The latest page cache-related LPE, even though it's not Thursday night (here). EL9 kernels don't have the modules enabled, and the PoC doesn't build on Debian 13 or Ubuntu 24.04, whether or not that means they're safe.
HN user
gnufx
You might not have root on an organizational "managed" system.
Any university or national HPC system as I'd understand the term is multi-user.
There are also things like the extensive high energy physics WLCG compute federation, which is somewhat different, but can potentially be compromised quickly at large scale. For the original copy-fail we didn't want to drain our WLCG Alma9 cluster, or just kill all the jobs like the university HPC system. We got eBPF mitigation in place within a couple of hours, relieved the exploit signature wasn't in logs from the night before. That would have been done earlier if Proofpoint hadn't bounced the forwarded oss-security article as "contains malware"; sigh.
The primary source, which says keep the dirtyfrag mitigations in place, is https://github.com/v12-security/pocs/tree/main/fragnesia
Yes, but its authN components only act locally, and PAM is optional for sshd. It can/does call out to network services like Kerberos/LDAP given a password, of course, but I was thinking of network authN connected directly with OIDC somehow, for which I don't know a mechanism in vanilla OpenSSH. (I don't know what Authentik does for this -- I could imagine it's behind the scenes somehow.) I should probably look it up sometime.
I'm happy for anyone who doesn't have MS Windows/Active Directory -- so Kerberos -- in their organization, but I'd need (Free)IPA or similar for user/access management anyway. Certificates are an extra layer of SSH-specific complexity, which concerns me for security even if it doesn't involve some third party. MFA is needed once a day, say, for SSO to all Kerberized services. [As I understand it, "managing an OIDC IdP" includes shipping the contents of Active Directory to Entra, heaven help us.]
Setting up Kerberos in 2026 feels somewhat close to malpractice to me.
Microsoft (if that means anything, but they've done good work) and Red Hat obviously disagree, along with decades' experience. It is malpractice not to secure NFS mounts (and other network filesystems with sensitive data), and that means Kerberos.
Yes, FreeIPA is Kerberos+LDAP+X.509 CA, and GSSAPI is in OpenSSH (normally with the key exchange patch). SSSD is a local mechanism, not network authentication. I mentioned authorized keys distribution mechanisms elsewhere, but I was thinking authentication (c.f. OIDC), not authorization.
I don't want to have to get a special purpose credential when I have a TGT which can work generally, and is at least required for secure remote filesystem access.
You have to manage extra infrastructure for certificates and, as a user, have the friction of firing up a JavaScript-enabled web browser via an additional tool, assuming "real IdP" means using OIDC. Unfortunately that flow is actually needed for remote systems and something like Edugain federation, since Moonshot/IETF ABFAB failed, but at least Shibboleth can use the TGT, and it's not the Globus horror.
Public keys (for OpenSSH) can be in DNS (VerifyHostKeyDNS) or in, say, LDAP via KnownHostsCommand and AuthorizedKeysCommand.
If you mean using OIDC, in that space there's at least https://github.com/EOSC-synergy/ssh-oidc, https://dianagudu.github.io/mccli/ and OpenPubkey-ssh discussed in https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=43470906 (which might mention more).
How does SSSD support help with SSH authN? I know you can now get Kerberos tickets from FreeIPA using OIDC(?), but I forget if SSSD is involved.
Life is easier if you can use Kerberos SSO, i.e. GSSAPIAuthentication in OpenSSH. (If we're talking certificates, presumably it is OpenSSH, or does anything else implement them?)
As far as I remember, that's just because only the find/replace was implemented, and it could have more sophisticated (semantic?) features.
Its author says it implements a CRDT in its theory documentation.
Before isnan() the Fortran test for NaN was (x .ne. x), assuming an IEEE 754 implementation.
I had a Fairphone 3, and after 5 years, /e/OS was outdated by 4 years w.r.t. the manufacturer updates
Mine is running /e/ and reporting Android 13, which appears to be the last one Fairphone support. /e/ said it was too difficult to support 14 with the kernel involved. It's had continual security updates apart from the Android version.
Edit: Murena make it clear which phones are officially supported and which have "community" support.
Some of those codebases might be (interesting) operating systems.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALGOL_68#Operating_systems_wri...
Used in the impressive Guix bootstrap.
https://guix.gnu.org/manual/1.5.0/en/html_node/Full_002dSour...
Indeed. The first dedicated light -- for various values of "light" -- source[1] repurposed the tunnel and various bits and techniques from the particle physics accelerator it replaced, and on which parasitic "light" measurements were made previously. See also [2].
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchrotron_Radiation_Source
2. https://www.ukri.org/publications/new-light-on-science-socio...
In the context of the article "collider" means intersecting particle beams, like in RHIC and LHC, which obviously involves rather low probability interactions, as opposed to accelerators which slam a beam into a dense target (like the SLAC accelerator). In a synchrotron light source you want the beam to circulate and specifically not collide with anything; they were developed from particle physics accelerators, of course.
You imply that experiment contaminated drinking, and other, water. How? Are you saying the Cs¹³⁷ leaked, and at concentration above that from fallout, say? Its γ-rays don't activate materials — I've used enough of them.
Since when were industrial products the purpose? Why do you think my colleagues can't analyse LHC data and discover the Higgs particle? The article says RHIC was a considerable scientific success.
As I recall, RHIC itself replaced some cancelled project. I remember the tunnel being at least partly there in the mid-80s, with a plan to trundle ions from the tandem lab through a crazy long beamline across the site and stop nuclear structure research there as a result.
Good to see. For what it's worth, data were previously available from the Competition and Markets authority, used by https://localfuelprices.co.uk/
Oh, I hadn't found that. Yes, it seems strange not to publicize something like that to give users confidence (assuming the audit/pentest isn't damning). It doesn't have to have been perfect initially, as long as appropriate fixes were made.
With regard to European sovereignty, I note that Netbird uses AWS.
I've looked without success for external audit reports of either Tailscale and Netbird, like Mullvad gets. While I don't approve of the sort of auditor box-ticking we get at work, it would be reassuring to see a report from a proper security consultancy.
I'm just reading what was written, especially "the specific components we needed", and assuming they're not as incompetent as is being suggested, given they've served me well. Perhaps you haven't been tendering for server hardware recently, even bog-standard stuff, and seen the responses that even say they can't quote a fixed price currently. At least, that's in my part of the world, in an operation buying a good deal of hardware. We also have systems over ten years old running.
commodity hardware
Apart from the "someone's basement", as objected to in this thread, it also doesn't say they acquired "commodity hardware"; I took it to suggest the opposite, presumably for good reason.
Fedora, for instance, is built with LTO, except for some packages which it breaks. I've forgotten the details of where I had to turn it off.
Fortran calling...