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vec

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If you're unable to set a consistent cookie across your user's many sessions (especially for a high retention business like e-commerce), or your javascript conversion events (Google Tag Manager for example) are being blocked, your user's historical behavior will be extremely difficult to stitch together over time.

Yes, that is in fact the point.

Look, I know there are strong financial incentives to build individual user profiles and doing it this way may not violate the letter of the law, but it sure as hell violates the spirit. If we ask a user if they're willing to be tracked and they do everything in their power to tell us no then I'm not sure how comfortable we should be doing it anyway.

Of course people have different risk appetites, including poor people.

The point isn't so much about "risk" per se, it's about whether or not there's a viable Plan B.

If I'm working two jobs to barely keep a roof over my head and play the lotto and lose, I'm still keeping a roof over my head (by working two jobs). The odds are long, but the cost of failure is low.

If, on the other hand, I have the Best Startup Idea Ever (and all the necessary skills to make it a reality) then I will still be unable to pursue it. Sure, I'm like 80% certain it's going to be a huge success, but in the 20% case I'm fuuuuuuuuucked so taking a swing at it is a nonstarter.

Presumably they are doing something during that week; namely code reviewing all the patches in front of yours in the queue.

Don't get me wrong. I, too, wish that other developers would drop whatever they're doing on demand to prioritize my immediate needs. I would also prefer that they waive their normal security concerns because, after all, I already know that I am trustworthy. I've got enough self awareness not to publish a blog post about it, though.

So capture dozens of messages. Better yet, capture dozens of symlinks to make it trivial for me to review the messages in the original context.

The point is, I've already had a long, sprawling, disjointed conversation with the interested party. Don't expect someone to do manual data entry that will never actually be kept current enough to be useful, and don't force me to have the same conversation twice.

It should be as invisible as possible.

I discuss an issue with someone on Slack or over email or whatever. I can invoke some magic command in band to capture the surrounding conversation and create a reference number. I can then cite that reference in code comments or commit messages. When my CI server deploys the fix, it automatically informs the other participants in the same channel the issue was created from.

The last thing I want is yet another browser tab with another separate inbox to maintain. Interact with me entirely over the channels that I already budget attention to.

My wife owns and operates a private medical practice (she's an audiologist), and it's insane the way she has to do billing and accounts receivable.

When a patient asks about prices she quotes them her standard price for the necessary services and calls their insurance company to confirm that the patient is covered and check what kind of copay the patient needs to pay. Assuming the patient is satisfied with the results of that call she provides the services, bills the patient for their copay, and files a claim with their insurance company.

Several months later (and no real way to predict when), the insurance company will provide an "offer" for probably somewhere around 60% of the quoted price (though this varies dramatically as well). She can accept the offer, in which case she's inevitably required by the terms to eat the difference instead of attempting to collect the balance from the patient. Or she can reject it and attempt to collect from the patient, in which case they will likely be very confused and angry as to why their insurance isn't being accepted, despite her explicitly confirming that it would be covered before they purchased her services.

To be clear, none of this is negotiated or agreed upon in any meaningful sense. She doesn't have any special relationship with any insurance provider. Instead, the providers use their massive power differential to dictate terms. She wouldn't be able to stay in business if she didn't accept at least some insurance, but they'd be quite happy to never write her another check.

She knows what her price schedule for everything is, but it doesn't end up mattering that much since she doesn't know when or how much she'll ultimately be reimbursed except in an extremely broad aggregate sense. The worst part is that she has to dramatically overprice her services so that she can ultimately get adequately reimbursed to keep the lights on, which just ends up hurting the patients who don't have insurance.

Power plant doesn't just mean fixed electrical generation plant. There's probably a gas-fired power plant in your car, for example. And you're correct that the main place fuel oil is price-competitive is in transportation, but that's less a story about cars and more one about the massive amounts of extremely dirty bunker fuel consumed by marine shipping vessels.

Even with electrical generation it's a mixed bag. The recent US fracking boom has also dramatically lowered the prices for natural gas. Natural gas burns cleaner than coal, so to the extent it's pushing us away from coal consumption it's serving to buy us some time. But it's still desequestering carbon, which means we're still going to need to stop well before we run out of available natural gas to burn.

