calling them (thanks bank).

So how are they going to verify it’s you who is calling them?

gpvos• 7 years ago

Ask for things like postcode, birthdate, etc.

xorcist• 7 years ago

If the password reset procedure is over SMS, wouldn't any interception of that token have allowed the attackers to access your account and even initiate outgoing transfers?

A scam phone call seems like a clumsy way of doing it. It also risks alerting the victim to what's going on.

It surprises me that it is legal to conduct banking operations to the general public in this way. In many countries (including all of EU since SCA) that is not the case.

dvdkhlng• 7 years ago

Just realizing that a phishing-attack like this is nowadays impossible in the EU: proper two-factor authentication is mandatory now (Revised Directive on Payment Services, PSD2), even just for login. TAN-codes generated for transactions need to incorporate the data of the transaction (recipient and amount), so that a phished TAN cannot be used to authorize a different transaction. I think even a simple SMS TAN may not be allowed any more (could be MITM-abused to authorize a different than the intended transaction).

Here is a summary of what customers and phishers have to face since september:

https://wso2.com/library/articles/2019/06/strong-customer-au...

blfr2• 7 years ago

The security part of PSD2 is starting to look like another cookie law. Banks of course didn't implement any proper 2FA like U2F but rather send you scrounging for the phone with their app every time you want to look up a transaction or an account number, something that didn't require second factor until the directive.

In fact, because it makes checking recent transactions that much less convenient, it probably made me less safe because I do it much less often.

simias• 7 years ago

In your tweets you mention "And now... joyfully resetting all my passwords, filing a police report, getting additional fraud detection in place". What passwords are you talking about and why do you need to reset them? As far as I can tell no passwords have been compromised in the attack as you describe it.

Or do you suspect that there's been an other, undisclosed breach that the scammer used to get your name and phone number? I suppose it's plausible but it seems like it wouldn't be too difficult to get that info.

digitallawyer5• 7 years ago

Should have written that more clearly. More accurate verbiage would have been "changing all my banking credentials, and enabling all possible notifications". I have no reason to believe other credentials were compromised, and have unique pw in place for nearly everything.

workthrowaway• 7 years ago

thanks for sharing and sorry it happened to you. sad to say but, i would be suspicious with if any interaction with a bank is going this easy and is this convenient...

gondo• 7 years ago

"The caller called me twice in rapid succession" this is to bypass the "Do not disturb" functionality on iOS if you have "Repeated calls" enabled. https://cdn.cultofmac.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Do-Not-...

alanfalcon• 7 years ago

I noticed a political robocall taking advantage of this just yesterday, and there went any possibility that I would vote for this person. Your robocall did not constitute an emergency _you asshole_.

nothis• 7 years ago

When I read the thread now, it's obviously full of red flags. I was successfully manipulated, and whilst I'm certainly not as clever as all the people pointing out they would have caught this from sentence one, I believe I'm also not the lowest hanging fruit in terms of a target :-) Makes you wonder what this will look like when these scams evolve another couple of generations in terms of complexity ...

I think this is a social skills moment. For those that claim it's "easy" to spot: This is not the right time for people to brag about how they would have totally spotted it. This is mostly for protecting people who (as most people in this world) don't have time to build up a solid understanding of all aspects of internet security. If you don't care about these people, as some sort of Darwinian schadenfreude, stfu. If you do, focus on their perspective, not your brilliant detective skills.

AnIdiotOnTheNet2• 7 years ago

Most people claiming they would have spotted it are probably wrong anyway. They're reading the messages with the knowledge that they were sent by a scammer. Any idiot can identify these things in hindsight knowing what they're looking at. Without that context, with other things on their mind, it's much more likely they'd have been duped too.

alistairSH3• 7 years ago

I'd wager >50% of those that claim "Ah ha! I'd spot it here!" would fail in real life. Arm-chair quarterbacking is easy. Spotting the scam in real life, when you're walking down the street or otherwise distracted with life? Much harder.

GoblinSlayer• 7 years ago

They say the generic rule of thumb here is urgency. If you can't take your time, it's a scam. I was previously scammed several times with urgency, but as a rhetoric trick under a premise of impatience.

iicc• 7 years ago

The caller called me twice in rapid succession (First ignore the call from a number you do not know. Then they call back again immediately: "maybe this is urgent / important").

This also gets past some Do Not Disturb modes.

jb3689• 7 years ago

Step one for me when I am giving sensitive information is always "let's end this call and let me call you". I had gotten an e-mail from my bank and I called the number in the e-mail without thinking to lookup the support number on my own first. The number was legit and it gave the fraud dept a chuckle but it very well could've been a fake number

karmickoala• 7 years ago

I've recently read about a similar attack, but in Brazil.

Translated: https://translate.google.com/translate?sl=pt&tl=en&u=https%3...

Original (Portuguese): https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1179903474244444160.html

Same approach, they also pretended to be from the bank calling about an irregular transaction. In this scam, it seems they hijacked her home phone line. She tried to call from her cell phone, then they called back to her home phone and said all communication should be from it, to ensure she was at a different location.

dangerface• 7 years ago

When I read the thread now, it's obviously full of red flags. I was successfully manipulated, and whilst I'm certainly not as clever as all the people pointing out they would have caught this from sentence one, I believe I'm also not the lowest hanging fruit in terms of a target :-)

I think it's soo easy to spot scams because 99% of them are so shit, poor spelling, talking nonsense.

If scammers simply spell checked their scams I would fall for them all.

jowsie• 7 years ago

Not sure if still the case, but this used to be done specifically to weed out people who weren't quite gullible enough.

