Bret Devereaux has a great series of essays on nearly every aspect of Spartan society (https://acoup.blog/category/collections/this-isnt-sparta/) that's also worth the read.
HN user
scarier
Do you have any references on this? My understanding is that it’s in kind of a similar boat with intergenerational trauma that quantum mechanics is with certain schools of philosophy, and that the actual science of epigenetics supports a much more limited scope (responding to e.g famine and other current stressors in utero), so anything that could fall into the intergenerational realm would need to be passed down through the normal evolutionary process of populations experiencing selective pressure.
No kidding. My old company needed to replace an aircraft engine part for a customer in Japan, and it ended up being something like a third of the cost and time to give one of our mechanics essentially a weeklong vacation rather than ship it (as a bonus, he was able to hand carry the broken part back for failure analysis, rather than having to deal with equally expensive and slow return shipping).
Just to be clear, the NRA Foundation and the NRA are distinct entities (the NRA is not a non-profit), even though the Foundation was more or less obviously created to take advantage of tax law. Hilariously, the NRA recently sued the Foundation.
That's one option, although for longer missions your preparation generally needs to start the night before and I wouldn't recommend flying on an empty stomach (unless it works for you, but it makes most people more susceptible to airsickness). There isn't one consistent method that works for everyone--I think the book Sled Driver has a section where they talk about physiological preparation for SR-71 flights, and the only consistent habit the crew had was NOT eating the "traditional," low-residue steak-and-eggs breakfast.
Good news for gassy food lovers is the cabin pressure changes make everyone fart, there's no one else in the cockpit to hear or smell you, and even if there was it'd be loud and they'd be wearing an oxygen mask. Little victories.
Honestly this isn't something people select for at all--by the time you've made it through that many rounds of selection you aren't going to let GI issues keep you from the finish. I've heard of some creative solutions to the problem involving safing the ejection seat and getting out of your gear, but I don't really believe any of them. If you think it's a significant risk, you basically have two options: talk to the squadron flight surgeon and get medically grounded, or wear a diaper. Almost everyone is too proud to do either of those things, so a number of pilots have call signs related to shitting themselves in flight. Yes, everyone will make fun of you after the fact--if you're a decent person, you'll at least clean out the cockpit yourself.
To be fair they're pretty easy to use as long as you don't have to fly an airplane at the same time...
[1] (NSFW lyrics!) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jd9_RffdmBA
(1) Sure, I'm not arguing that the Chinese economy is less vulnerable to a SOH closure than the US. I do think the US government is much more vulnerable to economic pressure than the Chinese government is (especially in an election year that even before the war was shaping up poorly for the ruling party), and any calculus the government makes needs to include this. If this was the goal of the war, I think we would also see significantly different targeting and messaging than we do now. If there was a ceasefire tomorrow, it's unclear that China would be the outsize loser here.
(2) Again, sure, but Iran can clearly sustain it longer. They've read their Clausewitz and properly understand this as a contest of political will, which they have much deeper reserves of than capital or munitions. Anyone with any power in the Iranian regime knows they have no offramp.
Absolutely agree that Trump cares strongly for his legacy, maybe more than anything except for his self-image, but the most important part of that legacy is being recognized as both popular and a winner--I would argue that these are far more important to him personally than US power and influence on the world stage (shutting down USAID, for example, was a massive blow to US soft power, and the NATO infighting that he initiated is still probably a net negative for US hard power, even if it has had a positive impact on European defense spending and self-sufficiency). He also clearly wants to see that legacy established in his lifetime (hence the obsession with having things named after him). It's hard to imagine this being a particularly effective way to increase long-term US power and influence relative to China, particularly in a way that will generate positive sentiment within the US--especially among the majority voters who favored his populist-isolationist political platform.
(1) Why do you think this is worse for the Chinese government than the US? Also, this view of the strategic goals of the war seems fundamentally incompatible with both how it began and the ongoing US government narratives about it.
(2) I think we all (the author included) agree with you that it's easier to break things than to build them--both hardware and relationships--so it's obvious that maintaining trade through these kinds of choke points requires some degree of cooperation on all fronts. Iran does have a geographic advantage over other players, though (partial exceptions to Oman and the UAE), as well as a clear acute interest in constricting traffic through the strait. Sure, it may be bleeding them, but it seems to be one of the few ways they can meaningfully attack their enemies. It'll be interesting to see if anyone has the will to force the strait open against Iran's efforts.
