There is a difference between what anyone can do and what everyone can do at the same time. Some people could always choose alternative life paths, but that option was not available for the majority.
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jltsiren
Why would anyone choose subsistence grain agriculture when literally anything else was available.
There was nothing else available. If you were born in an agricultural settlement, that was probably the only lifestyle you knew. Even if you knew other ways to sustain yourself, all land was already taken. Settled regions were too densely populated, and the lands beyond them were claimed by indigenous peoples. If you wanted to migrate there, the best option was to go in sufficient numbers and start a new defensible settlement.
Middle-Eastern farmers started migrating into Europe ~9k years ago, and they reached the British Isles and Scandinavia ~6k years ago. The population that reached the British Isles was ~80% Middle-Eastern and 20% Indigenous European by ancestry.
If you are basing your claims on Against the Grain, Scott focuses on early centralized states, which emerged thousands of years after agriculture and towns.
Such states were by definition exceptional. Most of them were in regions, where rainfall alone was insufficient, and agriculture dependend on irrigation. Such a dependence on centralized infrastructure favored state formation, but it also made the communities fragile. Local population collapses were common everywhere, but the fragility made them worse. When the irrigation infrastructure failed, harvests failed, the town failed, and the survivors dispersed.
But agriculture spread long before states. Where the local conditions were favorable, agricultural communities naturally had a surplus of labor. If there was unclaimed land available, landless men and women would occasionally split from the community and start a new one. That was the primary mechanism of the spread of agriculture.
That's what I meant by "largely stopped existing". With the decline of agriculture, there was a major decline in food production and therefore a major decline in population.
When archaeological evidence shows that people largely stopped farming, it usually means that those people largely stopped existing. Or at least living in that area. Apart from a few rare exceptions, agriculture is the only viable way to support substantial populations.
Farming came first, and with it came larger communities and higher population density. That led to surplus, which enabled elites and other forms of existence beyond basic subsistence. And that lifestyle mostly spread organically. Not because the agricultural elites didn't try to conquer hunter-gatherer societies, but because there were so few hunter-gatherers to conquer. Conquered lands were mostly farmed by descendants of farmers from neighboring regions, because they formed the majority of the population.
There is not much difference between the US and Europe in that. In the Nordic countries, children move out earlier, while multi-generational households are more common in Southern Europe.
You could also say that English is an awful language, because the spelling and the pronunciation have diverged too far. But it's the international lingua franca in most contexts, because it's the international lingua franca in most contexts.
People use Bash as the default shell for scripting, because people use Bash as the default shell for scripting. If you want to replace it, you should pick a winner and discourage the use of alternatives, especially when they are better than Bash. So don't say "use something more sane, like PowerShell or nushell". Say something like "use PowerShell, or Bash if you really have to for legacy purposes, but never use nushell for any reason" instead.
Ireland is not in Schengen, so you were doing an international-to-international transfer. You normally don't have to go through immigration and customs for those, unless there are specific legal requirements or the airport is poorly organized.
In my experience, the airports could handle the passenger volume, but they lack the people. I've entered the US 25–30 times, and almost every time, there have been long lines and empty immigration counters.
One of the key skills of a professor is asking the right questions. Figuring out something worth working on, and then framing it in an appropriate way and asking questions that allow someone with specific tools and skills to make progress in the topic. Usually the tools and skills are those available to a new student, but working with an LLM is similar.
That skill comes with experience. Most people don't have it immediately after PhD.
Its more about where you want to live.
I'm not familiar with the situation in San Francisco. But in Santa Cruz, the cost to own with a 20% down payment is ~50% higher than the rent for the same unit. If you can't afford a substantially higher down payment, you're not really in the market for a home.
With $7k/month after tax, you would probably be renting an 1br, or maybe a cheap 2br. But your income is not high enough to buy anything, unless you start looking for homes well outside the town.
International comparisons are tricky, and you should always check the data definitions carefully.