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/microsoft/9346371/Nig...

beerandt3• 7 years ago

To me, the biggest red flag is asking for any identifying info in a conversation they initiated, especially without them initially providing some sort of privledged information to you first.

Unfortunately, some banks do this. (I'm looking at you, U.S. Bank.)

It's like someone calling me and then asking me who they're speaking to. Really? You called me! (Assuming they're not returning a missed call, of course.)

If (someone claiming to be) a bank calls/texts you, (and it's not immediately after a declined transaction) you always hang up and call the number you already have for the bank.

Even if it is after a declined transaction, you still don't provide any info. If they ask if you attempted a $101.89 purchase at "big box store," you should simply respond yes/no, and provide no other info.

If you didn't attempt that transaction, they especially don't need to confirm any other info.

kevlawrence• 7 years ago

How do we know you are the OP?

_bxg1• 7 years ago

I got a similar call a few months back. They didn't ask for my PIN, but did ask for some other sensitive information. Fortunately I was able to verify afterward that it was legitimate by initiating a call to the bank using the number on their website (in case the original was spoofed), and they confirmed a record of the call in their system. But this was after I'd given them some information.

Phone number spoofing has to stop. There is no excuse anymore.

bpp• 7 years ago

With regard to the phone number spoofing: I recently had an actual call from American Express's security department marked by AT&T as "Fraud Risk," presumably because it's been spoofed in the past. It delayed the detection and resolution of the theft of my card number (not by much, but still...). It's criminal that we haven't better secured the Caller ID system.

nradov• 7 years ago

Every financial institution has a mobile app now. They should just add a secure voice chat feature to the app instead of relying on phone calls.

cwojno• 7 years ago

Calling twice in rapid succession is an emergency feature for Android (possibly other) phones when in Do Not Distrub mode. It bypasses the DND when you call twice like that. Usually, only the numbers on your Starred list can call without getting blocked by DND.

The recipient may believe they had starred the number because of this, making them more likely to pick up the call.

0xffff24• 7 years ago

On iOS you can choose whether to allow or block repeated calls, but as far as I can tell it's an all or nothing toggle. If it's enabled, anyone can get through by calling twice.

paul7986• 7 years ago

I would say Thanks for the call. I'm hanging up now to call my bank to verify this.

ping_pong• 7 years ago

The biggest mistake was offering any information. You never offer information, you only confirm or deny things that they tell you. If they insist on things like member id, or email, you hang up, and call the bank yourself.

We as a society need some form of standardized ISO 9001-level protocol where ALL companies handle security the same way. They all ask the same questions, they don't allow first-tier support access to passwords or changing password, only specialized tier-2 support has this power, etc.

If all companies like banks, Amazon, Facebook, etc standardize their procedures in a way that leaks no information, or engage customers in a way that leaks no information, then it will make it harder to phish people because phisher will be forced to ask weird questions that customers will detect as weird.

The problem right now is that some companies ask for last 4 digits of SSN, last 4 digits of credit card, some ask for email address, etc, etc. A phisher can put all those together so if you reduce the attack surface it makes it very very hard.

undefined3840• 7 years ago

This is actually fairly common now, unfortunately. Many reports of Uber drivers being tricked into getting their account hacked using this method to obtain the 2FA pin sent via SMS so they can drain their balance or switch the bank account on file.

mzanchi• 7 years ago

I never give any information to anyone who calls me, apart from people I already know like friends and family. If they say they are from the bank I apologize and say that I will contact them independently via the number that is on my card. I don't even confirm my name. Some banks think I am being difficult, but I stick to this principle regardless.

AnimalMuppet• 7 years ago

I think it's more likely that some scammers think you're being difficult. Shouldn't that be standard procedure for a bank?

dheera2• 7 years ago

Sorry for the nitpick on grammar but

"I was just subjected to the most credible phishing attempt I’ve experienced"

Everyone has been subjected to the most credible phishing attempt they've experienced. Need to find another qualifier ;)

zamalek• 7 years ago

Pro-tip, perform mutual authentication:

"Can you give a reference number (they will have a case number), and tell me where I can find your department's number on your website please. [Edit] I will call you back."

I've never had a bank or other financial institution have a problem with this approach. I don't give myself the opportunity to be fooled, because all of us can be fooled, it's how I respond to every single call from a business.

omnifischer• 7 years ago

Once I gave my member number, the attacker used the password reset flow to trigger a text message from the bank. --> They used this to gain access to the account.

How did they to gain access from "password reset flow"? How could they tell your last transactions?

gdy3• 7 years ago

It's even worse in Russia - fake caller ID makes you think you are talking with the bank, mobile phone operators don't seem to be doing much, or at least didn't a couple of months ago.

That said, all the banks I used send you along with the confirmation code a description of what you are actually confirming.

walrus01• 7 years ago

This is really a SS7 issue not a Russia issue, spoofing outbound caller ID in the USA/Canada is also trivially easy using any major SIP trunking provider.

gdy3• 7 years ago

Thanks, I thought it could be fixed somehow

StreamBright• 7 years ago

> mobile phone operators don't seem to be doing much

It is in the protocol. Operators are not the only problem here.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Caller_ID_spoofing

gdy3• 7 years ago

Thanks for the link

anaisbetts2• 7 years ago

The easiest way to avoid this entire class of attack, is to never be willing to answer any kind of question from someone who calls you. Always hang up, Google the customer support line for the business, then call them.

rkangel• 7 years ago

My bank does that. They call you and say "we need to talk about some fraudulent transactions, can you please ring the helpline and ask to talk to Dave".

icelancer• 7 years ago

Yeah but people expect when calling a business to be put on hold for 20 minutes and be dicked around on a phone tree. They don't want to deal with that.

easytiger• 7 years ago

There was a widespread phishing attack in the UK that used this approach.

