red0point

It's switching components every 8 seconds, like a carousel. It's a bit unfair to judge Rails UI by that, but I agree, it's not a good first impression.

The Aerial Framework has been designed from the ground up to meet the needs of 3GPP Radio Access Networks — signal processing workloads with microsecond latency requirements. It is a single platform that unites research, testbeds, and production deployments to solve development challenges for real-time applications.

Use cases: Signal processing applications with strict latency requirements Audience: RAN system engineers, signal processing specialists, AI researchers Built with: DOCA, DPDK, TensorRT, Python, JAX, PyTorch, C++, CUDA, and more

Doesn‘t tailscale force you to bring your own SSO / IdP already?

So it‘s not part of what Tailscale brings, it just adds another layer of indirection between the SSO / IdP you have already and the app, plus requires some custom library integration work, further enhancing lock-in.

Of course you can. The IMSI is sent before any authentication.

This article missed the point entirely. The answer is no, it did not kill it - not even if you‘re only on 5G as this article reports.

This is due to flaws in its design as shown here:

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3448300.3467826

Do you have any information about the privacy achievable by Meshtastic?

From a quick glance it looks like it‘s using static NodeIDs derived from the Bluetooth MAC address in the always unencrypted Packet Header.

So not only can you sniff these messages from far away at greatly simplified complexity when comparing to cellular communication, but also tie it to the hardware that you carry with you.

Mesh networks sure have its uses, but I‘d be wary of their offered privacy in the presence of adversaries you could be facing at protests!

Often they rely heavily on GPS for time and frequency synchronization (think 5G TDD, where all operators need to be aligned in time or they jam eatch other‘s uplink). The GPS antenna is also often quite visible from the outside of a base station.

Still, what‘s also possible is to use PTP as backup (e.g., over eCPRI) and use the fiber / microwave backhaul to some master clock with, say, a ribidium time source as a backup, so I think it‘s not entirely unreasonable to assume that cell phone signals will remain available in the presence of a GPS outage.

But one overlooked use case of the technology is (talking head) video compression.

On a spectrum of model architectures, it achieves higher compression efficiency at the cost of model complexity. Indeed, the full LivePortrait model has 130m parameters compared to DCVC’s 20 million. While that’s tiny compared to LLMs, it currently requires an Nvidia RTX 4090 to run it in real time (in addition to parameters, a large culprit is using expensive warping operations). That means deploying to edge runtimes such as Apple Neural Engine is still quite a ways ahead.

It’s very cool that this is possible, but the compression use case is indeed .. a bit far fetched. A insanely large model requiring the most expensive consumer GPU to run on both ends and at the same time being limited in bandwidth so much (22kbps) is a _very_ limited scenario.

I feel like there are so many pitfalls when designing this - is there something standard and trusted (would TLS work?) that you could build your application on top of?

How does one use the NPU features on such a chip from like a normal C++ program?

But that‘s not what happened according to the article.

The problem is, there were no empty seats on the flight. So when he emerged from the lavatory and the plane began taxiing, flight attendants realized something was wrong, and the plane returned to the gate.

If I remember correctly, there is an extensive „Inspection“ settings page where you can enable / disable / set the levels (hoe much in-your/face) of exactly such checks.

Maybe this would suit you?

https://www.jetbrains.com/help/idea/code-inspection.html#acc...

Can you provide a bit more details to your setup (HE, …) - it sounds perfect and exactly what I am looking for at the moment.

As it turns out, you do not even need cell site simulators / false base station to do IMSI catching.

In my research, I developed a technique to attack a phone with low power from km away, without being able to be detected at all with traditional tools like SeaGlass or Crocodile Hunter. It‘s published here and works against production LTE networks, no downgrade attacks whatsoever necessary:

https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3495243.3560525

It doesn‘t always have to be a RPi, sometimes there is dedicated hardware for that use case that is also kinda cheap.

Check this thing out, it‘s a programmable audio DSP:

https://www.thomannmusic.ch/the_t.racks_dsp_4x4_mini.htm

The article is about a simple misconfiguration on their email campaign, nothing to do with their actual tests.

It‘s a misleading title for sure.

What‘s missing from all these figure is the resulting latency. It‘s often the case that vendors show impressive throughput numbers, but then the latency is terrible at that throughput.

Do you have those numbers as well?

You can also synchronize with sub-nanosecond precision using WhiteRabbit (used at CERN and other research facilities). It's all open source (HW/SW):

https://ohwr.org/projects/white-rabbit/wiki/switch

There's also commercial vendors of those exact switches: https://creotech.pl/product/white-rabbit-switch-wrs/

What do you do about security here?

Isn‘t automatically checking out and opening a repository after clicking a link quite a risky affair? Does it bypass the „do you trust this repo“ screen put up by VSCode?

The attacks are designed to only require downlink information, so they‘re triggered by the base station.

In fact, this is in practice the only range limitation of the system - wherever the downlink could be decoded, the attack worked.

In the paper you can see that the attack over 3.8km worked with an omnidirectional antenna and required only very little output power.

Hi, we‘re happy to present AdaptOver this Thursday in Sydney, Australia at the MOBICOM conference.

We use overshadowing, in particular on the uplink, to create a new set of attacks that turn a legitimate base station into an attacker’s asset.

With AdaptOver, an attacker doesn’t use a fake base station. This marks a new attack paradigm that has to be taken into account when developing and evaluating countermeasures or new protocols.

Happy to answer any questions!

I use TeXstudio [1], which is really good with tables, and supports macros which tremendously help speed up the writing process.

When writing for group projects, we use Overleaf [2]. Its Git feature also makes it possible to write locally in TeXstudio and then push the changes to Overleaf.

[1] https://www.texstudio.org/

[2] https://www.overleaf.com/

I couldn‘t figure out how this scheme works - the only detail I found is that there is „a bunch of maths“ and replay protection of some sort.

Is there a technical protocol description somewhere? I‘d be interested in reading this.

So if any single one of your used services leaks your password, you‘re essentially screwed since the root can be determined. Have you heard of haveibeenpwned.com?

Are there solutions that allow you to do this for more than 1 server?

I‘d like to be able to choose one of the servers in the rack to access and not buy & manage one of these devices for every server.

No that can't be it, it's limited to 2TB. Could you post the link? Thanks!

Where did you find the unlimited storage offering? I couldn't find it on their website.

Any idea where to get a good quality 30dBi antenna these days (for 2.4GHz or different frequencies)?

Nice, thanks for the link. I‘m the author of AdaptOver, and I‘m in process to release a new version (paper is under submission atm) that removes the range limitations almost entirely by overshadowing the uplink instead of the downlink. It works by coercing the legitimate base station to transmit the attack message as response (i.e., Identity Request, Attach Reject, …).

I‘m interested to see if Radio Sentinel could/will detect the new improved version! Would you be willing to provide us with a test version/device?

The article focuses heavily on why existing solutions are bad, but doesn’t seem to propose novel detection techniques - or at least glosses a bit over the details of the detection algorithm.

Would the approach be able to detect an AdaptOver/LTrack style attack?