coutud

Having used conducto's predecessor extensively, I'd say the approach is more generic.

Buildbot seems very specifically geared towards a CI/CD type of workflow (like jenkins/buidbot), with the classic checkout/build/test/deploy(/notify) steps (cf https://docs.buildbot.net/current/manual/introduction.html#c...). Buildbot seems to allow you to customize some steps within the build part, that will run on the same worker.

On the other side conducto is meant to allow you to describe your workflow in python, without forcing you to follow a specific structure. It's up to you to decide how to parallelize things (I can think of build examples where conducto is used to build many objects (ParallelNode), then link). You just define the successsion of serial/parallel tasks that are needed in your automation, rather than trying to make it fit in whatever the makers thought was a proper way to build/test/deploy.

The fact that there is a routine in the job doesn't make it less necessary for a pilot to be present.

Yes, on a transatlantic flight and once you have reached cruise altitude, you rely on the autopilot to handle the plane while you carry your other tasks : checking fuel levels and consumption, checking new weather reports, etc. Just because you can have a cruise control on your car doesn't mean it is that easy to switch to driverless cars.

b) A large amount of the training book that hey have to go through is relevant to the general practice of flying. Yes, on the very specific airplane that he's using a lot of the calculation is already handled by the fms, but it doesn't mean the pilot shouldn't know about the regulations and workings of his plane, especially for the case where an emergency happens.

c) The biggest barrier to self-flying plane is not the perception of safety. It is the reaction in case of emergency. While one could argue that many accidents can be linked to human error, many are also averted by the pilots onboard reacting correctly to an emergency. And the recent history has shown that even with the huge amount of redundancy that exists in planes computers/sensors/automation systems nowadays, it's not enough to make the plane entirely safe to fly by its own.

Look at AF447, the autopilot disconnected when it couldn't understand the discrepencies between its sensors. And while the pilots didn't have the good reaction, it was due to their lack of proper flying experience (and reliance on automation). Look for the "children of the magenta" video on vimeo for a bit of knowledge about the dangers of relying on automation too much in a cockpit.

This is highly misleading. This money is mostly not from fees, but simply the return made on their own wealth invested in their funds.

See http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-06/billionaire...

Translation from french :

Hi, To change your password, you have to go on ovh website and ask for a change with a given id. An email is sent to the email address associated with the id which includes a unique url. This url is randomly generated with 21 characters, generated from 3 different algorithms for randomess generating each 7 characters. The client who receives the email can then click on the link and get a new password for his id. A confirmation email is sent announcing the change of password. In all emails sent, ovh includes the IP of the person who did the request.

This is a procedure that was set up 7 years ago and hasn't changed since.

On april 26th, we have discovered internely an issue with the function that generates the 21 characters. Two of the three random functions were generating a not-so-random string. It was hence possible to ask for a password change and then to brute-force the password reset url. This problem was found by one of our developpers on apr 26th at 11:03:14 and was fixed at 12:54:13. The origin of this problem was linked to the rand() function used in this part of the code that hasn't been patched to the same level as the rest of the code when we activated the script execution cache (?). We have replaced the old function returning 21 characters from 3 "random" functions with a new function using two really random functions each providing 64 characters.

We have then started searching in our databases to check if the vulnerability had been exploited, and when it could have been. To do that, we have looked at 3 years of history of password resets. We are authorized by the CNIL (commission nationale informatique et liberté, french agency regulating databases containing personnal data) to archive and use all logs for the last 10 years, specifically for this kind of issue.

We have found 3 active ids which had a password reset done by brute-force. These three occurences were targeted attacks against a part of the "bitcoin" community that uses ovh. The hacker seems to have found the flaw on apr 23rd at 22:00, and did a lot of testing for one hour to make his method work. At 23:00, his method was working and he has hacked the first id, then the two others ids the following day, still for bitcoin related sites. We have been in contact with these clients but the quality of our exchanges did not allow us to get enough information that would help reveal an vulnerability on our side. Our developpers have in a completely independant way found the issue mentionned above, and only then have we realised that there was a link between our flaw and these 3 customers. We certainly have something to learn here about the best way to ensure dialog with clients about this kind of issue.

It took us some time to communicate on the subject, because we have quickly realised that the impact was very limited (3 customers) and we wanted to take enough time to verify everything in depth and make sure that this had not impacted any other customers. Having finished our search today going back three years, we can now assert that no other customers have seen this issue. We are going back 10 years now, but the probability that this happened ealier is null.

I think that despite the small impact for our customers, it was our duty to inform everybody of this security incident that we had to deal with last week. We have added a code-review process on some very old code that hasn't been rewritten for years, to check that there are no other similar issues. We are also trying to see how we can improve communication with clients for this kind of incident, knowing that 2 of the 3 customers are actually customers of our affiliates/branches.

TL;DR : Yes, we had a security vulnerability allowing a password change using some complex brute-force procedure. We advise all clients running critical services to limit access to the manager from some IP only. Yes, 3 clients of the bitcoin community have been impacted by this security flaw. It is very important to read the emails that ovh sends automatically, especially the notification of password change emails, when they aren't initiated by you. If you see a request for a password change that you haven't initiated, you should call our incident support 24/24 which will block your account until everything is clear. No, our clients database hasn't been compromised. No, there was no impact on other clients than these 3.

We are deeply sorry for the three customers that have been impacted, and invite them to contact our commercial team (in french).

Regards Octave

Nope, there's an even simpler way.

Say f(x) is the expected value of the number of draws to get to value x. Then f(x) = 1 + integral_0^x f(x)

Hence f'(x) = f(x), so f(x) = c exp(x) The constant is of course 1, and f(1) = exp(1).

Hum, I'm not overly impressed. Yes, erlang is nice, and I guess that using it to create some messaging broker is probably good, but I don't see what this projects adds compared to zeromq for example. 0MQ having the advantage of its large community, company-backed development, and (most importantly) brokerless messaging ...

Glad you introduced me to it, it is really an awesome lib.