brianchesky

Augusto lived with us in the original Airbnb house for a while (apt below us). He even joined our company kickball games when we had 10 employees.

One evening in early 2008, I got the opportunity to meet Michael at an Austin hotel during SXSW. I pitched him on the idea for Airbnb, and he took us under his wing. For the rest of the year, we would visit his office every Friday night for hours on end. Each session, Joe and I would demo our latest site and report on our progress. Michael taught me about fundraising, product growth, and building the basics of a startup culture. He kept reminding us to take just a few more steps. If we had known just how many steps there were, we may have been discouraged, but Michael always made progress feel within reach. The most important thing Michael did was believe in us. Had it not been for Michael, there might not be an Airbnb today.

This was not a "company town" in the way that is being referenced in the comments. It was quite literally a prototype community where residents would only live for about a year. It was primarily funded by other companies to showcase their products and develop R&D labs. Walt's stated goal was to inspire cities around the world to develop their urban centers in this model. Before he died, he said, "I don't believe there's a challenge anywhere in the world that's more important to people everywhere than finding solutions to the problems of our cities." Whether this design would have succeeded is the subject of much debate, though there were many elements that were radical in their time (wedway people mover, airport of the future with oval runway, tiered transportation levels).

Congrats Sam! Starting with even before we joined Y Combinator in the summer of 2008, you were always a very important advisor to us. I remember when we were first trying to raise money, no investor would talk to us. In our fundraising deck, we had our total addressable market at something like $100M, which was ridiculous considering our vision was just airbeds. We wanted to make it smaller. You told us to opposite - switch the m's to b's. I asked why, and you said that "investors want b's, baby." Ok, I may have added the "baby" part of the quote, but more importantly, you mentored us to think bigger, and you were (alongside the Justin.tv guys) an inspiration for us to join Y Combinator. Since then, you have been super helpful with showing us how to hire and scale a company. Congrats on this next part of your journey. Many startups will be better off because of you.

In this case the guest was, and always would be, offered a full refund when a host cancels. Unless you are referring to something else...?

two different guests.

This is a very good insight. Thanks for the suggestion. You are definitely right here. In the past during events (e.g. SXSW), we have actually booked Airbnb's ourselves, and some hotel rooms, just in case a guest got canceled on last minute and all Airbnb's and hotels were sold out, but we should definitely go further.

I am sorry you did not get better support from Airbnb. That is a bad experience. You can email me at brian.chesky@airbnb.com if you would like to elaborate further.

hey everyone, I have looked into this and a few things are going on here.

(1) Turns out there was a bug in our system where a guest was actually allowed to double-book this host's listing, so this was our fault. The host did not cancel, we double-booked. We are fixing this bug now, and I haven't heard of any other guests being affected by this.

(2) I just want to note this is a statistically rare event (though by reading comments some of you have experienced this), which is why we probably haven't spent enough time trying to solve this, but we should.

(3) I agree with the author that our cancelation policy is not adequately balanced on both sides of the transaction. Our team has actually been developing a better system for some time, and we should have a more balance policy soon - unfortunate this happened though. Right now, when a host cancels a booking, there is an automated review left on their listing saying this happened, a penalization in their search rankings, and if they chronically cancel, they are removed from our platform; but I agree we could do more here. The changes we are making will hopefully lower the frequency of these instances occurring going forward. Open to feedback here, and if a host has canceled on you I would love to get your feedback on how we handled it.

(4) In the event that a host does cancel, I think we can do more to provide protection and peace of mind to the guest for their trip. We have a Guarantee for hosts, so we are looking at what an equivalent version would be for guests. If you have any ideas, please let me know.

Here is the link so you don't have to go back to the story: http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2014/02/airb...

I am not aware of any factual misrepresentations, but I am working my way through some of the comments.

There isn't actually evidence that this occurs that I am aware of.