That's exactly backwards. Cheaper oil will lower the operating costs of power plants that use oil as a fuel, which raises the bar that newer technologies will have to clear to be comparatively more efficient, which will in turn slows the rate of adoption for renewables.

CO2 emissions are cumulative, and there's far more CO2 still sequestered in as-yet-unburned fossil fuels than even the rosiest estimates say our atmosphere could safely absorb. That implies that we're going to have to leave some sizable fraction of our planet's remaining oil in the ground, permanently.

From a long term betterment of the species standpoint, what we really want to be seeing is the global supply of oil starting to taper off and costs per barrel drifting slowly but steadily upward.

It does. There's no free market for soup kitchens for the homeless, for example.

There exist entities who are willing to provide soup kitchen services below operating costs in perpetuity (i.e. charitably, for free). The price for services is kept artificially low ($0) by constant infusions of capital from outside the market (charitable donations), which prevents for-profit vendors who don't receive constant cash infusions from being able to compete on a level playing field. The resulting market is thereby warped by the distorting influence from non-market forces, preventing it from operating efficiently. It's not "free", in the technical sense.

This isn't necessarily a bad thing, to be clear. The charitable funding system may well provide better aggregate social outcomes than a free market would for any number of reasons, not the least of which being that one of the freedoms that "free market" implies is the freedom for vendors to decide that some of their potential customers are more trouble than they're worth to serve.

This kind of system is more or less impossible in the US and it would be extremely expensive.

That's literally how Social Security works, and the fact that more guest workers pay payroll taxes into the system than are eligible to collect benefits from it actually makes it slightly cheaper than it would otherwise be.

As I understand it, we have a relatively small number of people with serious or chronic illnesses whose normal, predictable healthcare expenses will drastically and permanently outstrip their realistic ability to pay. The only way they will ever be able to receive treatment is on someone else's dime, one way or another. And because everyone involved knows they're going to cost more to treat than they can pay then no sane insurer will willingly cover them if they have a choice in the matter.

As far as I can tell the main difference between the socialized food insurance we already have and the socialized medical insurance I'd like us to have is that subsistence level food costs are uniformly low for everyone whereas subsistence level medical costs vary wildly from person to person.

True, but that's subtly different than the point I'm trying to make.

Imagine your hypothetical were reversed. Imagine we already had a network toll roads priced at an average of $5/100 miles, and that we had a plan to build and maintain public roads at an expected cost of $1/100 miles. There might be plenty of good reasons not to prefer the more efficient public plan, but the fact that it would put toll road vendors out of business isn't one of them.

Capitalists don't mindlessly prefer private things just because they're private. We like them because they tend to self-optimize for efficiency more effectively than a centrally managed system can. Usually. There are a whole thread's worth of reasons to believe health care is one of the exceptions, both in theory and in practice. If that's the case, then refusing to implement a superior public system solely because it would decimate the inferior private one is just another flavor of the same anticompetitive protectionist bullshit that makes tarrifs and professional licensing and restrictive zoning and a dozen other types of cronyism distasteful.

I don't dispute that the current status quo emerged as a direct result of government intervention. Again, I agree with you that it can be traced back to WWII era wage controls.

My claim is that, once established, the resulting equilibrium is economically stable. Your claim, as I understand it, is that it's not.

Given that the price controls that we agree created the current status quo were replaced by significantly less coercive tax incentives decades ago and to the best of my knowledge the industry hasn't attempted to realign away from employer-provided insurance since then, I don't see a reason to privilege your hypothesis over mine.

We can't say the prisoners chose to enter the gulags of their own free will, though. Since freedom of contract requires all parties to enter into the agreement consentually, that means that the market for gulag laborers is not free.

The US governent does create incentives which change the optimal behavior of rational actors in the health insurance market, but those actors still have very broad latitude to respond to those incentives as they see fit. That's not perfect economic freedom, but it's a lot closer to it than the systems most other countries use. It also gets noticeably worse results on a broad variety of metrics than the systems most other countries use. Make of that what you will.