Generally agree on Ukraine/Taiwan and the bigger geopolitical picture though.
This is an odd place to put a stake in the ground--there are a number of macro trends that have been going on for far longer (e.g. the military-industrial complex, the Cold War, Congress, American football), as well as a few others that have only really come to a head more recently (e.g. demographics, media spheres/tribalization). I would argue that our failure to learn lessons from the Millennium Challenge has a massive overlap with our failure to learn from Ukraine--not to mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam... The military is not monolithic--remember that the Millennium Challenge was more or less a sparring bout between two parts of the military with different philosophies--and it really takes something like an existential war for meritocracy and common sense to reassert themselves to a meaningful degree.
A smaller point: all military exercises are heavily scripted--it's more or less impossible for them to be otherwise, as you just can't simulate the details of war that matter without actually killing people, breaking things, and giving up your secret game plans. Usually the goal of this sort of thing is to make sure that everything (people, equipment, doctrine) works together more or less as intended, and people have the experience leading and operating in larger units than they do on a routine basis. The PR people then spin it into an unqualified and historic success, validation of our technology and tactics against the forces of evil, blah blah blah. It is still very difficult to draw the right lessons from these sorts of things--even more so when the civilian leadership of the military has 99 things to consider besides a certain kind of pure military effectiveness (and although I have strong feelings here, we're still doing quite well on the tactical and operational levels in spite of everything).
Fun fact: the Millennium Challenge is still taught as a case study in basic officer training, at least in the Marine Corps (well, probably--it definitely was a little over a decade ago).
My understanding of the UK CAA is that it isn’t as liberal as the US FAA when it comes to amateur-built experimental aircraft airworthiness. I would still be surprised if a 3d-printed intake manifold on a homebuilt passed an airworthiness inspection in the US without a number of detailed questions being answered to the satisfaction of the airworthiness representative.
It seems reasonable and prudent to go through decontamination after this sort of thing, but if the worker had just gone home to their family soaking wet without changing, there would still have been close enough to zero risk to anyone (again, cleaning up and making sure this is the case is a very reasonable thing to do).
This sort of place is safe enough to bring your kid into without significant precautions (I got to do this as a kid—it was really cool). The biggest risk by far is drowning.
Relevant XKCD: https://what-if.xkcd.com/29/
Sure, as long as you stick to flying light aircraft on runways designed for commercial air transport. I would also recommend thinking about how you would control speed on a long downhill taxi with a tailwind, even if you didn’t need brakes on landing.
This is a pretty narrow take on aviation safety. A heavier airplane has a higher stall speed, more energy for the brakes to dissipate, longer takeoff/landing distances, a worse climb rate… I’ll happily sacrifice maneuvering speed for better takeoff/landing/climb performance.
Here’s another take: https://www.astralcodexten.com/p/your-review-alpha-school
At the very least it’s an interesting experiment—still unclear if or how well this sort of thing will succeed.
I really want to believe that MOSAIC will usher in a revolution of safe, affordable airplanes, but I'm not holding my breath. A lot of the stuff you mention has existed for decades in experimental aviation (electronic ignition, EFI/FADEC, non-TSO avionics, the ability to import factory-assembled but otherwise non-certified light sport aircraft...), and none of them seem to offer compelling cost, performance, and safety advantages over legacy systems.
My cold take is that the only significant, short-term effect will be slightly lowered training standards for low-to-moderate-performance aircraft. It's unclear that this will have any practical effects, since personal airplanes will remain prohibitively expensive to own and operate for the vast majority of us.
far safer than a certified aircraft than the statistics will tell you
I share your frustration with the technological stagnation of general aviation, but this is completely damning. Cirrus added all of the features you mention, at great expense and in a fully certified aircraft, and took decades to show any kind of clear safety advantage over clapped-out Cessnas (as I understand it, the vast majority of improvement came from intensive training in when to deploy the parachute, which was wildly less intuitive than anyone originally realized and likely remains so for pilots without specialized training). Digital instruments, weather displays, and automation have significant benefits for many use cases, but it's unclear that they're inherently safer than legacy systems for amateur aviators.