On UK landlines the call is not terminated until the person who made the call hangs up. That is to say if I call you, you answered and then hung up, then waited a minute and picked up the phone again, I'd still be there and the connection still made.

Scammers phoned people, told them there is an account issue and to phone the number on the reverse of their credit or debit card. The scammers keep the line open and play a recording of a dial tone to the target phoning back and then go through garnering all the details needed to rinse the accounts.

I believe in response UK phone networks are implementing time limits on one sided terminations

wintermute58• 7 years ago

This BBC article from 2014 suggests that the call clearing time was reduced to a few seconds by most carriers: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26559554

gexla• 7 years ago

We should have learned this one a long time ago from email. If something comes through from a service which may require action, then go directly to the service and stop interacting with the email.

Phones seem just as dangerous these days. I don't answer them at all. Anyone who really needs to get in touch knows multiple services that will get through to me.

upwardbound• 7 years ago

How easy would it be for an attacker to (at least temporarily) outrank the bank in SEO so that when people google the bank's number they find the top result being the attacker's number?

afghanPower• 7 years ago

Extremely hard. Maybe you could buy an ad space and "outrank" them that way. Have to pass Google's ad approval process though.

rahidz• 7 years ago

There's quite a few articles about this happening in India through Google Maps:

https://www.forbes.com/sites/leemathews/2018/11/26/fraudster...

tidenly• 7 years ago

I've already taken the most effective security measures against this kind of attack, which is to never answer the phone.

SmellyGeekBoy5• 7 years ago

Sadly this is my approach, too. If it's important they can leave a voicemail message and I'll call back at my convenience.

I always thought the expectation of interrupting whatever you're doing at a few seconds notice was incredibly rude anyway, even more so now we have so many other ways of communicating.

throwaway7446783• 7 years ago

Or have your regular representative call you; an attacker may guess their name and hope you won't be able to recognize their voice, but it adds a level a complexity

mhandley• 7 years ago

My simple policy is I never give out any information if I'm cold-called. If they claim they're my bank, I say I'll call them back on the number printed on the card, and ask the caller which department I should be put through to. Legitimate callers have never objected to this approach, and it saves me any stress - same policy, no matter the caller, no exceptions, no need for me to try and figure out if I'm being phished.

ljf2• 7 years ago

Good idea - but here in the UK there was a scam where they called you and THEN suggested you call the number on the back of the card.

They then don't hang up, but play a dialling tone down the line until you dial the number. At which time they 'answer'. This only works on home phones, not mobile, but is worth considering, and warning your family/friends about.

komali2• 7 years ago

Fuck that's clever

TheFattestNinja• 7 years ago

But, if I don't hang up the received and the counterparty hangs up, then the line tone is the one of the "busy", not the one of the "free", and I'm unable to dial anyone until I physically hang up to reset the line. Or at least that's how it works back home. Is it different in UK ? I suppose it's something that less attentive people might fall for anyways.

Moru2• 7 years ago

I don't think this works any more. My parents always did this when kids did prank calls. Kept the phone open for hours blocking their line. Did not work last time I tested. Uncertain how long you have to wait before next call though.

bloak• 7 years ago

Have you any idea when this worked in the UK?

It's such an old story that you'd have thought there would be an explanation online by now of exactly which telephone exchanges had this problem and when those telephone exchanges were in use.

For what it's worth, it didn't work when I tried it, probably in the 1980s. Perhaps it worked in the 1970s in some places?

JorgeGT• 7 years ago

This is probably the best security technique in terms of simplicity vs effectiveness, one that everyone and their grandma can use. I wish there was more effort in educating people to use it.

I even remember a thread here in HN were one three-letter agency authenticated themselves to a user with this method, calling his numbers and saying, this is the FBI/NSA/etc but for you to be sure, please hang, look the website for the public number, call, and ask to be put through with $Agent from $Department.

oxplot• 7 years ago

Wrote about this years ago: https://blog.oxplot.com/dont-ask-for-personal-details/

hibbelig• 7 years ago

The Twitter thread points out that you need to call from a different phone, else the scammer could leave the line open (even after you hang up!).

mytailorisrich• 7 years ago

My simple policy is I never give out any information if I'm cold-called.

That's what I do. When someone calls me and then proceeds to ask me security question to allegedly assert my identity I reply "well, you called me so how do you prove to me who you are first?"

I usually get a "err..." but on one occasion the guy was rather rude and hanged up.

The worst thing is that most of the time these calls are genuine. This means that my bank does think it's fine to do that.

SmellyGeekBoy5• 7 years ago

My bank did this once - called me out of the blue and started asking for answers to security questions. I asked them how I could be sure it was definitely them and they said to call the number on my card and ask for a particular department, which I did, and it turned out it was indeed genuine.

The fact that they had an immediate answer to the question obviously means that they were asked this question all the time. I wonder how many people happily handed over the info?

It seems that they now just play a recorded message asking to call, and then automatically hang up.

WalterBright• 7 years ago

They always ask if I want to pay over the phone. I say nope, I'll mail you a check.

sambe• 7 years ago

I usually receive soft objections to this. They don't even seem to understand the problem most of the time. In fact, they speak rather like I would expect a scammer to: "but we just need to verify who you are, and you will still have to do this if you call the number on your card, so it's easier if I do it now".

moviuro• 7 years ago

The bank I'm currently at has this "obnoxious" text around verification numbers:

  Don't EVER communicate the following verification number to anyone, including <bank> collaborators: 123456

SMS OTP should always have that or similar text.

cpuguy832• 7 years ago

Also maybe a less predictable otp

LeonM3• 7 years ago

I don't understand why there are still banks that do SMS verification. It has been proven so many times now that that it is vulnerable to both phishing (proven here), sim swapping attacks, etc.