The first metric on that page is household income divided by the square root of household size. That has some unreasonable consequences. For example, if housing is unaffordable, children live longer with their parents, and measured income is higher.
The second metric measures either net income or consumption, depending on the country and the year. It takes taxes, benefits, and purchasing power into account but fails to consider savings and subsidized services.
Because AI doesn't have the factional conflicts or interpersonal issues that humans do.
All the factional conflicts are in there, and there are also plenty of reports of people getting weird / toxic / passive aggressive responses from AI.
Because the model is trained with everything, you can in principle get anything out of it. You want to get an answer based on all the right things, while keeping all the wrong things suppressed. But it's easy to get something less than ideal, due to the specifics of training, harnesses, context, prompts etc.
In Finland, the government and the universities negotiate on how funding will be allocated between the fields. STEM fields are generally easy to get in, while places in arts, humanities, and social sciences are more limited. When I was a student, cultural anthropology had the reputation as the hardest field to get in, with the acceptance rate usually around 2%.
At least a decade ago the system was anything but fair. The income threshold for repayment was low, while the interest rate was very high. At that point, the expectation was that those who got an average job after graduation would pay an extra 10% income tax for 30 years, after which the debt would be forgiven. Those with good jobs would pay off the debt quickly enough, and they would pay much less overall for their education.
Things are already much better than they used to be. The 2003 heatwave killed ~70k. This year's heatwave was worse, but the number of deaths probably didn't go much beyond 20k.
I've spent more time in the Andes than in Lima. The Quechua are clearly an indigenous group, but they have been forced to adopt most of the European cultural package. If you travel in Russia, you can find many ethnic groups in similar situations.
Ignore the political aspects for now and focus on culture. And feel free to use "Roman" if "European" sounds wrong. But "Western" is wrong, because the same cultural sphere extends to Australia, New Zealand, and Russian Far East.
From my perspective, as someone from the Northern fringes of Europe, Latin American society and culture feel fundamentally familiar, while Middle East and North Africa don't. Out of the Latin American countries I'm most familiar with, Peru feels more European and Chile more American. Peru feels more like an Old World country, while Chile used to be a sparsely populated frontier.
Europeans definitely don't view other Europeans as kin. They are foreigners with a lot of shared history and culture. Both World Wars were fought because Europeans saw other Europeans as fundamentally different.
All real negotiations are private. When politicians debate or negotiate in public, they inevitably start talking past each other to the general public.
Voting rituals would be a waste of time. The confirmation vote is not just about the President of the Commission but the entire package, including other major positions in the Commission and major policy directions. If no party has a majority, no candidate can hope to get majority support before the whole package has been agreed on.
That's how multi-party parliamentarism usually works. A minority is not allowed to choose the leader just because they are a slightly larger minority than the others.
Because no party has an outright majority, there are weeks of negotiations after the elections, as the parties try to find a compromise acceptable to a majority. Once a deal has been reached, the parliament votes to confirm it. If the vote fails, the parties return to negotiations.
Von der Leyen was chosen to head the Commission, because she was an acceptable compromise. All lead candidates had been tried before her, but all of them failed to obtain majority support in the negotiations.
Culturally, America is much closer now to Latin America or Asia.
That's an interesting statement. From my perspective, Latin America is clearly European, in the sense I understand the concept. It feels much like Russia. Major cities and densely populated regions are European, with local characteristics. But there are other cultures around, and they are dominant in some regions. And if you travel in fringe areas, you often find peoples that have not fully accepted the European cultural package.
I don't see Europeanness as something associated with specific ethnic groups or states. It's a cultural package that started spreading from the Roman Empire and was imposed upon different peoples at different times. Where I'm from, that happened ~800 years ago, though rural areas often kept to the old pagan ways until the 17th century. That time frame is not too different from what happened in the Americas.
At least 25% of us Americans have never had blood or ethnic ties with Europe.
African Americans make up around 15% of the US, Asian Americans around 7%, Arab Americans around 1.5%, and Native Americans around 2%.
