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Except its more like you can choose if you wanted a fraction of a percent added to the price or if you wanted to pay a $5 delivery fee.
The answer varies for small and large orders (and even by share price) For most retail investors that use something like Robinhood, the average order size is small so a flat $5 fee would be way worse.
Then probably something like IB is your best bet. Do you have margin requirements?
Apologies if you already considered this, but make sure you consider execution costs. Depending on your type of strategy and selection of stocks, it may be a major determinant of the success or failure of the strategy.
Matt Levine has a great (humorous) overview of the First Bitcoin Corp shenanigans (scroll to the second section):
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-08-25/insider-t...
Many coffee shops in downtown NYC have the code/key situation.
There are similar regulations in NYC (and I think most of the US, although it is at a local level) that mandate customer bathrooms although they do not sound as strict. For example, small coffee shops (less than ~15 seats) frequently have no customer bathrooms.
I think that is actually the point of the article. Detroit managed to open up their market to a wider set of sellers through a combination of regulation (the Cottage Food Law cutting down regulation for small processors of relatively safe foods) and incubators (Kitchen Connect offering a commissary focused on building new food businesses)
Cutting the start up costs increase the range of profitable business opportunities.
How do you do pseudo classes like :focus?
The CAT on HN! I went to one of the early meetings for this project (years ago now!) It was a question and answer session for potential bidders.
My favorite question: "How long is the contract for?" (the SEC reps look to each other, and then respond...)
"There is no term."
"And the bidder is committed to storing all generated data?"
"Yes."
I dont think so... Maybe you were funneled into the free trial? I also use it with my students and it is free...
I would say the catch is that all of the messaging queues are unbounded.
An interesting tidbit embedded in the news is that $22mm in loans was sold to a single investor - the model they talk about on the website is peer to peer, but this appears more peer-to-institutional-buyer (which I always kind of suspected, but this clarifies it)...
An article on the trend: http://qz.com/355848/wall-street-is-hogging-the-peer-to-peer...
Interesting - I was suspicious that this "Quick Chip" process they refer is less secure, but apparently it is just a matter of poor implementations requiring the card for the entire authorization process:
"According to Ericksen, the ability for EMV transactions to continue as usual without the card remaining dipped after the creation of the cryptogram is actually already an existing EMV process, but it is just not widely used. With the implementation of Quick Chip, no additional testing or certification is needed from a Visa or EMVCo point of view, there are no changes to the process and the technology is inherently EMV compliant."
http://www.pymnts.com/news/emv/2016/visa-puts-the-quick-into...
I've been to NY4! It really is less magical then these articles make it seem. Yes - the security is a bit imposing. For anyone familiar with datacenters, though, it is pretty run of the mill except for it's tremendous scale.
Worth shouting out to Lucera - I have met the CEO and he is a really thoughtful technologist. They are doing some awesome work bringing AWS-style computing to the low latency space. Some interesting details on their deployment: http://www.enterprisetech.com/2014/02/20/amazon-cant-catch-l...
A bit disingenuous - the handful against include major exchanges like NYSE and BATS as well as major trading firms like Citadel.
You could argue that these are direct competitors of IEX and therefore have a vested interest in preventing the new exchange - or you could argue they are best suited to see the holes in the application.
Keep in mind that previous exchange applications have went through without this level of discussion. You could argue that this is because the other exchanges are "scared" of IEX. Or... consider the possibility that IEX's application has some faults. For example, much of the focus has been on IEX's smart order router not following the same rules as all the other exchange participants. The argument is too nuanced to summarize here... but you should never decide an argument based on number of responses!
The trading tax has been hanging over the heads of traders for a long time now. I almost wish they would just create a proper experiment to test it and then repeal it after it inevitably fails (see Sweden for a prime example).
The SEC seems to enjoy "experiments" - the large tick pilot (testing variations on requiring some small cap stocks to trade in increments larger than a penny) is an example of a massive upcoming one. While the large tick pilot suffers from many things - a huge cost to brokers for a dubiously structured experiment - at least it shows a willingness for the SEC to attempt structured experiments. This should be no different.
P.S. For those interested in Sweden - a report considering a transaction tax in Canada that discusses it: http://www.publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R/LoPBd...
The end of this article hints at the real macro trend here: the NYSE floor is a glorified TV stage. Compare NYSE to NASDAQ.
First - a quick explanation of what these market makers do. Every security is primarily listed on a single exchange. In the US, this is dominated by NYSE and NASDAQ. Any listing exchange assigns market makers to the securities that it lists - these firms guarantee that they will both offer and buy the stock within certain limit and pricing restrictions. In return for this responsibility the market makers get price breaks and other preferential treatment. NASDAQ never had a floor, so these were just designated firms you could (in the early days) call. NYSE, on the other hand, assigned this responsibility to specific individuals from firms - all in one building on a single trading floor. Once the markets electronified, it was easier for the NASDAQ market makers to adapt and become electronic and more automated as well. As NYSE held on to the old model of individuals on the floor, they attempted to justify it - mostly by spreading distrust of computers. (Distrust which has proven partially justified - see the Knight Capital meltdown a few years ago.) Despite their arguments that the humans are adding to the stability of the market, the reality is the humans are doing less and less. For the last 5 years at least all floor brokers and market makers are managing most of their orders electronically with the help of "upstairs" - other employees of the markets makers / floor brokers who are upstairs. Furthermore, the benefits that come with being a market maker apply to some of the firm's electronic business as well - effectively making the floor presence a cost that is made up off the floor.
