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ganeumann

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www.wsj.com 6y ago

Big Oil’s Favorite Toy: Supercomputers (2018)

ganeumann
39pts36
www.wsj.com 7y ago

Google Maps Littered with Fake Business Listings

ganeumann
2pts0
www.bloomberg.com 7y ago

Apple Infringes Qualcomm Patent; Judge Recommends Ban on Some iPhones

ganeumann
5pts1
www.wsj.com 7y ago

Crypto Pioneer David Chaum Says He’s Built a Better Bitcoin

ganeumann
4pts1
www.wsj.com 8y ago

Big Oil’s New Favorite Toy: Supercomputers (2018)

ganeumann
2pts0
blog.kraken.com 9y ago

Kraken Phishing Warning

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1pts0
blogs.wsj.com 10y ago

Confessions of a Failed Early-Stage Equity Investor

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1pts0
en.wikipedia.org 10y ago

Natural Proof

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1pts0
www.fiercetelecom.com 10y ago

Comcast follows Google Fiber's $70 plan in Atlanta

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1pts0
www.bostonglobe.com 10y ago

Thousands of Fidelity workers enroll in student loan repayment benefit

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2pts0
cryptome.org 10y ago

NY Judge's iPhone Hacking Case Reassigned [pdf]

ganeumann
2pts0
www.popularmechanics.com 10y ago

Google and NASA Say Their Quantum Computer Finally Works

ganeumann
3pts0
bugra.github.io 10y ago

Mining a VC

ganeumann
1pts0
www.wsj.com 10y ago

Network of ‘Scouts’ Spreads Money Through Silicon Valley

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76pts22
www.nytimes.com 10y ago

Large Companies Game H-1B Visa Program

ganeumann
400pts392
priceonomics.com 10y ago

The Rise and Fall of .Ly

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3pts0
avc.com 10y ago

Outsider vs. Disruptor

ganeumann
2pts0
www.nytimes.com 10y ago

With G.M.O. Policies, Europe Turns Against Science

ganeumann
2pts0
www.nytimes.com 10y ago

Smaller, Faster, Cheaper, Over: The Future of Computer Chips

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42pts45
www.nytimes.com 10y ago

Smaller, Faster, Cheaper, Over: The Future of Computer Chips

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10pts0
twitter.com 11y ago

The regulatory reaction to eBay [Josh Kopelman tweetstorm]

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2pts0
www.wsj.com 11y ago

Patent Reform Won’t Hurt Professors

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2pts0
www.vanityfair.com 11y ago

Flash Boys a Year Later

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69pts70
www.wsj.com 11y ago

How a Fight Over a Board Game Monopolized an Economist's Life (2009)

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17pts4
freakonomics.com 11y ago

Can Economic Growth Continue Forever? Of Course

ganeumann
6pts0
lists.w3.org 11y ago

Proposal for adding extend to CSS

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1pts0
scottberkun.com 11y ago

Why has innovation slowed down? (Or has it?)

ganeumann
3pts0
reactionwheel.net 11y ago

Heat Death: Venture Capital in the 1980s

ganeumann
23pts1
news.vice.com 11y ago

Is Democratic Senator Jay Rockefeller Trying to Kill a FOIA Reform Bill?

ganeumann
3pts0
online.wsj.com 11y ago

Even Silicon Valley Tilts Republican

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3pts1

That may be true in many companies, but venture capital funded companies almost always have something called a "Voting Agreement". I pulled a random one from my folder of docs, it is below. The upshot, if you are not used to reading these, is that all of the shareholders signed an agreement that says they will vote their shares to elect certain directors. In the absence of an agreement like this you are right, the board could fire the CEO but the majority shareholder could fire the board. But, again, every equity round from a VC that I have seen in the last 25 years (and, I assume, longer, but that's as far back as my personal knowledge goes) has a Voting Agreement in some shape or form.