Those are cultural identities. The average African American has ~20% European ancestry. Latin Americans vary by country and region of origin, but on the average, they have more European than Native American ancestry.
Payloads are expensive, because high-value businesses can outbid low-value ones. By the time there is enough launch capacity for low-value businesses, manufacturing improvements should have made launch vehicles even cheaper.
Or you could look at this from another perspective. The services enabled by infrastructure must be more valuable than the infrastructure itself to justify the investment.
In that scenario, most of the value would be in Starlink.
Launch vehicles have always been the cheap part in going to space. Payloads tend to be more expensive, and the actual value is in the services enabled by the payloads.
You have a few misconceptions.
The actual expectation is that after finishing PhD, you take a journeyman position, where you can practice the skills needed in an academic career and gradually gain independence while being mentored by a senior academic. Then, if you were successful, you get a permanent position. The postdoc path fails, as there is no clear path to a permanent position. The assistant professor path fails, because the funding system requires you to become a manager without sufficient experience.
European PhDs vary in duration. The most common system is 3+2+4 years for bachelor's + master's + PhD, which is not that different from the American 4+5 years for bachelor's + PhD. (Those are nominal durations, and actual studies usually take longer.)
In most European countries, a postdoc is a nice enough middle-class job. If you are interested in an academic career after finishing PhD, you have good chances of getting a postdoc position. The real bottleneck comes after the postdoc stage, as faculty positions are scarce in most European universities.
The US spends less on academic research than the OECD average. See, for example, https://ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb202326/academic-r-d-internatio...
From a European perspective, the most noticeable sign of this is the scarcity of postdocs at American universities. Some fields and individual labs are better funded, but on the average, the universities lean heavily on students doing the actual research.
Because there is less competition for jobs and grants. Europe spends more on academic research (as a fraction of GDP) than the US, but there are more people competing for the funding.
And the foundations of those statistical approaches are built on heuristics and shortcuts.
For example, sequencing instruments include base quality strings in the output. Base qualities are estimates how likely the instrument got each sequenced base right. But most people don't want to store that much noise, especially when the actual data is highly compressible. So the base qualities get quantized using more or less principled methods that seem to work well empirically.
Read aligners make similar estimates of how likely they got the correct alignment for each read. Those estimates are typically based on simplistic models and a number of assumptions. There are two main components in the estimate. One is based on comparing the primary alignment the aligner chose to the secondary alignments it also found. Another is an estimate that the aligner didn't find the correct alignment, because that part of the sequenced genome is too different from the reference. The latter is obviously handwavy. And the aligner cheats in the former. Because people don't want to wait 10x or 100x longer for better results, the aligner gives up early and estimates how good secondary alignments it might have found if it had actually done the work.
And then there is variant calling. At some point, the state-of-the-art callers were statistical. But then people got better results with neural networks. Or at least the results were empirically better.
I guess you had more of those people after the revolution.
Many combat veterans react to anything resembling gunfire and explosions. And you can add drone noise to that these days.
The strategic level is the level that matters.
In a video game, military forces fight other military forces and the stronger side wins. In the real world, a military force may choose to fight enemy forces, if it believes that's the best way to advance its goals. But if the enemy is clearly stronger, fighting it directly is probably counterproductive, and it may be more useful to hit softer targets instead.
US forces suffered limited casualties, but that wasn't particularly relevant. Iran realized quickly enough that engaging US forces directly wasn't an efficient way to use its resources. It targeted infrastructure such as oil refineries in Gulf States allied with the US and caused serious enough damage to steer the course of the war.
I think the war revealed two deficiencies in US forces. First, the US did not have sufficient offensive capabilities to prevent Iranian counterattacks. Iranian drones and missiles were cheap and plentiful, while the US used expensive platforms designed for hitting high-value targets. And second, the forces available to defend allied civilian infrastructure were insufficient. The US only had limited forces in the region, and force composition focused heavily on offense.