The banks here in the Netherland all have (well, except for one maybe) hardware authentication devices. They are portable smartcard readers, you insert your card, enter your PIN on the device itself (not your computer or phone) and transfer a digest from your PC to the reader by typing or scanning a QR code (some readers have a little camera). You then type the signature into your computer or phone.

The readers for my bank even have a screen, that tells you what you are signing, like a login, or transfer of which amount to which bank account. Photo here [0].

The banks are very clear that they will never ask you to use the device over the phone. And that double confirmation by showing the sign action on the screen of the reader makes any form of phishing really hard.

IMO these smart card readers are the best compromise between convenience and security for banking.

[0] https://4.bp.blogspot.com/-6c1NGHew1P8/VBqvTeqDQdI/AAAAAAAAf...

M4v3R• 7 years ago

In my bank (Poland here) they have a mobile app which receives push notifications instead of SMS messages. The notification also contains the reason for the code. So in OP's case it would say "Code for resetting your account password", which would probably trigger a red flag sooner.

tom_mellior• 7 years ago

Not disagreeing with you in general, but:

The readers for my bank even have a screen, that tells you what you are signing, like a login, or transfer of which amount to which bank account.

That's information that could and should also be included in the SMS. The OP's bank did not do this, which is a huge fail on their part.

tomp4• 7 years ago

IMO smart card readers are the worst solution for everything. They are invariable less capable and less secure than my phone. Why would I carry 2 devices (one of these quite primitive) if I could only carry one?

LeonM3• 7 years ago

Can you elaborate why you believe smartcards are less secure than your mobile phone?

Jsharm• 7 years ago

Is there a way to detect a spoofed phone number?

Tepix• 7 years ago

Depends on the type of phone you have. For VoIP phones you may have more possibilities than on an analogue landline.

yoz-y• 7 years ago

In France at least you need to keep the member number a secret from everybody. Since banks here are lazy bums with security they only ever implement the minimum recommended security. According to French data protection services this is 5 digits!!! when the 'username' is secret.

Never disclose your member number.

rothron• 7 years ago

His first mistake was to read back the verification number? Why would they legitimately asked for this theoretically?

To verify he has the phone they just called him on?

You should never have to read back a verification code.

jaclaz• 7 years ago

In EU, there is the (recent) implementation of a (new) directive, PSD2:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Payment_Services_Directive#Rev...

That carries with it the requirement of SCA:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_customer_authentication

In practice (here in Italy) you have a client number (secret) a password/PIN (also secret) AND either a SMS to your mobile with a one time code or a Smartphone app (yikes!), there used to be hardware tokens generating one time authorization codes that have now been retired.

bonzini• 7 years ago

Also, when you're wiring money to someone, my bank is now requesting to input certain digits of the amount and destination account into the app. Those digits are then factored into the 2FA algorithm. I am not sure if this adds substantially to the security though.

tialaramex4• 7 years ago

The idea is, it defeats attacks not so different from the one the Tweet is about, where you are misled about what will happen when you take an action.

If you only need "a code" whether it's to send $40 to a close friend or your entire account balance to an account you've never heard of that was created yesterday in a foreign country - then the scammers only have to trick you into trying to do the former, even though what they want to achieve is the latter, so that you'll give them a code which is what they need.

The bank can do a good or bad job of communicating what's going on and actually preventing the fraud, depending on whether the understanding of what they're trying to achieve was pushed down all the way from regulators to the engineers building the system.

The best systems here don't give you (and thus the attackers manipulating you) a lot of opportunity to manipulate things, but they do present you with information that should be raising red flags if you're being tricked. For example if the app says "Enter the six digits shown on the web page" and you just mindlessly copy those digits, an ordinary customer may not know why it's those six digits, bad guys with a fake web page can tell them to put whatever they want. Whereas if the _app_ says "Enter the whole dollar amount to send" then bad guys may struggle to explain why they want you to type 5839, your entire account balance, when you wanted to send $40 to the supposed friend in need and your suspicions might be raised enough for the scam to fail.

ThomPete• 7 years ago

I experienced the same thing Or something similar in august.

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20777046

paxys• 7 years ago

The most surprising part is that they were able to gain access to your account using just the code texted to you. It's called second factor for a reason. The bank should still have sent you a password reset email.

momania• 7 years ago

My bank doesn't even allow password resets like that. If you forget, you can request a new one, but that goes just like the initial setup: you get 2 separate documents per post, one with a new password, and one with a new activation code.

al_form2000• 7 years ago

I used to hate it that my bank requires a physical trip to the branch for cred reset. No more.

rb808• 7 years ago

I used to pure online banks were the future, but no I wouldn't touch a bank that doesn't have a physical branch somewhere close.

codingdave2• 7 years ago

I can understand how people would fall for this one. With 20/20 hindsight, asking for the member number is fishy - it doesn't actually verify anything. And when my bank calls me, it is always automated - I only get a person talking to me if I ask for it through the automated systems. So in a way, any actual person calling would be a red flag. But in the moment, I can see why it sounded legit.

My parents have taken their precautions against phishing to extreme levels. They don't speak into the phone when unknown numbers call. At all. If they choose to answer, they wait for someone on the other end to talk and then decide whether to speak or hang up. They have heard horror stories of people getting their voices recorded and replayed into automated systems, so if someone calls and asks, "Hi, Is this <name>?", they avoid even saying "Yes", and instead ask who is calling. It may be paranoia, but as the saying goes... just because you are paranoid doesn't mean that they are not out to get you.

theseadroid• 7 years ago

I wonder if the criminals start to use automated voice systems, especially if those systems prompt and allow you to input numbers/password from the dialpad, how many more people would fall to the scam.

codingdave2• 7 years ago

If done well, it likely would be highly effective. Maybe we should not give them any ideas.