Actual text from a Voting Agreement:

"NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree as follows:

1. Voting Provisions Regarding Board of Directors.

1.1 Board Composition. Each Stockholder agrees to vote, or cause to be voted, all securities of the Company the holders of which are entitled to vote for members of the Board, including without limitation, all shares of Common Stock, Series A Preferred Stock, by whatever name called, now owned or subsequently acquired by a Stockholder, however acquired, whether through stock splits, stock dividends, reclassifications, recapitalizations, similar events or otherwise (“Shares”) owned by such Stockholder, or over which such Stockholder has voting control, from time to time and at all times, in whatever manner as shall be necessary to ensure that at each annual or special meeting of stockholders at which an election of directors is held or pursuant to any written consent of the stockholders, the following persons shall be elected to the Board:

(a) For so long as there remain outstanding not less than 200,000 shares of Series A Preferred Stock (subject to appropriate adjustment in the event of any stock dividend, stock split, combination or other similar recapitalization with respect to the Series A Preferred Stock), one (1) individual designated by the holders of a majority of the shares of Series A Preferred Stock then outstanding, which individual shall initially be Jerry Neumann (such director being the director defined as the Series A Directors in the Restated Certificate); and

(b) Two (2) individuals designated by the Key Holders who are at such time providing services to the Company as an officer, director, employee, consultant or advisor holding a majority of the Shares then held by such Key Holders (each such director being one of the directors defined as a Common Director in the Restated Certificate);"

etc. etc.

That is how it works. The board has the power to fire the CEO in all companies that I know of. (I suppose you might be able to write the bylaws so this isn't true but I'm not sure; a corporate lawyer would know.) The best you can do is to have an employment contract that regulates how the firing happens (ie. do you get severance, accelerated options, longer option exercise times, COBRA, etc. if you are fired without "cause", with cause carefully defined.)

Removing you from the board itself is a different matter. But that's usually also explicitly covered: they don't put the founder in the "Common seat" they put the founder in the "CEO seat." That way, when you're fired as CEO you automatically lose your board seat.

Very few things in a VC-backed startup require a shareholder vote. Firing the CEO is not one of them (this is a board vote.) Electing directors to the board is not one of them (this is usually the subject of a voting agreement that ensures board representation by the VCs.)

Let's say the company raises money from VC1, who buys 20%, leaving you with 80%. The contracts add VC1 and an independent to the board, alongside you. Later the company raises money from VC2, who buys 20%, leaving VC1 with 16% and you with 64%. The contracts add VC2 to the board.

Now the board is VC1, VC2, an independent, and you. If the VCs can convince the independent director to vote with them, the board can fire you, even though you own 64% of the company.

Responding solely to the 'moat' question: think railroad price wars in the late 1800s in the US.

Industries with capital expenses relatively large compared to contribution margin tend towards local monopolies. When faced with a potential new entrant the incumbent can lower prices to where the entrant's assets can't return their cost of capital. The incumbent's capital is already sunk so they can afford to bring prices close to the marginal cost of providing the service. This threat of a price war is usually enough to deter entry.

This also leads to agglomeration in local markets both to avoid duplicative assets and to add credence to the price war threat.

I'll skip the humility. I'm smart. Always have been. My parents realized it early on and praised me for it. I pretty much slept through high school because after a couple of minutes of explanation of any math, science or computer science concept I grasped it. I never did any work, although I read a lot about the subjects I enjoyed, because I enjoyed them.

The non-STEM stuff was confusingly ill-defined and in those subjects I was average, at best. And because I wasn't good at them, I avoided them: I didn't do anything to be smart, I always had been, so what could I do to become smart at reading Shakespeare? I had no idea how I could learn to understand something I didn't understand because understanding seemed to have been something I was just born with.

I did well enough on the SATs to get into a top college and decided to major in electrical engineering. I skated through freshman year, earning a low B average.

Towards the end of the year I met with my advisor, the head of the department for the first time. Without preamble he said "We made a mistake. You're not really the person you looked like you'd be in your application." I didn't really grasp what he was saying. "You're not getting the grades your record indicates you could get. You're not working hard enough. You should think about transferring to a less demanding school. In any case, EE requires a commitment and I think you should pick a different major."

