HN user

abhisek

307 karma

Dabbling into open source software supply chain security

github.com/safedep/pmg

Posts51
Comments97
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github.com 1d ago

Show HN: PMG, open source package firewall

abhisek
4pts2
safedep.io 11d ago

Jscrambler 8.14.0 Compromised with Credential Stealer

abhisek
3pts0
www.schneier.com 3mo ago

Claude Mythos and Cybersecurity

abhisek
4pts0
cloud.google.com 3mo ago

Coruna: The Mysterious Journey of a Powerful iOS Exploit Kit

abhisek
1pts0
safedep.io 5mo ago

Step by Step Analysis of Malicious NPM Package

abhisek
1pts0
crabby-rathbun.github.io 5mo ago

OpenClaw bot calls out maintainer when its PR got rejected

abhisek
1pts0
github.com 5mo ago

Show HN: Gryph – Audit Trail for AI Coding Agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini)

abhisek
1pts0
safedep.io 5mo ago

Agent Skills Threat Model

abhisek
3pts0
blog.trailofbits.com 7mo ago

Catching malicious package releases using a transparency log

abhisek
3pts0
aisle.com 7mo ago

CVE-2025-66491: Traefik's "Verify=on" Turned TLS Off

abhisek
1pts0
safedep.io 7mo ago

DarkGPT: Malicious Visual Studio Code Extension Targeting Developers

abhisek
2pts0
comsec.ethz.ch 8mo ago

Exposing and Exploiting Incomplete Branch Predictor Isolation in Cloud

abhisek
1pts0
substack.com 8mo ago

KnownSec breach: What we know so far

abhisek
1pts0
secureannex.com 8mo ago

Buying browser extensions for fun and profit

abhisek
3pts1
safedep.io 8mo ago

Curious Case of Embedded Executable in a Newly Introduced Transitive Dependency

abhisek
4pts0
safedep.io 10mo ago

NPM Supply Chain Malware with Self-Replicating Behaviour

abhisek
2pts0
safedep.io 11mo ago

Tensorflow.js Typosquatting Attack: Malicious Package Targeting AI/ML Developers

abhisek
2pts0
safedep.io 11mo ago

Secure Vibe Coding with AI Agents

abhisek
2pts0
safedep.io 1y ago

ESLint-config-prettier: How NPM Package with 30M Downloads Spread Malware

abhisek
1pts0
invokere.com 1y ago

Scavenger Malware Distributed via ESLint-Config-Prettier NPM Package Hack

abhisek
1pts0
vetpkg.dev 1y ago

Near Real-Time Stream of Open Source Packages Published to Public Registries

abhisek
2pts0
www.oligo.security 1y ago

Critical RCE Vulnerability in Anthropic MCP Inspector – CVE-2025-49596

abhisek
5pts1
news.ycombinator.com 1y ago

Ask HN: HN: Why do we code review?

abhisek
2pts2
root.sigsegv.in 1y ago

The PostgreSQL Locking Trap That Killed Our Production API (and How We Fixed It)

abhisek
2pts0
github.com 1y ago

Show HN: Xbom – Generate AI and SaaS-Aware SBOMs from Code Using Static Analysis

abhisek
3pts0
github.com 1y ago

Vet MCP: Software Composition Analysis for AI Code Editors

abhisek
1pts0
safedep.io 1y ago

Catching the Silent Threat: How Dynamic Analysis Revealed an NPM Attack Chain

abhisek
2pts0
github.com 1y ago

Kubernetes Limits Links to Third Party Projects

abhisek
2pts0
root.sigsegv.in 1y ago

Sneaky Malware Hidden in Transitive Dependency of ESLint-config-Airbnb-compat

abhisek
3pts0
github.com 1y ago

PMG: Wraps Package Managers to Prevent Installation of Malicious OSS Packages

abhisek
6pts0

Building Package Manager Guard (PMG) - https://github.com/safedep/pmg

With all the supply chain attacks on OSS ecosystems targeting developers, PMG is a practical protection using a combination of threat intel, policy and sandbox.

It’s a package firewall on the terminal really. It has been surprisingly effective against most of the recent attacks.

