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akyuu

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arstechnica.com 4d ago

EU will force Google to share search data and open up AI on Android

akyuu
6pts1
www.techpowerup.com 4d ago

Chinese CXMT to Match Micron's DRAM Manufacturing Capacity This Year

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3pts0
www.rtings.com 4d ago

Smart TV Tracking

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1pts0
finance.yahoo.com 5d ago

US Corporate Insiders Are Selling Stocks at a Near Record Pace

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1pts0
climatecasino.substack.com 9d ago

Some Monsters Are Real

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50pts4
www.techpowerup.com 11d ago

Blame the Plumbing: Why Intel Handles USB Onboard Audio Codecs Better Than AMD

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7pts0
www.tomshardware.com 11d ago

Nvidia RTX 3060 returns to retail 5 years after original launch, priced at $339

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2pts0
www.marketplace.org 12d ago

Nearly half of U.S. retail spending comes from top 10% of earners

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8pts1
www.dexerto.com 13d ago

GTA 6 players will need to provide real life ID to play in Australia

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3pts0
www.nintendo.com 16d ago

Nintendo announces new product revisions in Europe with replaceable batteries

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367pts219
schaerli.org 19d ago

Proton's crypto is not Transparent and not OPAQUE

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2pts0
www.tomshardware.com 20d ago

Google testing controversial webcam-based reCAPTCHA that asks for a hand scan

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7pts0
www.apollo.com 20d ago

The Growing Compute Shortage [pdf]

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3pts1
proton.me 20d ago

How to play Doom online in Proton Drive

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2pts0
medium.com 21d ago

Sanpo Yoshi: the Japanese business principle of success through responsibility

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2pts0
www.businessinsider.com 21d ago

Microsoft plans job cuts, impacting <2.5% of workforce

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5pts0
support.reddithelp.com 22d ago

Reddit Age Verification in Europe

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10pts1
support.apple.com 23d ago

About the security content of iOS 26.5.2 and iPadOS 26.5.2

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4pts0
pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov 25d ago

Moral elevation can induce nursing

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2pts0
blog.calif.io 25d ago

Apple Internals: Swift in the Kernel

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2pts0
df-f.com 26d ago

Darwin: Libsystem_malloc .dylib and XZone

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1pts0
blog.calif.io 26d ago

Apple Internals: Swift in the Kernel

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1pts0
finance.yahoo.com 27d ago

Oracle workforce shrinks by about 21,000 employees amid AI adoption

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4pts0
www.medicalnewstoday.com 27d ago

Pesticide exposure may relate to colorectal cancer in younger adults

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4pts0
blog.mozilla.org 1mo ago

Designing Firefox for the Future

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3pts1
gizmodo.com 1mo ago

Scientists Find Intriguing Link Between Ozempic and Violent Behavior

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5pts0
www.healthcare.digital 1mo ago

Oracle Cerner: Potential Acquirers of Oracle Health

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3pts0
www.semiconductor-today.com 1mo ago

China bans sales of Germany's Infineon GAN chips

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2pts0
www.apollo.com 1mo ago

When Three Passive Funds Become the Market

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2pts1
www.codeweavers.com 1mo ago

The Future of Crossover

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3pts0

I believe Chrome is also the only software that enables certain mitigations such as ProcessSystemCallDisablePolicy on Windows and NO_SMT and TECS on macOS [1]. I wonder if some of these OS features have been implemented at Google's request.

However, in the case of Spectre, I think the OS should try to prevent exploitation rather than end programs, with a user-facing toggle to disable mitigations per-program for compatibility reasons.

[1] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2021/08/macos-11s-hid...

Apple is still adding large amounts of new Objective-C code in each new macOS version [0].

I haven't found any language usage numbers for recent versions of Windows, but Microsoft is using Rust for both new development and rewriting old features [1] [2].

[0] Refer to section "Evolution of the programming languages" https://blog.timac.org/2023/1128-state-of-appkit-catalyst-sw...

[1] https://www.theregister.com/2023/04/27/microsoft_windows_rus...

[2] https://www.theregister.com/2024/01/31/microsoft_seeks_rust_...

The Linux desktop technology stack lags behind Windows and macOS when it comes to security. The causes are both technical (see this comment [1] for an overview) and non-technical, often stemming from a fragmented development model where there are no clearly defined security boundaries. For example:

- There is no real concept of base system because distros are usually a patchwork of software from diverse sources. This means stuff like proper secure boot is not really feasible on any distro (although AFAIK the systemd/Fedora people are working on it with signed UKIs and immutable OS images).

- Some features that could live in userland for improved security are instead implemented in the kernel, while both Windows and macOS generally keep moving exploitable features like font rendering to userland.

- Distros often disable or disregard security features such as SELinux or mitigations like CFI.

Here [2] is a more detailed article examining the lack of security of Linux desktops in case you're interested.

[1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=37502088

[2] https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/linux.html

Builds are reproducible [1], so you can compile them yourself and check they match the official ones. Additionally, official releases are signed and the update client verifies them and prevents downgrade attacks [2]. You can also install updates offline from a computer if you prefer [3].

[1] https://grapheneos.org/build#reproducible-builds

[2] https://grapheneos.org/releases#about-the-releases

[3] https://grapheneos.org/usage#updates-sideloading

Consider using GrapheneOS instead of stock Android for an improved version of MTE (and extra security and privacy as a bonus): https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/8439-mte-support-status-for...

Stock Pixel OS has it as a developer option which isn't usable in practice since it breaks far too much. The implementation is also much less powerful than hardened_malloc.

We integrated it into hardened_malloc where it's able to provide stronger security properties than the experimental stock OS implementation.

When fully integrated into the compiler and each heap allocator, MTE enforces a form of memory safety. It detects memory corruption as it happens. 4 bit tags limit it to probabilistic detection for the general case, but deterministic guarantees are possible via reserving tags. In hardened_malloc, we deterministically prevent sequential overflows by excluding adjacent tags.

Also, currently it's not clear if it makes sense to enable kernel MTE:

MTE support for protecting the Linux kernel isn't enabled yet, but we can likely enable that by default too. However, it's currently part of kasan and is more oriented towards debugging than hardening. It's not entirely clear that enabling it in the current state is a good idea.

From what I’ve read from some security researchers, glibc is not really focused on security. For example, it contains CPU-specific manually crafted assembly for optimization purposes, and its memory allocator implements exploitation-friendly features such as thread caches. I’m not surprised by this vulnerability, and I suspect there are many similar ones that haven’t been discovered yet.

musl (used by default on Alpine and Chimera Linux) and the BSD libc’s on the other hand are much more minimal and conservative.

If you mean restricting filesystem access to random programs, I think that's already possible on macOS (with TCC) and Linux (with Flatpak), but the underlying mechanisms aren't very robust and can be easily bypassed by malicious code.

If you mean a true capability-based OS, there is Fuchsia, which doesn't seem to be used yet, and RedoxOS, which is in development.