3JPLW2• 7 years ago

Anecdotally, I think answering and immediately muting calls from unknown numbers is a deterrent to repeated calls. They're almost always robocalls that wait for someone to start talking before launching into their shpeal. Without any audio input, they sit and wait exactly 10 seconds before giving up... and my hunch is that they put that number into a "dead" pool and won't try again.

zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC2• 7 years ago

And as always: The best defense is minimizing data other people have about you. None of my banks needs my phone number, so none of my banks has my phone number, so if someone called and claimed they were my bank, that would obviously be bullshit.

It's not just the obvious "people can't abuse or lose data they don't have" why keeping your info to yourself protects you against abuse.

throwaway7446783• 7 years ago

Wow, I am pretty sure most banks require a phone number when you open an account. Or do you give them a random number?

zAy0LfpBZLC8mAC2• 7 years ago

Well, many require that you fill the phone number field, but just entering zeros does the job. If anyone (not just banks) does extended validation, I enter some syntactically valid but unallocatable number, that has always done the job so far.

throwaway7446783• 7 years ago

Quick question: What would an attacker gain from getting into your bank account?

From mine (french big bank), they could be annoying (asking the bank to close accounts, ordering new checkbooks, getting all kind of information on past transactions, wire money between my accounts), but I can't see how one would effectively leverage that.

I mean, an attacker goal would be to draw money in some way; all money wirings to external bank accounts are protected by a code (SMS or in-app verification), with a 24h delay between the time one enters a destination account and the actual wiring.

Is that any different with other banks? Is an attacker able to effectively draw money as soon as they get access to the account?

SmellyGeekBoy5• 7 years ago

I'm not sure why you've been downvoted for this - it's a perfectly legitimate question.

I'm in the UK and have a personal account with HSBC and a business account with Lloyds. In both cases I need to generate a code to setup a new recipient - using the app (HSBC) or a physical card reader (Lloyds). I also get an SMS in both cases asking me to contact them if I didn't submit the request. So anyone gaining access to my accounts wouldn't be able to transfer money out.

I suppose they could do other things - contact the bank's support staff using their realtime chat thing maybe and social engineer something that way? Perhaps they don't ask for further confirmation in that case but I haven't checked.

EugeneOZ• 7 years ago

This trick is pretty old. In Russia people receive such calls so often that they get used to ignore them. Most calls are from prisons - prisoners have a chance to make decent amount of money this way.

tinus_hn3• 7 years ago

Unfortunately it seems we went from one ineffective solution, knowledge of a social security number and some useless ‘security questions’, to the next ineffective solution.

Even if you don’t fall for this trick sms is not secure and most providers don’t even bat an eye if a fraudster walks into one of their stores and requests a sim registered to your phone number.

Password reset is a difficult problem.

codedokode• 7 years ago

In Russia when a bank sends a code via SMS, there usually is a comment like "don't tell this code to anyone, even to bank employees".

I have read about similar type of fraud. The scammers say that they are from the bank and they saw suspicious transaction and want to verify whether it was you, and try to get your card information and code from SMS.

jonplackett• 7 years ago

Banks have such shitty security over the phone and they train us to do stupid stuff like giving out personal info when they call.

For example, your real bank in the U.K. ask for your date of birth and address for ‘data protection purposes’ when they call you, or they won’t even tell you what the call is about.

How are people supposed to understand what is OK to give out and what isn’t when these details, often used as security questions are somehow fine?

GistNoesis• 7 years ago

Something quite similar happened to a relative of mine this summer in France. A scammer impersonating bank support. He called Friday 16h30 mid holidays. He proposed to help reduce fees by disabling not needed options, while in fact he was triggering a text verification code. The text doesn't specify the reason for the request.

He got in. Then did a few other useless operations during 15 minutes that required email confirmation which state what they are requiring it for. Those had mainly two purposes : help lower the guard and provide cover for the initial false requests. He kept smooth talking explaining that because of the various changes they should expect the bank app not be available and that everything was normal. Then he went for the option which allows to activate instantaneous bank transfers which required both email and phone verification code.

My relative was about to read it to them, when his wife smelling something fishy was happening put me with him on the phone. He was so convinced that everything was normal that I almost can't convinced him to hang up. What did the trick was telling him : "hang up and call back the bank before continuing".

My relative thought he was safe because he never gave the password of the bank app, nor the web password. But for our bank, this 4-digit pin password you put in the phone app is not a real password it is just a per-device off-line password you pick upon first device use to disallow someone stealing your phone to have access to your bank account too easily.

After he hang up, and I succeeded to talk some sense into him. I convinced him to call his bank. It was past 17h00, so it was closed. I told him to call emergency security which he did. But the number is typically used for lost credit card ; so they did the only thing that they usually do : revoke credit card and send a new one. Which is basically useless because the scammer wasn't about to use the credit card number to buy something online but he was initiating some wire transfer via the app.

So I had him call again a few times reexplaining the problem more precisely, or at least told them to block wire transfer for the account. Maybe it succeeded to raise some red flags, but they always told him that they couldn't do anything and that he needed to wait till Monday. From their point of view, you can be the impersonator so they didn't told us they did anything.

He also sent an email to the local bank manager during the night.