Sure, an engineering control for MRI room access would be implemented differently--that's just the canonical example that people are familiar with. One possible implementation for MRI access is the airlock method, where the inner access door would only be allowed to unlock with the outer door locked and no metal detected in the space between (also the outer door would be prohibited from unlocking when the inner door is unlocked, except for some kind of inner emergency override that might also be tied to the emergency quench).
Literally no one disagrees with you on this, and most (if not all) hospital administrators will say they already do it the way you suggest. I'm pointing out that the actual implementations I'm aware of are often ineffective because they use administrative rather than engineering controls, and this is a critical distinction people need to be more aware of when interacting with dangerous systems. Managers, at least in my experience, tend to wildly overestimate compliance rates with administrative controls, even ignoring any possibility of deliberate noncompliance.
An engineering control is how your microwave works—if the door isn’t physically closed, it can’t run. The way many (most?) hospitals currently operate is called an administrative control—analogous to a sign on the microwave door telling people not to run the microwave with the door open or open the door when the microwave is on.
I’m struggling to see the nefarious angle here—-this seems like a case where both ethical and efficiency concerns are well-aligned, for a modest increase in cost that may disappear with scale. How is this anything other than a win?
Nope, metal detectors are fairly typical for MRI access. They just generally aren’t set up as an engineering control like you suggest.
This is already a common practice. One of the issues with the standard implementation is that it’s set up as an administrative control rather than an engineering control (which would be significantly more difficult/expensive/space-consuming). At least one other comment thread has discussed the airlock implementation that I’m sure a very large number of people have independently thought of.
I love that this is a thing, but man am I disappointed by the lack of a quantitative methodology (especially in terms of ranking problems by probability, severity, and cost) and specific, actionable recommendations. In aviation for example, some of the recommendations include
Understand and adopt new and emerging technologies...
Embrace proactive approaches to address sustainability, resiliency, and risk...
Support and encourage airports to look at their systems holistically...
I can't disagree with any of those things, but at the same time nothing in this report helps clarify where we should allocate our ever-more-finite resources.
I don't totally disagree with you, but I think it's important to note that just because a technology isn't value-adding to you doesn't mean it isn't fundamentally value-adding in general. VR has been game-changing in immersive simulation for me, for example.
Duuuuuude, TIT is the temperature after combustion, not compression. Adiabatic compression isn't even close to the main contributor to TIT--heat input from burning fuel is. Also you may be confusing turbofans and turboshafts--helicopters have torque limits (not a helo guy, but my understanding is this is a gearbox or masthead structural limit rather than an engine limit), but if your turbofan can't hit RPM limits on the ground on a cool day you should seriously consider bringing it back for maintenance instead of going flying.
Decent chance they were using something like this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spear-thrower
Story time, a decade or so ago at one of the Naval Air Stations where they conduct intermediate/advanced jet training. The base did a community outreach event where they invited the aerospace club from a local school (basically an extracurricular program where they played a lot of MSFS) to spend an afternoon in the T-45C simulator. This being Naval Aviation, each guest had the opportunity to attempt a carrier landing. Most of them sucked at it (of course they did--it's hard enough for experienced pilots). The last person to go was a tiny hispanic girl, maybe a fourth-grader. She needed to sit on a stack of NATOPS manuals like a foot thick to be able to get to the design eye height, and was unable to reach the rudder pedals or pretty much anything other than the throttle and stick. She trapped on her first try. No idea where she ended up, but I hope that she's at least had the opportunity to become a pilot by now.
Anyway, I think simulator training is fantastic procedural training (normal, emergency, and instrument procedures in particular, but a good sim with force feedback should instill good habit patterns regarding trimming the aircraft in response to throttle/configuration changes and lots of other things). I've never been impressed with full-motion sims though--lots of stick-and-rudder skills really need flight hours to build still.
Tangentially related: https://www.tor.com/2012/07/20/a-tall-tail/
In the US, spin recovery training is mandatory for flight instructors. That’s the only requirement I’m aware of, although all pilots do get some relatively basic training in unusual attitude recovery.
For perspective, the thing EFBs primarily replace is paper charts and approach plates, which are probably a worse FOD hazard due to how many different ones you have to use on a long flight. Most military pilots are trained to “dummy-cord” or otherwise secure anything that can become a FOD hazard inside the cockpit. There are plenty of products out there that let you strap a tablet to your leg at least as securely as a traditional kneeboard or IFR strap.