Smells like contagious interview campaign by DPRK folks. They have been doing this for a while. Even using IDE settings, Claude hooks for malicious code execution.

I partly agree. Agents are not going to replace senior devs. Exactly for the internal context and the decision making that comes with it.

But senior devs are also expected to have a compounding effect even pre-AI. Writing a single doc, refactoring legacy code to make it extensible, building security frameworks specific to the project and many more. All of these would compound the dev team.

I think the same will happen with agents working on a org specific paved path set by senior devs.

I think this is the right approach to building sandbox for agents ie. over existing OS native sandbox capabilities so that they are truly enforced.

However the challenge is, sandbox profiles (rules) are always workload specific. How do you define “least privilege” for a workload and then enforce it through the sandbox.

Which is why general sandboxes wont be useful or even feasible. The value is observing and probably auto-generating baseline policy for a given workload.

Wrong or overly relaxed policies would make sandbox ineffective against real threats it is expected to protect against.

[dead] 5 months ago

We found a malicious npm package pino-sdk-v2 impersonating pino, one of the most widely used Node.js loggers with nearly 20 million weekly downloads. The package is a near copy of pino’s source, docs, and README with one addition: an obfuscated payload in lib/tools.js that scans .env files for secrets and exfiltrates them to a Discord webhook on require().

pino-sdk-v2@9.9.0 copies pino’s entire source tree with a single modification: obfuscated credential stealing code injected into lib/tools.js

The payload scans .env, .env.local, .env.production, .env.development, and .env.example for secret keys

Extracted credentials are sent to a hardcoded Discord webhook

No install hooks. The code executes on require(), bypassing scanners that only flag install scripts

Everybody wants to build infra. Automate something which is known and well understood. Hoping someone else will use it to solve end user's problem which is hard to understand, messy and often highly contextual.

To summarize: Everyone wants to automate stuff. Most people do not want to touch boring, large problems.

110 tools. That’s probably a reason why Anthropic is probably switching to sandboxed code execution over MCPs.

It’s just easier to write code and do something specific for a task than load so many tool metadata.

I did not go past IDA. But I remember idc and IDA python. I wonder if it’s a better approach to expose a single tool to execute scripts to query what the agent needs.

Agent Skills 6 months ago

I see this as “libs” for the agents. They can discover relevant skills by searching a known index, extend their capability for on a given task.

While this makes sense for higher autonomy, it brings the well known supply chain security issue.

Currently all index list skills that are unverified. There are already examples of malicious skills.

Hacking Moltbook 6 months ago

Loved the idea of AI talking to AI and inventing something new.

Sure. You can dump the DB. Most of the data was public anyway.

Tried installing clawdbot. Got blocked by (my own) sandbox because it tried to git clone some stuff which in turn was accessing my private keys.

- clawdbot depends on @whiskeysockets/baileys

- @whiskeysockets/baileys depends on libsignal

npm view @whiskeysockets/baileys dependencies

[..] libsignal: 'git+https://github.com/whiskeysockets/libsignal-node.git', [..]

libsignal is not a regular npm package but a GitHub repository, which need to be cloned and built locally.

So suddenly, my sandbox profile, tuned for npm package installation no longer works because npm decides to treat my system as a build environment.

May be genuine use-case but its hard to keep up.

I still think metadata associated with packages (like stars, download count and more) are easy to fake and not the best metric. OpenSSF scorecard has some adoption among project maintainers but hardly any adoption in terms of making security decision based on it.

IMHO code is the source of truth. It may seem infeasible to mass analyse OSS code, but given the recent incidents (Shai-Hulud et.al) I think that’s the way forward. Personally am more bullish on SLSA or other artefact provenance technology adoption. Till that happens, metadata will be misused by attackers.

Yes. Many times. Kubernetes upgrade during maintenance schedule borks up entire cluster, yet everything is green on status page. Support case under enterprise support plan took almost 6 hours to get it resolved.

The thing that people miss out is Git is really a content addressed storage. This means all commits, even the ones not linked to any refs are still stored and addressable.

p.s: If you run OSS project, please use Github Advanced Security and enable Push Protection against secrets.