Offering insurance as compensation started during WWII when wages were frozen by the government.

Absolutely true, and those regulations haven't been in effect for the better part of a century now.

If you want to argue that long-discontinued government programs can entrench systems that continue to produce market distortions today then I'm happy to agree with you, but that's the exact stated rationale for the broad suite of civil rights regulations that in my experience most libertarians oppose on economic freedom grounds. I don't think you get to have it both ways.

There is also the fact that employer-provided insurance is almost entirely untaxed.

Again, true. But I think you're drastically underestimating how beneficial it is to an insurer to cover groups of mostly healthy people (i.e. a company's entire labor force) instead of groups of mostly sick people (i.e. those most motivated to acquire private health insurance).

In order for the market for healthcare to be truly free, in the sense you're describing, medical professionals would need to be willing to consistently refuse service to people who can't pay, which is frequently in violation of their professional ethics. Since that (entirely private and voluntary) market distortion isn't going away any time soon, insurers who can find other mechanisms to incentivize relatively healthy people to contribute to the risk pool can provide the same coverage at a lower cost per person.

That means that, tax incentive or no, insuring a broad cross section of mostly healthy people as a group is always going to be cheaper than insuring them individually. And the more healthy people can be incentivized to sign up, the cheaper it becomes for all participants, which gives whoever is making decisions on behalf of the group an incentive to encourage as much of their potential pool to participate as they can. The taxes reinforce this system, but it would still be self-perpetuating without them.

A) Right. We have universal single payer food insurance, also known as taxpayer funded welfare for the poor. We're in essence covered by, and paying premiums to, a mandatory State-run insurance policy such that if we ever can't afford the minimum necessary food to survive the State will (at least in theory) step in and buy it for us from the open market.

B) Let me rephrase. I'm not going to wake up one day to find that my required daily calorie intake has increased by multiple orders of magnitude. There are very few household budgets that could reasonably be expected to absorb such a shock, no matter how efficiently the market for those calories functions.

A) We do have socialized food insurance. That's literally what EBT is.

B) I'm not going to wake up in the morning to discover that my expected annual food costs have suddenly increased by four or five orders of magnitude. There is no budget-conscious version of a lot of non-emergency, but still lifesaving, medical care.

It doesn't always have to work out, it just has to work out in the aggregate. The bar that the existing private insurance regime has set for discouraging wasteful medical tests isn't exactly high, though.

It's also worth pointing that what you're describing is an illusion of efficiency arising from Medicare implicitly pushing costs off onto non-Medicare patients. That wouldn't be able to happen if there weren't any non-Medicare patients.

Gee, that sure does sound like a private dispute between you and your employer to me. If you want to opt out of your company's health care plan then you're more than welcome to go attempt to negotiate with your manager about raising your salary by the amount of their health care contribution. Best of luck to you.

This works reasonably well for things like vision care because they're entirely opt-in. Patients who aren't satisfied with the prices they're being quoted can realistically choose to keep wearing glasses instead.

No one in their right mind is going to decide that the going rate for chemotherapy is a little steep right now so they're going to sit with the cancer for a year or two and see if the prices come down.

We do not have a free market. Most people get their health insurance from their employer - you cannot reasonably get insurance elsewhere

What you are describing are in fact the freest parts of the health insurance market.

Employers, quite rationally and of their own free will, choose to offer health insurance as a benefit because it attracts and retains talent better than other similarly priced incentives. The fact that you're hesitant to take a leave reveals that it's working.

Insurance companies, quite rationally and of their own free will, choose to offer steep discounts to purchasers who buy for a large group of people instead of just one or two. It reduces their marketing costs and gets them a better balance between sick and healthy clients.

You, quite rationally and of your own free will, choose to both accept your employer's offer of discounted insurance and to remain at your position longer than you would otherwise prefer to maintain that insurance coverage. In fact, the only thing you foresee changing the status quo and allowing you to retire at all is when you become entitled to benefits from the state in the form of Medicare.

Nothing in the phrase "free market" implies the resulting equilibrium won't conspire to limit an individual consumer's choices.