Stressful week-end lock-out of all bank accounts information goes by. The bank app is kind of deceitful because sometimes when it doesn't succeed in connecting shows you the last available data like it would in off-line mode and you think you are connected OK but you are not.

Monday they could reach the bank have the hack acknowledged and investigated ; access to accounts restored and password changed ; no harm done (except for the inconvenience of not having a credit card during the holiday, and info leaked) ; Luck.

stakhanov2• 7 years ago

Go to the police? Let us know how that works out for you. I did that once, after a highly credible phishing attempt (that, ultimately, I did not fall for). This was in Germany.

Me: Here is what happened to me, I'd like to file a police report.

Police: Well, with these internet scams, the fraudster is usually in another country, meaning we can't really do anything about it.

Me: They used perfect German, used information that I only ever provided into a non-public database of a German-based business that must have had a breach of some sort. The fraudster also used pictures of apartments in Germany that must have been taken here.

Police: Well, still. The person actually doing all of that could have been doing all of that from another country. Usually Russia or China or something.

Me [thinking to myself]: Yeah, Russia, or China, or some country where law enforcement generally presumes, even against all evidence, that any and all cybercrime is happening outside their jurisdiction and therefore not doing any law enforcement at all when it comes to cybercrime. Like what is happening right here right now.

Me: Well, I realize that nobody is going to start an investigation into this specific thing that happened here, but still: Isn't anyone at least compiling a database so that, once patterns become bigger and more apparent, an investigation of sorts may become warranted, etc?

Police: Nope. Nobody doing that. You can file a report. But I can tell you right now that nobody is going to look at it or do anything with it. Also, we kind of have more important things to do, here at the station. I mean: It's your choice. I can't stop you. Just telling you how it is.

Me: Okay, thank you, goodbye.

ccozan• 7 years ago

Thinking of this I would have continued like:

Me: are you confirming that if I start a scam you will not investigate it?

Police:...?

Me: Ok , then thanks a lot, I know now.

Police: umm, wait maybe..

missinglink12• 7 years ago

Exactly

0xffff24• 7 years ago

Of course the local police department isn't likely to investigate it. That doesn't mean no one is.

juped• 7 years ago

This is an uninsightful comment. You go to the police to get the report.

mschuster913• 7 years ago

File a written criminal complaint directly with the Staatsanwaltschaft, bypass the incompetent morons at the police.

Faark• 7 years ago

The good old self-reinforcing loop...

It's not a prevalent issue -> We won't do anything -> You filing a report will be just a waste of time -> Statistics show it's not a prevalent issue

yellow_lead• 7 years ago

Unfortunately with spoofed numbers it is, from what I've heard, incredibly difficult to track. The carrier that terminated the call to your carrier is likely not the originating carrier (the one that initiated the call) so it could involve subpoenas to many carriers to find the originator, which you then have to subpoena for the customer information.

dependenttypes5• 7 years ago

The police is more busy trying to catch victimless crimes instead of going after scams which have real victims. If you search for "fake dna test online" for example you will find a lot of relevant results even in the first page of google.

Kneecaps07• 7 years ago

Yeah, that's kind of what I've expected. However, having the police report often helps when dealing with the bank if there is any real fraudulent activity. It shows them you're serious.

rawfan• 7 years ago

I had the exact opposite experience. The DAs office eventually called me to tell me that they didn't catch the perps but were able to kill the phone-number blocks which they had been using for years because no one ever reported them.

Sometimes cops are just lazy (or assholes). When thieves tried to steal the rain gutter from the appartment building on the other side of the road, the cops told me "don't expect us to rush in with sirens and screeching tyres", even after I told them the thieves were still there, in broad daylight.

Later my landlords told me they lost 50k Euros in the previous year because of stolen rain gutters.

trumbitta2• 7 years ago

Since we also discussing personal strategies:

- when you answer the call, stay completely silent: some systems will automatically hang up after a few seconds

- I never say the word "Yes" if I don't know the caller, so that they can't record it and use it in some scam contracts. Yes, vocal consent is a thing in some countries.

dillonmckay• 7 years ago

I don’t stay silent, I will either make caveman grunting noises, push some random digits, or ask for ‘Mom?’ in a fake accent.

And then they hang up.

koolba• 7 years ago

Never, never, never trust inbound phone calls.

devchix• 7 years ago

I'm sorry, I'm missing something between

Me: <gives member number> (that number, by itself, is useless).

and

Once I gave my member number, the attacker used the password reset flow to trigger a text message from the bank. > They used this to gain access to the account.

What happened here? How does an exposed useless member number trigger a password reset? Would the reset request not have come to an email account, presumably a well-protected one?

elyobo• 7 years ago

Would the reset request not have come to an email account, presumably a well-protected one?

Not in this case (and not in many); verifying access to a phone number is also common and apparently was an option for this bank.

invalidusernam3• 7 years ago

I might be wrong, but I think the fraudster used the member number (which is basically the online banking login username) to perform a password reset on the banks website. The website sends a confirmation code via SMS, which would be used for 2 factor auth to reset the password.

But I also don't understand is: did OP give this number to the fraudster? And even if they did, I would assume the bank would send a second SMS to confirm the password reset. I don't know how it went from "useless" member number to access to the account so quickly. Maybe I'm completely wrong

jawns• 7 years ago

Yes, OP gave this number to the fraudster, not realizing it was a password reset authorization code. OP thought it was a code that established that the person they were speaking with was a legitimate representative of the bank, since they had the power to generate a code that came from the bank.

magashna2• 7 years ago

I've often seen that a password reset completion will trigger an email notification, but not a second 2FA verification to confirm.

bjt2n3904• 7 years ago

So here's a problem with banking "2FA". It's not clear what the number they send you by SMS is used for.

