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jfkimmes

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They hint at their AI-augmented reversing methodology, which demonstrates one of the core strengths of current LLM agents. These models, trained extensively on code, can immensely speed up the process of understanding complex system internals.

Security research historically has two difficult components that build on one another: 1. Understanding complex system internals: uncovering the inner workings hidden by abstractions or interfaces 2. Finding vulnerabilities in these uncovered mechanisms

Sometimes both steps are equally hard. But often, finding the vulnerability is trivial once the real mechanisms are uncovered, rather than relying on assumptions about inner workings.

CVE-2026-3854 is a case where the vulnerability is not plainly obvious after understanding the internals. Still, I am confident that this command injection would have been found quickly had it been exposed to a more traditional or accessible attack surface.

GPT-5.5 3 months ago

Do you have a source for that?

Neither the release post, nor the model card seems to indicate anything like this?

GPT-5.5 3 months ago

Everyone talked about the marketing stunt that was Anthropic's gated Mythos model with an 83% result on CyberGym. OpenAI just dropped GPT 5.5, which scores 82% and is open for anybody to use.

I recommend anybody in offensive/defensive cybersecurity to experiment with this. This is the real data point we needed - without the hype!

Never thought I'd say this but OpenAI is the 'open' option again.

Fully agree. But instead of having "the government have full control over people's money", I think, setting this up as a federated cheap-to-run payment system would be even better. This would allow multiple existing banks to offer the service to their existing customers. This could reduce the risk of a fully decentralized solution a little bit.

It's private for the user. Transactions are only between you and the merchant. Credit card networks, PayPal, etc are all third parties with insight into all Payments going through them globally.

It's offline. Neither you nor the merchant have to have a connection to the bank for the transaction to happen.

Usually, in the context of these privacy-preserving payment systems, online vs offline refers to whether the merchant has to be online to check if the 'coin' they received is valid (authentic and not doubly spent). The user usually has no reason to be online at all, since they withdrew the coin already in the past.

By that definition neither the wallet holder nor the merchant would have to be online for a real 'offline' system.

GNU Taler e.g. is an online system on the other hand, where the merchant has to be online for pragmatic reasons. It's kind of sad to see them being categorically excluded by this requirement. Their the best we currently have afaik.

(Check out my answer below for sources https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36520725)

Chaum designed and tried to commercialize an anonymous + offline payment system in the 90s already.

Basically he used (and invented) blind signatures to allow the bank to sign a 'coin' without knowing what they signed. The customer takes the blindly signed coins from the bank, pays at a merchant and later the merchant deposits the coins at the bank again, where the signature is checked.

In this context offline just means that the merchant can verify the authenticity of the coin without immediately needing a connection to the bank. At some point in the future, however, the merchant will have to connect to the bank to get their money. Check out his original paper for details[1].

Offline systems have drawbacks, though. E.g the GNU Taler people made the pragmatic decision to have an online system. See chapter 1.2.1 'Offline vs Online' of Florian Dold's Phd thesis for a discussion on why[2].

[1] https://chaum.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Chaum-1990-Chap... [2]: https://taler.net/papers/thesis-dold-phd-2019.pdf

Just be aware that your pipeline prompt should not contain any secrets and you should expect that users will be able to subvert your pipeline prompt! I think the most popular name for these attacks is currently 'prompt injection'.

I'm in the same situation as the author and I cannot agree more with this statement:

The Framework is… a pretty good laptop! Frankly, for the first model from a brand new company, Framework did an astounding job of feeling like your everyday consumer electronics seller. Pre-ordering opened up quick, shipped soon thereafter, and there weren’t any hiccups.

I was definitely impressed of how well everything worked, from shipping the laptop to build quality. It is a very fun device to use.

In case the author reads here:

I sure wish Framework provided fwupd support! I have yet to update my BIOS because I’d prefer to use fwupd rather than create a mess with my bootloader.

There is an image for the most recent BIOS upgrade in LVFS-Testing [1].

[1] https://knowledgebase.frame.work/en_us/framework-laptop-bios... >> "LVFS update"

I toyed with a similar setup recently and I had the problem that I, too, would have rules depend on a "docker build"-step (like `docker-image` in your example). Usually `make` would stop building the dependency for non-PHONY targets if it finds the correct file but in this case it obviously cannot find anything.

I tried `touch`ing hidden files for each step and then add those as a dependency but that is not very elegant. Do you have this problem at all?

We're not there yet, but we're trying :)

Thank you for trying! You have an amazing product and provided much needed innovation in this space.

(Written from my Framework Laptop)

I run several bridges from my home. With End-to-Bridge Encryption enabled this gives you about the same security guarantees as E2EE with a second device added (Signal Desktop, etc). With Beeper you can do the same, IIRC. Their value proposition then hinges on how good their clients can aggregate conversations and different chat networks, I guess.

There have been plenty of times that I didn't want to hand over my name and address for an online purchase, but the traditional payment systems aren't set up for privacy.

Private payments can easily solved without a blockchain. For private payments you don't need a completely trust-less system. Taler[1] solves this quite elegantly: they provide completetly anonymous payments for the customer but still require the merchant to be 'on-record' to make money laundering harder/impossible. For that they rely on a regulated and trusted party as you would with a regular payment provider or bank. No proof of work needed, no value volatility, just an online representation of cash with accountability for the merchant built-in.

Of course, this also means that your second point is still valid for Taler: The involved trusted parties could collectively decide that they want to discriminate against certain merchants, in the same way the current payment providers did.

[1] https://taler.net/en/