Yep, the article is a great example of why one would use CF over LE. I think LE is worth an honorable mention given the topic, but it's not a big deal.
HN user
bluetooth
Cloudflare is a valid suggestion, albeit (IMO) inferior to letsencrypt in many cases. Surprised to not see it mentioned here, given that it also costs nothing, for arguably more security.
Did you read the article?
HSBC aren't likely to be swayed by such an article.
The article is clearly aimed at small business owners. He's doing people a favor by steering them clear of HSBC. I never got the impression he was speaking to HSBC, or attempting to call them out.
It's very easy to set up two or more business bank accounts and use them both.
This is literally second on his list of takeaways.
Heh, how do you delete a submission?
Are you asking if this is a non-issue if you've... addressed the issue?
I've found the official documentation (docs.opencv.org) to be one of the best sources online. It goes into mathematics/theory often but presents the info in a way that you don't need it to get stuff done. I would also check out pyimagesearch.com. There's a ton of really cool projects and tutorials (mostly in python but the c++/python api are near 1:1)
The same thing happened with Julian Assange. Thanks to the media, the only thing the average person knows about him is not what he helped uncover but instead that he is either a "villian" or "hero." Snowden is the new Assange.
but are repository updates even atomic?
No, they are not. During the push, there will be a short amount of time in which some parts of the website will be operating on new code, while others will be operating on old code. If many components are in play (ie using libraries) you may end up breaking things if a new request comes in at the right time.
You made a map, then someone used the map. Isn't that nice?
Yeah, if that map was free to use, then sure. But that's not the case.
It's become all too common I see this type of argument used in cases where big name studios rip work of others without attribution. This is an extremely weak (not to mention somewhat offensive) argument which is analogous to telling a rape victim "you should be happy the rapist found you attractive."
If GhostMail was compromised, the attacker would be able to read messages as they are being sent. Sending messages as images does not stop them from being copied or held for an indefinite amount of time.
Here's a similar project based on another similar project that's been around for quite some time: http://penturalabs.wordpress.com/2013/04/25/blue-for-the-pin...
Original project: http://hakshop.myshopify.com/products/wifi-pineapple
How did you test for YAML injection? From my past experiences with Ruby (hardly any) YAML injection is difficult to test from a blackbox perspective as you need an understanding of the source code in order to be able to craft the appropriate serialized YAML object to yield code execution.
It might also be because this link has been posted at least two times recently:
Maybe you're forgetting, but this is the real world. Ideally, the government should be afraid of its people, but the US is in a far from ideal situation right now.
Two issues I can see arising from this:
1. You're funding someone who the government most likely has labelled a terrorist. I don't think the government will take too kindly to such a thing.
2. Snowden is in hiding. Not only might it be hard to come into contact with him, but how can we be sure our money will reach him?
I think #1 is not too difficult to solve via ways of bitcoin, but #2 is still a blocker.
Is this serious? This "news" website is making an outlandish claim, yet cites not a single source.
"The White House can’t order all 20 million of its employees around. Someone will always talk to us, and help us understand the truth behind these troubling, but somewhat ambiguous conversations and other communications. All your PRISM are belong to us, and it’s going to be this way for as long as something like PRISM exists."
Where did this quote come from? Who are they quoting? There is just so much wrong with this article.
Edit: The more I browse, the more this site seems like a less funny version of The Onion. Here are some choice articles chronicle.su has published in the past:
Stephen Hawking joins Illuminati, snubs Israel
Amanda Bynes dead at 27, inventor of ‘lol’ signs off [she is still alive]
Margaret Thatcher, Illuminati leader, dead at 87
Fascist Zune Conspiracy ExposedIt's almost as if he's speaking to a cult. Might as well have said something along the lines of "Obama is the savior of the US. Let him into your heart and soul and you will know it to be true. Go forth and vote!"
if government does nothing and we get attacked people will complain
Who says this? Do you honestly think warrantless wiretaps are a valid form of defense?
For some reason, comments on HN appear with seemingly random font sizes when viewed on mobile. I've seen it on both android and iOS.
Got a source? That sounds so incredible I almost want it to be true.
