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mhher

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OpenClaw has a faithful base of Chinese agents behind it. The Chinese web is flooded with posts about OpenClaw users becoming millionaires in order to entice more and more people to install it due to its incredibly sloppy and easily exploitable nature.

Peter and Sam are a masterclass in deception (or incompetence).

I once randomly stumbled upon this in GNOME Software (alphabetical sorting). Was very happy to find such a quality title there.

Most AI coding assistants are fundamentally broken. Tools like Claude Code and OpenCode eagerly load 10k+ tokens of monolithic system prompts into a single context window before you even type. This guarantees context amnesia and destroys local inference speeds.

I built late to fix this. It’s a single-binary Go/BubbleTea TUI built around a subagent orchestrator pattern. The main prompt is strictly ~100 lines. The orchestrator routes tasks to transient subagents with isolated context windows, explicitly preventing the "Debugging Decay" (https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.18403) and context pollution seen in monolithic agents.

Architectural notes:

* Linux Native: Strictly respects XDG base directories. No Windows support. No padded Electron GUI.

* Execution Load: The rapid context switching breaks the mainline llama.cpp scheduler. You must compile the specific PR linked in the README (or just point it at any standard API via localhost:8080).

* Licensing: BSL 1.1 to keep the core orchestrator logic out of VC-backed wrappers.

I also open-sourced pure-go-sgd (AGPLv3) today for those interested in bare-metal Go infrastructure: https://github.com/mlhher/pure-go-sgd

While I understand the premise I think this is a highly flawed way to operate these tools. I wouldn't want to have someone with my personal data (whichever part) that might give it to anyone who just asks nicely because the context window has reached a tipoff point for the models intelligence. The major issue is a prompt attack may have taken place and you will likely never find out.

The current hype around agentic workflows completely glosses over the fundamental security flaw in their architecture: unconstrained execution boundaries. Tools that eagerly load context and grant monolithic LLMs unrestricted shell access are trivial to compromise via indirect prompt injection.

If an agent is curling untrusted data while holding access to sensitive data or already has sensitive data loaded into its context window, arbitrary code execution isn't a theoretical risk; it's an inevitability.

As recent research on context pollution has shown, stuffing the context window with monolithic system prompts and tool schemas actively degrades the model's baseline reasoning capabilities, making it exponentially more vulnerable to these exact exploits.