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email: me at rdeaton dot space
Add to that list respecting the TOS of the user's ISP so that the user does not get banned, and providing some sort of remuneration if illicit activity through the proxy causes problems for the primary user, and then _maybe_ you could call this all not shady as fuck.
There’s a number of comments and linked threads suggesting it is not, but easier to just link the biggest thread than try to track all the subthreads.
A Github issue with actual data instead of just someone reposting info: https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/28224
Previously discussed: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48626930
A Github issue with actual data instead of just someone reposting info: https://github.com/openai/codex/issues/28224
Previously discussed: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=48626930
Yes. Flash cells in SSDs are rated for a particular number of write cycles.
This metaphor, while it seems intended to challenge the OP, kinda reinforces it. Many countries and cultures give some limited access to alcohol at a younger age, and the result is generally that they end up having fewer instances of problematic binge drinking when they come of age. A little bit of exposure instead of complete abstention helps people learn to have a healthier relationship than letting them hit 21 and dropping them into the deep end unrestricted.
This is and has been a common term in any systems programming concept for decades. You can, for example, search CVEs and easily find some from over 15 years ago: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2010-1119
It was even enumerated in the first pass of CWE as CWE-416 in 2006.
what is most likely a simple mistake or process breakdown
I think this needs justification. My status quo is to believe that most times I have a problem when dealing with these large corporations that they've made any process for getting support or remediating what _should_ be a simple process breakdown is a labyrinth of steps to make it as difficult as possible to reach any sort of remedy to discourage you from even trying. People are raging because calmly asking for assistance doesn't work, the only way to pierce through is to make a scene big enough that it risks reputational damage to simply get the attention that every individual deserves.
that constellation is already up there and if its fine right now
A lot of astronomers disagree.
The default sandboxing for Codex does not allow the agent to access .git
The math trades still happen regularly at cons, e.g. Origins had one just last week.
I guess I'm glad I snap bought, looks like I may have gotten the last one on Amazon for the 14" at least. I see a couple 16" options around at slightly higher than they were at retail but steal cheaper than Apple's new prices.
There are some Apple resellers that haven't quite caught up to the price increase yet. I just got a 14" M5 Max 128G, 2TB for $5100 off Amazon through Adorama, https://expercom.com/products/16-inch-macbook-pro-with-m5-pr... seems to have them in stock as well.
That would be why it chose a VM that is explicitly designed for sandboxing rather than native executable code or similar, the risk can be minimized by reducing the surface area available to that executable code to almost nothing.
It would take those devices having synchronized atomic clocks, which they do not.
CPUC exists. CAISO exists. The consumer experience is still bad. What this means is that there is not enough generation
The existence of CPUC and CAISO says nothing of their efficacy. Jumping all the way past any question of their efficacy is egregious.
Importantly, in that rule:
Complaints about paywalls are off topic, so please don't post them.
Not with those exact terms, but it is certainly being discussed. Wes McKinney said in a recent talk that with current coding agents there’s no longer an excuse for shipping suboptimal code that takes on tech debt. Writing tests has never been cheaper, writing custom fuzzers, linters, and other harnesses that serve as guardrails has never been cheaper. His take is that “we didn’t have enough engineering time to do it right” is no longer an excuse, and the only excuses left are that you don’t know any better or you have bad taste.
What language that is actually used 40 years after release isn't undergoing big, fundamental changes?
Java? Nope, you're getting a fundamental change in Valhalla C++? Nope, new language edition every few years with fundamental changes C? C23 has a number of fairly fundamental changes, expect more in the next language revision
I think your sense of causality is backwards here. These languages are getting fundamental changes because they're being widely used. That is what motivates and drives the change. Languages with no users don't need to change.
I'd have hoped in 2026 that anyone publishing this type of report would understand that DNSSEC isn't helping anything, and is generally considered to be actively harmful to enable. I'd suggest doing a bit more research and dropping the DNSSEC stuff, or reversing it entirely.
If you read the article and the linked documentation, you'll see that those things aren't in the list of what this change applies to.
Do you have any reference to the Rust community “not allowing” something? This seems more like a case of a relatively niche tool doing what it needed to do to work, but not (yet) some broader effort to upstream or integrate this into cargo or rustup. I couldn’t find any RFCs or anything, for instance.
How about the boy who called nonsense security vulnerabilities. This is the same author who posts with incredulity that the ability to change a config file with a shell command in it gives you the ability to run the shell command you posted and wants it treated as some big CVE. Absolutely inconceivable that you might already have your harness in a sandbox where this is okay, and inconceivable that anyone might have a threat model that says that someone who can edit configuration of a tool can make that tool do arbitrary things allowed by its config.
https://www.flyingpenguin.com/ox-security-report-anthropic-m...
I can buy the idea that if you can have the MDM infrastructure attest the code signing identity through the designated requirements, that you can probably come pretty close, but I'm still not quite sure you get there with root on macOS (and I suspect that this is part of why DCAppAttest hasn't made it to macOS yet).
Certainly, it still doesn't get you there with their current implementation, as the attempts at blocking the debugger like PT_DENY_ATTACH are runtime syscalls, so you've got a race window where you can attach still. Maybe it gets you there with hardened runtime? I'd have to think a bit harder on that.
If you can prove a public key is generated by the SEP of a machine running with all Apple's security systems enabled, then you can trivially extend that to confidential computing because the macOS security architecture allows apps to block external inspection even by the root user.
It only effectively allows this for applications that are in the set of things covered by SIP, but not for any third-party application. There's nothing that will allow you to attest that arbitrary third-party code is running some specific version without being tampered with, you can only attest that the base OS/kernel have not been tampered with. In their specific case, they attempt to patch over that by taking the hash of the binary, but you can simply patch it before it starts.
To do this properly requires a TEE to be available to third-party code for attestation. That's not a thing on macOS today.
MDMs on macOS are permissioned via AccessRights, and you can verify that their permission set is fairly minimal and does not allow what you've described here (bits 0, 4, 10).
That said, their privacy posture at the cornerstone of their claims is snake oil and has gaping holes in it, so I still wouldn't trust it, but it's worth being accurate about how exactly they're messing up.
A note, as others have posted on this thread: I mention this as a concrete and trivial flaw in their whole strategy, but the issue is fundamental: there's no hardware enclave for third-party code available to do the type of attestation that would be necessary. Any software approach they develop will ultimately fall to that hole.
Looking at their paper at [1], there's a gaping hole: there's no actual way to verify the contents of the running binaries. The binary hash they include in their signatures is self-reported, and can be modified. That's simply game over.
[1] https://github.com/Layr-Labs/d-inference/blob/master/papers/...
That idea was not expressed in the article, only the fact that the ads were removed. This is worth covering, especially when coupled with the context for what ads Meta regularly does allow. One does not have to believe that they're obligated to do so while also believing that it's incredibly scummy behavior that consumers should be aware of and question.
https://www.reuters.com/investigations/meta-is-earning-fortu...