I was stunned. This was the first time in my life that anyone had ever done anything but praise my academics. I was angry. How could this adult, who claimed to be some sort of mentor, talk to me like that? In fact, writing this years and years later, I'm still a little pissed off.

But looking around, all my friends and classmates were working their asses off, getting ready for finals. The guy may have been a jerk, but he was right: I wasn't working hard and I wasn't learning very much. Much as I dislike the guy, I have to admit he did me an enormous service. He recognized that I needed a kick in the teeth to take his advice seriously. The next three years I made sure I worked harder than everyone else around me, if only to prove that he was wrong, that I hadn't been a mistake. I stayed in EE and would have graduated near the top of my class if I hadn't had to factor in my freshman year grades.

So what does that prove? That you can make a kid neurotic if you push him hard enough? Maybe. But I know that if I had tried to skate through my post-college life being smart and not working, I would have got nowhere and done nothing interesting. Being super intelligent is like having giant biceps: impressive, but rarely useful. People admire intelligence, but they reward getting things done. Getting things done requires some intelligence, but much more it requires hard work and stick-to-itiveness. I'm not faulting my parents one bit: they manifestly loved me, found me good schools and interesting activities and fed my eagerness to do useful things. But I'm careful with my kids to praise the things they control and can change--like hard work and not being deterred when things are hard--and let the being smart thing take care of itself.

It's often an issue in up-rounds as well.

Sometimes firms can't follow-on from a different fund even if they're following, up-round or down-round. That's why funds usually reserve money for follow-on investments.

Firms often have to go back to their LPs if they want to invest in the same company across funds.

Sure, but tackling a problem in a way that your competition can't respond well to is called a strategy. I mean, you can define disruption any way you want, but keep in mind that the reason people use the word disruption when they mean strategy is because they imbue the word with magic power, not because it communicates anything meaningful.

OP.

Meh, every single startup I've seen in the past 25 years has claimed that they are tackling their problem differently than their competitors in some way. If this is what disruption means, then it's the quintessential distinction without a difference. It's the entrepreneurs' equivalent of a VC saying "we add value." A waste of pixels. And if that's the entire content of your strategy--you think being different is all the strategy you need because, "disruptive"--then chances are you're cooked.

Twilio S-1 10 years ago

Re the options, the S-1 says: "As of March 31, 2016, we had outstanding options to purchase an aggregate of 16,704,752 shares of our Class B common stock, with a weighted-average exercise price of approximately $5.57 per share, under our equity compensation plans. After March 31, 2016, we issued options to purchase an aggregate of 671,550 shares of our Class B common stock, with a weighted-average exercise price of $10.30 per share, under our 2008 Plan."

Assuming they're going to IPO at more than $10 per share (which is usual) and that the option strike price has not gone down (so all the options issued prior to 3/31/16 were at a strike less than $10.30 per share) it looks like almost all the options would be in the money to some extent.

It matters mainly because we have come to the point where you need to be very rich to pursue justice. If Gawker wronged you, as a hundredaire, you're just SOL.

I think much of the anger at Thiel is really misplaced anger at a justice system seemingly built with the goal of enriching lawyers. Government's one job is to provide justice: why should people have to rely on private funding for it?

Well, not in the US. The money paid to employees is tax-deductible to the business, so it's only taxed once (the employee pays taxes on the money paid to them, but the business doesn't.)

Well, it's not. Not unless you live in one of a very few countries (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Nigeria, or Iraq, http://qz.com/552334/more-people-died-from-terrorism-last-ye...).

People forget that there has always been terrorism and that it has historically been much worse than it is now. Scroll down a bit to the chart of international terror attacks on the US in this report: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/05/terror-tren... (You can also run your own custom report here: http://smapp.rand.org/rwtid/search_form.php)

The 1970s and 1980s were much more dangerous in the US and Western Europe than the 1990s and 2000s. The idea that we are now fighting terrorists and weren't before is ahistorical nonsense. The idea that terrorism is more dangerous in the US today than it has been is purely a result of politically motivated fear-mongering. In the US at least, there is always a war on something. If it's not the cold war, it's the war on drugs, or the war on terror. It's just another system of control.