My Gmail account has 2FA. The token is only used for login. If anyone asks me for it over the phone, there's only one reason.

Banks use 2FA sometimes at login, sometimes over the phone, and sometimes to authorize transactions. That should be made transparent in the message, but it usually isn't.

Imagine: "Your temporary pin for identity verification is 373123, and expires in 5 minutes."

"Your temporary pin to authorize a transfer for an amount ending in $xxx4.23 is 522185 and expires in 5 minutes."

Lycake• 7 years ago

My bank here in Germany does exactly this. The message I get is something along the lines of "Here is your authorization code for transaction number XXX for 5€ to RECIPIENT issued at 14:23: 12345"

1023bytes• 7 years ago

2FA is now mandatory in the EU with recent banking regulations (PSD2)

manigandham• 7 years ago

Mobile apps from banks have eliminated my phone communications. I get real-time notifications for every transaction and can report anything myself through the app. No more risk of scams like these.

DoubleGlazing• 7 years ago

I think it's interesting to see how hard we've worked on making the web secure by adding all sorts of checks and protocols, but we've neglected to do the same with basic telecoms.

When I first started using web based communication platforms like Twitter and Nexmo I was really surprised to learn that I could put anything in the from field when sending a text message. All I could think was that it was a weakness that was ripe for abuse.

I believe there was a case in Germany a few years back where a group of phishers had online banking login details for several hundred users but couldn't initiate transfers without entering a PIN sent to the account holders phone via SMS. So the phishers set up a fake telephone company so that they could issue SS7 commands and have the account holders phone's temporarily redirected to another number where the PIN could be intercepted.

I think there is a false assumption amongst many people that the telephone system is inherently secure. Stuff like the above and all the robo calls coming from false numbers should warn otherwise.

dgudkov• 7 years ago

From the Twitter thread:

"Never answer your phone. Seriously. Only use it to make outbound calls. You cannot trust caller ID, and you should never answer unscheduled inbound calls."

Makes sense. Phone calls as they are can no longer be used for security verification. Just can't.

slackpad• 7 years ago

I saw a variant of this where they used a very similar script but the text came from Apple. They were attempting to add the card to Apple Pay so they could easily use my stolen card number in physical stores.

jonathanstrange• 7 years ago

The simple measure against any such attacks - whether online online, on the phone, or in person - is to end the communication and then contact the bank yourself in the way you would do it normally.

abstractbarista• 7 years ago

Nice trick. I commend it. However my hard rule is to simply never continue incoming calls.

If it really is a serious situation, they'll just have to chill until I call back to a verified number.

As far as I'm aware, this will stop all attacks like this. Unless they've hacked the phone network and can reroute my calls? :)

q5jwB6bD• 7 years ago

This happened to my wife a few months ago. I heard her part of the conversation. We thought something was wrong. I logged in to my bank account and watched the money drain out of our join account. My wife couldn't login to her account (the phisher changed the password) but they drained all her accounts. I called our bank within the hour. They were very reasonable with resolving the issue and returning our money. The phisher was attempting to purchase gift cards from a Walmart 500 miles away. It was easy to prove to the bank that we were scammed. I hope others are just as lucky and can report it in time.

ninja edit: we called and froze our credit immediately

soheil• 7 years ago

Why is this the most sophisticated “phishing” attempt if they’ve already hacked your bank account?

JTbane• 7 years ago

This seems like a big problem, since my bank's SMS codes don't specify why they are sending it:

"This is a verification code from [bank]. Enter online at prompt or in password field w/in 30 minutes."

Nowhere does it mention the purpose, or to NOT read the code over the phone under any circumstances.

stordoff3• 7 years ago

My bank starts with "SECURITY ALERT: NEVER REVEAL THIS CODE TO ANYONE" and ends with "Contact us if you didn't request it".

cpuguy832• 7 years ago

Same exact thing happened to me. They claimed to be from PayPal. About half way through the ordeal I caught wind of it thankfully.

kovek• 7 years ago

A few bits about me: Wells Fargo is the bank I use, I post things on Craigslist and list my phone number, and T-Mobile is my mobile phone provider.

I almost always get text messages from numbers trying to scam me into receiving their check or giving them my G-Voice verification code.

I looked into the phone numbers that contacted me and it's difficult to find exactly who is trying to reach me.

A few things I learned:

- Apparently phone number spoofing has legitimate use cases so it is a "feature" that is do-able. I was asking different companies and they said for example: checking for domestic violence or checking on someone if they have a second spouse somehow.

- It is difficult to look-up online who is the caller and what mobile provider do they use.

- Some private companies have an internal database that contains the information. I asked one company and they told me what was the provider of the phone number.

- Spoofing makes it difficult to know where the actual call is coming from. Someone can use my mom's number to call me. It might be difficult for my phone provider to inspect the call further than what I would see on my phone already.

What I'd like:

- For T-Mobile not to forward to me calls that are known to be from fraudulous callers or thought to be from fraudulous callers.

- Know if T-Mobile can provide me with information on where the call is coming from.

- After I identify what company XYZ issued the phone number, or what company provided the telephone service to the fraudsters, ask them more information on the caller.

- Ask such company XYZ to stop routing these calls to me.

- Create a resource such that whenever there is a scam call coming in, we could send the number to such a resource, and discover what company BCD issued them a phone number and routed their call. I believe that once this company BCD knows about their fraudulent customers, it is supposed to not do business with them.

Hopefully with such steps, the situation should clear up over time.

dboreham3• 7 years ago

Reading this thread reminds me of when I was subject to a social engineering attack by people who claimed to be the FBI. The voice messages they left sounded unconvincing so I ignored them on the basis the real FBI would have better ways to contact me.