You are correct that there are some hosts that list multiple properties, thus skewing the listing breakdown. It depends on the city. In most cities, room nights and revenue for "primary dwellings," meaning the homes people live in, are around 70-80%. We are in 34,000 cities, so this really varies quite widely. I would like to see the breakdown to be skewed much closer to primary dwellings for two reasons - (1) they have much higher review scores from guests, and (2) they don't typically enrich cities the way ordinary hosts do (though there are always exceptions. We are actually working with cities and our community to remove corporate rental companies that don't meet the above.

Hey, this is not actually what we are saying. Here is what we are saying. The vast majority of people in these cities (~85-90%) are renting the homes that they live in (also know as their primary dwelling) - either a living room, bedroom, or their whole home when they are gone. 60% of them depend on the money they make to pay their rent or mortgage - this according to the surveys we have done for our economic impact studies. These people were living in these homes before Airbnb, so they had a choice to either move out and find a cheaper place (presumably in a different neighborhood or out of the city) since they cannot afford the vacant space, or put it on Airbnb. Many of these people are self employed or under employed. A classic example are artists. This was my story when I moved to San Francisco. If these people moved out, the likely new tenants would be people who could afford to move in without renting on Airbnb. Now, of course some people could move in with the intention of renting on Airbnb. We are not saying this never happens. What we are saying is that more people are using Airbnb to keep their homes than using it as means of displacing people. The property manager issue is a real problem that we are dealing with.

You're right; we should have linked to it. I'm changing that now.

He was certainly an impetus for stronger action from what I can tell, but that's an overstatement. The 2010 bill was originally drafted to target property groups that predate Airbnb or him.

This is not correct, and Liz Krueger knows it since we showed her the specific demographics of who uses our site in NY. Greater than 90% of hosts are renting the home they live in when they are not there (primary dwelling). Simply type NYC in search and see for yourself who is renting. You wil notice most people with just one property. The few property groups we have switched to 30 day rentals long ago. Liz Krueger is the author of the 2010 bill that has been the cause of much of this controversy, so she is trying to protect her legislative legacy.

Most of the city officials we have spoken to are actually supportive of Airbnb, but there are a few that matter like Liz that do not.

I know. Train has left. Inspiration for a new startup perhaps?

We originally wanted to work in our apartment forever. We figured we could fit 100 people in 5 apartment units in our building. Assuming we would need to scale beyond that, Joe and I talked about renting every home on the street. Imagine product in one house, marketing in another... Wasn't really feasible though.

Our customer support team is primarily home-shored, and works around the world in over 15 countries - less than 5% is in SF. The majority of people will be product, design, engineering... plus marketing, bd, operations, G&A, etc.

When I worked as an industrial design, we had a similar person on staff that sat at the intersection of design and engineering - we call this person a design engineer.

We have this role at Airbnb.

:(

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/blogs/techchron/detail?entry_i...

we are covering all incidents retroactively, including EJ's and Troy's.

we are standing by, and we just contacted her again telling her that we will do whatever we can to help.

Brian Chesky (Airbnb CEO) here. My heart goes out to our host. My co-founder has contacted her multiple times, as recently as last night, and we have again offered to help her in any way that she needs. We will continue to make ourselves available to her to do whatever she asks of us in this time of need. We have encouraged her to reach us so that we can help her through this, and we are standing by.

Hey everyone - we were shocked when we heard about this unsettling event. We have been working closely with the authorities, and we want to reassure our community that, with the help of our security infrastructure, we were able to assist the police in their investigation, and we understand from authorities that a suspect is now in custody.

We've created a marketplace built on trust, transparency and authenticity within our community, and we hold the safety of our community members as our highest priority. We will continue to work with our users to stamp out those who would put that community at risk in any way. The vast majority of our community members genuinely respect and protect each other, but we urge users to be careful and discerning with each other and to hold others accountable through reviews, flagging and our customer service channel. Our hearts go out to our host and we will continue to work with her and with the authorities to make this right.

We have in fact contacted him.

We were already meeting our users over the previous year, including at the DNC and Inauguration. We had ambivalence to continue to do so city-by-city because, as we were warned by others, it didn't scale. PG gave us permission to continue these efforts, and to "do things that don't scale." It was one of the greatest pieces of advice we ever received.

We do.