Hard Tech is Back 10 years ago

To take an example at the far end of the spectrum: in 1989 WPP (the world's largest owner of advertising agencies) bought The Ogilvy Group (a very large ad agency) for $864 million ($1.7 billion in today's dollars.) Ogilvy was nothing but people...there was no other value (except, maybe, the brand, but that's debatable.) At the time people criticized the deal, saying "all of their assets go down the elevator every night." But it turned out to be a great acquisition for WPP.

While the founders and first few employees may leave after an acquisition, preferring to work for themselves, everyone after that is an employee and, as long as they are managed and compensated well, will generally not care so much who the company's owner is.

I know about the landing on the Hudson (my apartment faces the Hudson and I saw it happen), but this paragraph still didn't make sense to me. What solution did the pilots push? Sullenberger, the pilot on that flight is both a glider pilot and a GA flight instructor, so he seems to be the perfect argument that GA skills lend themselves to better problem resolution in unexpected flight situations: he was essentially landing a glider when both engines went.

Sure, but bank size falls off very quickly after the biggest four. Compass is about 3% of the size of JPMorgan by assets (source: http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2014/03/03/ranking-the-50-big...), and 10% of the size of JPMorgan by branches (http://www.usbanklocations.com/bank-rank/number-of-branches....). Theirs are less than 0.7% of bank branches in the US, compared to JPMorgan's 6.6% of branches.

You can disagree with whether this means they had barely any footprint or not, I guess that's semantics, but it certainly makes more sense that they would buy them to expand, not to get rid of a competitor.

I like the longer articles in the New Yorker. The charm of articles like that is becoming familiar with a milieu, not the notional theme of the article. Learning about a small but dedicated subculture by reading an interesting story is more interesting than just knowing the facts about a professional contract bridge cheating scandal.

This tl;dr thing makes sense in articles about technical subjects when all you really want to know is the answer. It makes no sense for things you read for pleasure.

Saying the government will do what it wants is a vast oversimplification of how the government works. The government doesn't speak with a single voice. The FBI can want one thing, the judge in this case another, a different judge something else, and each and every member of congress something different altogether. Even within the executive branch in the US there are differences in opinion: Tor, for instance, is partially funded by the US Department of State and the National Science Foundation (according to their donor page: https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en) while it has been opposed by law enforcement and the NSA.

The importance of a debate like this is it allows the various parts of our governments (and their bosses: us) to state their positions and work out a solution. What that solution is is not a foregone conclusion in the least (cf. the Clipper Chip, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clipper_chip)

Yes, this is a good strategic move by Microsoft. All of my kids have Google apps accounts that their schools set up for them. They are required to use Google docs, etc., so they can work on stuff at school and at home. I assume that a good portion of those kids will continue to use Google apps as a default for a long time. Similar to a strategy Microsoft used to keep Office a standard: the dirt-cheap student version.

If Microsoft can get schools to use Office 365 instead of Google apps, then $2.5 billion for Minecraft was cheap.

That may be true of industrial systems, but human systems bite back. If you devise a strategy for the stock market or the startup market to make more money that anyone else, people who get wind of that strategy can (and will) devise a counter-strategy to eat your lunch.

Innovation is not zero-sum, but if you create a monoculture of "what works", then what will almost certainly eventually work in the market is something different than the monoculture. An interesting analogy here is Feyerabend's take on creativity in science, "Against Method."

Also, I strongly disagree that Google has figured out a process for innovation. Google does not have "one hit after another." They have a hit here and there in a sea of failure, just like Microsoft did. IBM, on the other hand, had one hit after another, until the market figured out how to "disrupt" them, and did.

As an investor I've spent much of the last twenty years trying to figure out how to make a better risk-adjusted return. Either I'm a complete idiot, or it's not as easy as it sounds.