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kjok

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edera.dev 1mo ago

Container Speed. VM-Level Security

kjok
8pts2
multikernel.io 2mo ago

One Agent Sandbox Is Not Enough

kjok
3pts0
news.ycombinator.com 3mo ago

Ask HN: Founders/investors, what AI bet you made in 2022 and how it is going?

kjok
6pts1
www.businessinsider.com 8mo ago

At a major AI conference, Perplexity got voted most likely to flop

kjok
4pts1
web.ai 8mo ago

A collection of links that existed about Anguilla as of 2003

kjok
56pts24
news.ycombinator.com 10mo ago

Ask HN: Is ChatGPT/Claude suggesting to use malicious NPM packages?

kjok
2pts0
news.ycombinator.com 10mo ago

Ask HN: What measures are you taking to stop AI crawlers?

kjok
6pts14
news.ycombinator.com 1y ago

Show HN: Stopping bots and fraud in online surveys

kjok
4pts1
news.ycombinator.com 2y ago

Ask HN: What can we do as a community to prevent XZ-like attacks in future?

kjok
7pts3
news.ycombinator.com 2y ago

Ask HN: FOSS maintainers, what can you "sell" to sustain and earn a living?

kjok
16pts21
news.ycombinator.com 2y ago

Ask HN: How do you handle kernel security patches?

kjok
3pts0
news.ycombinator.com 2y ago

Ask HN: Why is open source vulnerability management still an unsolved problem?

kjok
3pts1
news.ycombinator.com 2y ago

Ask HN: Why is open source vulnerability management still an unsolved problem?

kjok
5pts1
guruitsource.com 4y ago

Here's an idea: permission system for NPM packages

kjok
4pts1
research.fb.com 5y ago

AskHN: Why are so many top-notch CS researchers working for a dropout?

kjok
3pts0
news.ycombinator.com 6y ago

Ask HN: Where are you hosting your in-person meetings and why?

kjok
1pts0
asciinema.org 6y ago

Use security vetted NPM and Python packages

kjok
6pts1

I should have been clearer and specific: state management is done on the backend, but collecting behavioral biometrics and device fingerprint is done using JavaScript, which can be manipulated.

Adversaries do not have to wait for LLM models to evolve to mimic human process, they can simply evade the detection JavaScript that evaluates similarity. JavaScript is visible, can easily be reverse-engineered.

Please also collect responses from people, you'd find a pattern: a new attack is launched, people make noise, and later go back to installing packages the same way. Enterprises already use private registries to combat such attacks, vulnerable folks include individual devs and small teams.

Compare this to Android where you can run malware and it cannot do anything except for annoying you with notifications.

Are you sure it cannot do anything? Looking through various past malware/exploits, this doesn't seem to be the case.

Thanks for sharing your approach!

It is nothing special. We keep X number of machines in a warm pool.

I'd love to better understand the unit economics here. Specifically, whether cost is a meaningful factor.

The reason I ask is that many startups we've seen focus heavily on optimizing their technology to reduce cold/boot startup times. As you pointed out, perceived latency can also be improved by maintaining a warm pool of VMs.

Given that, I'm trying to determine whether it's more effective to invest in deeper technical optimizations, or to address the cold start problem by keeping a warm pool.

There are dozens of projects like this emerging right now. They all share the same challenge: establishing credibility.

Care to elaborate on the kind of "credibility" to be established here? All these bazillion sandboxing tools use the same underlying frameworks for isolation (e.g., ebpf, landlock, VMs, cgroups, namespaces) that are already credible.

You're right that registries are under-resourced. But, if automated malware scanning actually worked, we'd already see big tech partnering with package registries to run continuous, ecosystem-wide scanning and detection pipelines. However, that isn't happening. Instead, we see piecemeal efforts from Google with assurance artifacts (SLSA provenance, SBOMs, verifiable builds), Microsoft sponsoring OSS maintainers, Facebook donating to package registries. Google's initiatives stop short of claiming they can automatically detect malware.

This distinction matters. Malware detection is, in the general case, an undecidable problem (think halting problem and Rice theorem). No amount of static or dynamic scanning can guarantee catching malicious logic in arbitrary code. At best, scanners detect known signatures, patterns, or anomalies. They can't prove absence of malicious behavior.

So the reality is: if Google's assurance artifacts stop short of claiming automated malware detection is feasible, it's a stretch for anyone else to suggest registries could achieve it "if they just had more resources." The problem space itself is the blocker, not just lack of infra or resources.

automated scanners seem to do a good job already of finding malicious packages.

That's not true. This latest incident was detected by an individual researcher, just like many similar attacks in the past. Time and again, it's been people who flagged these issues, later reported to security startups, not automated tools. Don't fall for the PR spin.

If automated scanning were truly effective, we'd see deployments across all major package registries. The reality is, these systems still miss what vigilant humans catch.