TL;DR - The NYSE floor is a joke. This just proves it.
I would suggest reading both at the same time. The rebuttal is organized to follow along with the format of the book just for this purpose.
This isn't bad: http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-the-big-short-movie-gets-ri...
While Big Short doesn't seem as factually challenged as Flash Boys, it is over-simplified. Either Michael Lewis falls short of his goal of producing an unbiased representation complex issues in a "pop non-fiction" form, or his goal is different and he is a biased observer forming a cohesive story from a cherry-picked selection of facts.
I have found the exact opposite with Flash Boys (and, to a certain extent, with Big Short - although that is less my area of expertise) If you have read Flash Boys and you are interested in the other side of the story I suggest reading a very well edited point-by-point rebuttal: http://www.amazon.com/Flash-Boys-Insiders-Perspective-High-F...
I think it's important to recognize that all this happened on the fringes of JPM - this appears to be some private wealth branch office. Small brokerage outposts like this are generally rife with issues - they have less supervision (frequently a single broker with their supervisory license) and even in better supervised conditions brokers spend the majority of time out of the office and away from the eye of compliance. Compounding the issue is older brokers who are used to different norms in the business - which explain some of his complaints on the broker's FINRA record: more aggressive selling (his suitability complaints), phone orders (the late order entry complaint), etc. Even though he was vindicated, this type of record is common for brokers in these roles. I suspect that is why they chose these specific trumped up charges against him.
I am waiting for the article that tackles the issues at these branch offices head on.
"We don't own your data - Your emails never leave your phone."
This fits with the general trend in trading in fixed income markets versus equities markets.
Due to to the lower amount of liquidity (inventory available for someone who wants to buy/sell), fixed income (bond) markets tended to be traded traditionally - by negotiating with a number of firms individually (whether electronically or over the phone). These traders are extremely worried about someone hearing about their order and trading ahead of them (the actual "front-running" that Flash Boys accused HFTs of doing!) Therefore, they want to carefully release information about their interest in buying/selling to brokers they can trust.
These markets are stubbornly difficult to automate. Attempts at creating open markets where participants can trade anonymously with other participants have mostly failed except in the most liquid fixed income markets. Even though treasuries are some of the most liquid bonds "on the run" (recently issued), other maturities can be extremely illiquid.
Agreed. Matt Levine is one of the few commentators that fully understands market microstructure. The Bloomberg View linked in a different comment (by John Arnold) is horrible with terminology, though.
I can't believe the article in the comment above made it on to Bloomberg View. It uses a completely incorrect definition of front-running - claiming it is a "loose" term. It isn't. Front running is illegal. It requires advanced knowledge of a customer order (as the definition linked from the article states!) That means seeing the order before it appears on a market data feed. "Gleaning" information about the order using publicly available information is not front-running. That is reacting to the market.
This abuse of the term completely confuses the entire debate.
Good question. HFT is a spectrum. At the lowest latency (approximately 5 microseconds), the barriers to entry are massive - multi-million dollar startup costs.
For "kind of fast" - 10-100 microseconds - there are a variety of brokerages that can get you started with costs of approximately $1000-10,000 a month. This is rapidly changing though - the exchanges have been continuously increasing the prices of their market data to the point where consuming the entire US equity market proprietary feeds costs around $50,000/mo in licensing.
Fragmented exchanges are better for everyone except for high frequency traders. Then they actually have to do low latency arbitration to make money instead of full on front running like they do now.
This is a very strong statement with little support. I agree that some competition among exchange operators is important, but how do you justify exchanges like CHX, with approximately 1% market share?
I am not sure how to respond to your comment regarding front running without more detail. Many sources have already debunked the Michael-Lewis-style argument regarding front running. Where do you see front running? (Using the proper definition of trading ahead of a customer order based on knowledge of that order)
Completely agree - in the single exchange markets you see a lot of monopolistic behavior with the operators.
In this current, though, we have three major operators with 2-3 exchanges each - many with single digit percentages of market share. I suspect that the savings in execution cost due to competition are vastly overwhelmed by the increased cost of infrastructure for most market participants (excluding the largest firms).
This article brings up something that HF traders have been bemoaning for a long time: the fragmented US market structure. In US equities, you need to monitor almost a dozen exchanges to be competitive. The popular book "Flash Boys" gave the impression that HF traders loved this market structure and used it to extract more money out of the market. In the majority of cases, this is wrong.
In fact, the fragmented market results in huge costs (4 datacenters worth of infrastructure, low latency connectivity, etc) In reality, most market makers would vastly prefer to simplify this away. This is one of the reasons many traders have moved to alternative markets that have fewer trading venues (for example, many futures and options trade primarily on a single venue)
A lot of the comments are very harsh. I think the underlying message is getting lost: Sometimes when you know something is wrong, it is easy to focus on all of the prerequisites and peripheral problems and never solve the big problem. This type of mistake is even easier with big problems where the difficulty gap between addressing the big problem and the related little problems is widest.
Maybe just abruptly quitting was the only way she could see to resolve a knot of dependencies that seemed impenetrable. If she has the resources to attack the knot from that angle, then there is no shame in it.
Yes. And depending on the material, the fire may spread very rapidly.