If the private system provides value, it will likely survive.

And if it doesn't survive, good! Industries don't have an inherent right to keep existing if they don't fill some useful function. Refusing to implement an otherwise desirable social program because it might cause an existing industry to become obsolete is far and away the most anti-capitalist argument I see self avowed capitalists make.

Because it's not everyone paying for everyone's health care, it's one entity paying for everyone's health care (using funds they get from everyone).

That one entity can unilaterally refuse to do business with abusive vendors. They can negotiate for lower prices. They can notice and investigate discrepancies in pricing between similar cases. They are in a position to judge which types of care are and are not cost effective and can refuse to cover the latter.

So that explains why having an insurance company helps, but it doesn't explain why a private insurance company can't perform the same role. For that, we have to introspect a little into how insurance firms work.

An insurance company is, in essence, a mechanism for transferring funds from lucky people to unlucky ones. If your car gets totaled then, in essence, a bunch of other people with working vehicles have all volunteered to chip in a couple of bucks toward buying you a new one. The insurer is mostly facilitating the transfer and skimming just enough off in the process to cover their administrative costs.

The private insurance market works well enough for most types of property because the volunteers can't predict in advance whether they're going to be lucky or not and because there's a realistic upper bound on how much money the unlucky ones will need to be made whole. Neither of these assumptions are true for healthcare. Many people were born into pre-crashed cars, to stretch the metaphor, and at least for the foreseeable future it's not possible to decide to replace a body instead of attempting to repair it.

So we need* some non-market mechanism to incentivize or compel insurance companies to cover the already unlucky: people with pre-existing conditions. But that introduces a new problem. The lucky people are being asked to volunteer to chip in more, and at least some of them will stop volunteering. That causes the prices to go up even more, which causes a few more volunteers to leave, which causes the prices to go up again, and so on. Pretty soon there's no volunteers left to transfer funds from.

So we also need* some non-market mechanism to incentivize or compel healthy people to contribute to our insurance system. And with those two requirements (needs to cover everyone and everyone needs to contribute) we are left with a problem space that the State is really the only entity with the ability to implement a solution. It doesn't have to be socialized medicine, per se, but it does basically have to be big government of one stripe or another.

\* Yes, we do technically have the option of compelling innocent people to suffer and die from otherwise treatable diseases that they're not wealthy enough to afford to cover out of their own pocket. If you're aware of that fact and comfortable with it then okay, but please do understand that it is the societal tradeoff that we would have to make to avoid some sort of serious state involvement in provisioning medical care.

Exhibit A for why "free market healthcare" is an oxymoron.

I have yet to hear a coherent explanation for how anyone can reasonably expect for price discovery to even pretend to function in a market where the consumers can't even guess the prices until after they've already purchased and frequently couldn't reasonably be expected to refuse service even if they did believe it was overpriced.

People are scared of hosting their own SMTP server because hosting an SMTP server is woefully insufficient for actually having mass mailings reliably delivered.

The hard part isn't actually sending the mail, the hard part is staying abreast of the already long and perpetually growing list of legitimacy signals you need to send to reassure understandably paranoid SMTP clients that they shouldn't mark your newsletter as spam. And you're not done even when the server is set up and configured properly; it doesn't take more than a handful of ignored complaints to start getting added to blacklists.

It's not difficult, per se, but it is a huge time investment for a service that centralized vendors can provide extremely cheaply because of economies of scale.

I'm all for moving toward decentralization too, but we're not going to get there from here if we don't understand and respect the incentives that lead people toward centralization in the first place.

If we as a society are OK with qualified law enforcement looking the other way, then we're OK with passing the buck to the unqualified.

You're excluding the admittedly somewhat bleak but still quite plausible third alternative: we as a society are in practice OK with this class of crime going largely unprosecuted.

The legitimate authorities are resource constrained, the political process isn't prepared to allocate sufficient resources to change that, and the societal costs of allowing vigilanteism and extrajudicial punishment are broadly believed to outstrip the scope of the problem they would ostensibly be solving. This leads to an equilibrium where a lot of petty theft goes unpunished and we, as a society, are in practice content to accept it that way.