> However, would there be any security enhancements over using key based authentication
I think you're misunderstanding. Two-factor authentication is a layer of security on top of regular authentication to ssh (whether password or key based). It's not meant to replace anything or stand on its own. This is for added security; first you authenticate via password or key, and then you authenticate via google authenticator.
Is writing a markdown text editor the new "hello world"?
Check out these:
This was posted and somewhat heavily discussed yesterday: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=5796935
It's not. The preferred method of preventing SQL injections is via prepared statements. mysql_real_escape_string is only suitable for strings (as the name implies). Something like
SELECT * FROM table WHERE id=$_GET['field']
where $_GET['field'] has been passed through mysql_real_escape_string is still vulnerable. Using prepared statements forces php to send data to the DBMS in such a way that it cannot confuse user input from the actual SQL. This is due to the fact that preparing data forces you to give types to the data before you use it in a query. Escaping input (such as with mysql_real_escape_string) makes this confusion still possible.Considering this requires you to go back to a single source to retrieve your passwords, I fail to see what this offers over tools such as 1password. I am aware that passwords are not actually being stored anywhere, but ultimately you are doing the same thing: copy and pasting. 1password with a sufficiently strong passphrase to protect the keychain (is it even called that?) is just as realistically impossible to crack.
This is a pretty clever use of the blockchain. However, instead of destroying the bitcoins you have (wasting coins is bad, no matter how small) you can simply send bitcoins to yourself and store data in the `coinbase` field. The resulting transaction will appear in the blockchain permanently, and can always be referred back to.
There already exists a service to prove the existence of a document before a certain date (much like the one in the blog post): http://www.proofofexistence.com/ Their implementation details are lacking but it should still be clear enough to get an overview. (Edit: I seem to have missed this link in the blogpost)
Besides hosting checksums, other types of data have been found in the blockchain, such as some Wikileaks content (http://www.thebitcointrader.com/2013/04/25mb-of-wikileaks-ca...) and even links to child porn (http://www.btcpedia.com/ped0-links-in-bitcoin-blockchain/).
Thanks. I'll put that link in my comment.
A copy of the email (slightly different from the notice on the site):
Easier to read: https://gist.github.com/sergiotapia/d241db48ec4f31dfd0fe
Dear community member,
We respect the privacy of your information, which is why, as a precautionary measure, we are writing to let you know about an incident that involves your personal information. The Drupal.org Security and Infrastructure Teams have discovered unauthorized access to account information on Drupal.org and groups.drupal.org. Information exposed includes usernames, email addresses, and country information, as well as hashed passwords. However, we are still investigating the incident and may learn about other types of information compromised, in which case we will notify you accordingly.
This unauthorized access was made via third-party software installed on the Drupal.org server infrastructure, and was not the result of a vulnerability within the Drupal software itself. This notice applies specifically to user account data stored on Drupal.org and groups.drupal.org, and not to sites running Drupal generally.
We have implemented additional security measures designed to prevent the recurrence of such an attack, and to protect the privacy of our community members.
The next time you attempt to log into your account, you will be required to create a new password.
Below are steps you can take to further protect your personal information online. We encourage you to take preventative measures now to help prevent and detect the misuse of your information.
First, we recommend as a precaution that you change or reset passwords on other sites where you may use similar passwords, even though all passwords on Drupal.org are stored salted and hashed. All Drupal.org passwords are both hashed and salted, although some older passwords on groups.drupal.org were not salted. To make your password stronger:
* Do not use passwords that are simple words or phrases * Never use the same password on multiple sites or services * Use different types of characters in your password (uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols).
Second, be cautious if you receive emails asking for your personal information and be on the lookout for unwanted spam. It is not our practice to request personal information by email. Also, beware of emails that threaten to close your account if you do not take the "immediate action" of providing personal information.
For more information, please review the security announcement and FAQ at https://drupal.org/news/130529SecurityUpdate. If you find any reason to believe that your information has been accessed by someone other than yourself, please contact the Drupal Association immediately, by sending an email to password@association.drupal.org.
We regret that this incident has occurred and want to assure you we are working hard to improve security.
Thank you, Holly Ross Drupal Association Executive Director