Couple days later two FBI agents show up in my driveway asking why I didn't respond to their voicemail..

AnIdiotOnTheNet2• 7 years ago

Well, you weren't wrong.

onychomys• 7 years ago

Or maybe it was just super persistent scammers dressed like FBI agents!

rcurry• 7 years ago

I got hit by the exact same type of attack about two months ago, except it was against my Verizon Wireless account. I was surprised at how convincing they were - I'm a former intelligence guy and I almost fell for it, lol.

hartator• 7 years ago

Technically they gain access to his accounts but couldn’t do a transfer. So it was successful in my book.

jimsug2• 7 years ago

Interestingly the most... clever, if not necessarily convincing, phishing attempt I've heard of, went like this:

1. Phishers call someone and pretend to be from their bank. If they've guessed the right bank and the person gives away their details, they win!

2. If they don't, and question the phishers authenticity, the scammers say "sure, just call us on the number on the back of your card".

3. The cardholder hangs up, and then dials the number for their bank, which they know and trust, because they've called it before or it's come from their card.

4. They get connected to a service representative, answer security questions, confirm that the transactions are valid, and then can relax.

5. A few days later, they get a call from their bank saying there's a whole lot of fraud on the account.

The trick to this one is that the phishers (a) call the cardholder on a landline and (b) when the cardholder thinks they've hung up, they haven't - the phishers just play a hook tone and then a dial tone.

In Australia at least (not sure about elsewhere?) if you call a landline number, the caller must end the call, or at least it used to be that way (I haven't owned a landline phone for a _long_ time. There's probably also a significant skew towards the elderly in landline owners, and in susceptibility to scam calls.

xycodex• 7 years ago

I don’t understand how they were able to get the actual transactions, which op verified as correct

vagab0nd• 7 years ago

Unrelated question: I went to my bank for a wire transfer. And I was horrified to find out that after verifying my info, they had full access to the same web interface I use, with my accounts. They even showed it to me, asking me which account I'd like the money to go out from. Is it common for banks to grant this kind of access to employees?

wyldfire• 7 years ago

3) "We've sent a verification pin to your phone."
~ Gets verification pin text from bank's regular number ~
Me: <reads out the pin>

I think I'd be able to stop them and refuse at this step. But I suppose it depends on what sort of text shows up in the verification SMS message.

sacado2• 7 years ago

Well that's brillant, up to the moment when the ask for the PIN code.

peterwwillis• 7 years ago

Nit-pick: Phishing is sending out e-mails and hoping someone responds with private info. Vishing is phishing via voicemail. Calling someone up and using an elaborate set of mental tricks to gain unauthorized access is social engineering.

Many fun stories here: https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=social+engineer...

jonnycomputer• 7 years ago

I don't understand how step 4 was achieved. How did they get a list of recent transactions? Or does the password reset functionality ask you to verify certain transactions?

jokoon• 7 years ago

Number 1 rule of banking and other services, they NEVER ask for your password or other authentication code. Usually I don't even think they would contact you by email or by phone.

If they really suspect a fraud, they would block your account, and eventually ask for a meeting.

whalesalad• 7 years ago

A rover scammer called my wife yesterday. She felt pretty quick that it was a scam.

I tried to call the number back from my phone (it was seemingly a regular local phone number in the LA area and I love fucking with scammers) and an automated response told me that “no Rover account could be found for my number, please visit Rover.com/help for more” which I thought was very sophisticated of them to really try and prove authenticity.

So then we called it back, from her phone, and it connected right away. The person on the other end said, “Ashley?” and I responded (in my non-female voice, not that there aren’t many men named Ashley) “yes, hello, how are you?” - they hung up immediately.

Ultimately my wife called Rover via their 1-800 number and it was indeed a scam. People try to ascertain your login creds to redirect funds. Basic stuff... but I was impressed at whatever basic twilio system was built to try and mask the scamminess with that automated message.

Yhippa• 7 years ago

Something nearly exactly the same happened to me. It was through my Venmo account. I was stressed at the end of a long day and they got pretty far before I realized what happened. The key thing is that the number listed on Caller ID on my Android phone came from "Venmo" and matched their customer service number so I completely let my guard down. Embarrassing.

ttul• 7 years ago

This is really an asymmetric authentication problem. The bank has ways of authenticating that it’s you talking, but do you have ways of authenticating that it’s really the bank?

RocketSyntax• 7 years ago

Yikes. Can't believe you gave out your PIN. The member number by itself is not useless... it's half of the login credentials.

erva• 7 years ago

My wife had the same thing happen to her but luckily our bank clearly says that this is a password reset pin code (don't share with anyone) type of message along with the pin code in the SMS. So, my wife refused to give it to the person on the phone.

A better sms password reset flow would be to first send a text asking "A password reset has been initiated. Was this you? Reply: YES or NO". Then after a YES confirmation they send the reset code along with the same big "Don't share with anyone on the phone" message.

jbombadil• 7 years ago

I don’t understand why banks don’t add the reason for the text in the text itself. This could have been detected earlier if the text said “Here’s the code for the password reset you asked for: ______”

jakedub4d2• 7 years ago

Anyone can be a victim. Thank you for sharing!

ivanb• 7 years ago

There is a wave of these exact scams in Russia right now.

citizenpaul• 7 years ago

No US bank will ever ask for a password/PIN so i'm not sure why this is any more credible than any other attempt. It is just a little longer getting to the point.

Scammers have been triggering password resets and 2factor to seem legit for long as it has existed.

I was just subjected to the most credible phishing attempt I’ve experienced

Related Stories