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hlieberman

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Security is part of it -- dpkg and apt were not built to deal with the problem of tracking each individual executables' complied library versions. When the next Heartbleed happens, how will you know which things need to be recompiled? (Some of this data exists in adjacent Debian systems for DD's internal use, but it's not integrated into dpkg in any way.)

https://wiki.debian.org/StaticLinking#downsides has some of the background there.

Hello! I am a Debian Developer, though not likely to work on this as I haven't done a ton of rust binary packaging.

I did want to clear up one misconception that you might be having, though. The .deb versions shipped by upstream are great, but they're not really ever going to be useful for Debian. One of the side-effects of Debian's requirements around software freedom is an important principle: you should be able to build any package in Debian with only the things that are in Debian.

The problem with fresh isn't fresh itself -- packaging that isn't particularly difficult, though it does need some amount of care and attention. The problem is that fresh pulls in 732 different crates which all need to be packaged in Debian before fresh can be. Some of them are already in Debian, of course, but... you can imagine that the effort here is very much not insignificant.

Upstream doesn't have to deal with this problem, as they can simply statically build them into the executables. That's a violation of Debian policy, though, and isn't allowed for anything in the archive.

Hope that helps you understand why you may not get many bites at this offer, generous as it is!

That's true... for the exploit demo that they released. The primitive that underlies the exploit, however -- a page cache write -- can easily bypass the container boundary. One only needs to hook an executable which is also present in the host.

… really? This is simultaneously so far down in the plumbing and extremely resistant to measuring the impact of, I can’t imagine anyone building a company off of this that’s not already deep in the weeds (lookin’ at you, WolfSSL).

The idea that a startup would be competitive in the VC “the only thing that matters are the feels” environment seems crazy to me.

If there is an aircraft evacuation and someone is getting their bag out of the carry-on, the proper response is punching them in the face and throwing them onto the ground so people can step over (or on) them.

With seat pitches so tight these days, the idea that an evacuation can be done by unprepared people in 90 seconds is a pipedream, even before taking into consideration people trying to get their luggage.

If it's salted, you can't share it with a third-party and determine who your customers in common are. (That's the point of the salt; to mean that my_hash(X) != your_hash(X)).

I really like this... except you should add a special case for 911. I strongly believe that all phones, and anything that looks like phones, should be able to dial out in an emergency.

Obviously, this can raise its own problems -- you'll have to train the kids not to randomly dial 911! -- but you never know what circumstances might exist where someone in a panic reaches for the nearest phone.

I bought "No Bullshit Guide to Linear Algebra" a number of years ago, and it was super useful for me to get closer to grokking the math behind it (as someone who flunked out of calc in school).

Ivan was also really helpful when I emailed him with some stupid questions -- way above and beyond.

I have many questions. The government uses a lot of these kind of things, but they need to go through very specific certification processes that Librem doesn't seem to have gone through.

They are extremely vague here about what the actual connection is. Is it IPsec with a PQ-safe algorithm? How are keys actually exchanged? How are they stored on the hardware?

This could potentially be really cool... but with the information we have, I can't imagine how anyone could actually look at this as a serious product for consideration.

This is a troll, right? The strace for "ls" on my system consists of 1) checking if selinux is enabled (which their re-implementation does not do), 2) openat -> fstat -> getdents64, 3) writing out the information those syscalls gave you.

Jumping from "oh my gosh you can (incorrectly) reimplement ls from a trace of syscalls" to "this means the end of binary blobs" is a level of detachment from reality I've most recently seen from Geoff Lewis. Never mind that the author mixes up eBPF tracing and strace.

Big oof. I hope he has family and friends close enough to pull him out of the spiral.

If you were the CEO of one of his companies, what would you do to limit his ability to access your corporate information and people at this point? Forget whether or not you invite him to a board meeting….

n=1 isn't necessarily data, and I have other questions (the formate concentration of the probiotic variant is 4x over JH1140, but JH1140 is itself a mutant; what's the formate production of an average wildtype strain?). Methanol can cause blindness in as little as 4mL, so the amounts we're talking about are relatively small; 4mL of methanol ≅ 99mmol.

It’s not just the UK who has standardized on these language; the U.S. intelligence community also has a list of required terminology to use for different confidence levels and different likelihoods — and distinguishing between them. It’s all laid out in ICD-203, publicly available at https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICD/ICD-203.pdf

I’ve found it very helpful in the same vein as RFC 2119 terminology (MUST, SHOULD, MAY, etc.); when you need your meanings to be understood by a counterparty and can agree on a common language to use.