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bootsmann

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An easy trick nowadays is to simply log out of the accounts. Most social media websites really want you to log in so they become unusable when you log out. Its a good defense in depth strategy.

Their options are probably insane sunk cost, hard to steal an engineer who has Xm in potential gains if they choose to stay.

Immigration is being controlled, EU immigrants require a work contract to come here (and consequentially 80% are employed with the rest split between spouses, kids and students). I strongly prefer this system over having some random bureaucrat in Berne decide who is "valuable" and who isn't.

Advisory locks are preferred for this anyways because holding a lot of SELECT FOR UPDATE doesn’t scale too well.

Edit: Actually I checked this again and apparently the advice has now changed to the inverse.

The price you pay for anthropic must include the price of training new and better models which is incredibly costly. If you use the models someone else already spend money to develop you don’t need to pay this price.

Can you model the flow of the attack you want to mount here?

Is it the following:

Issuer revokes the wallet of Alice and then publicly says “This ID is Alice btw” and then verifiers can check their lists to see whether any of their received signatures are revoked (in which case they must be Alice)

for example disallowing blocking/removing someone’s id

If I lose my passport I am obliged to call the police so that they revoke it, if I lose my phone with my digital ID on it they also need to be able to revoke that ID.

Real cryptographic unlinkability schemes like BBS+ or CL signatures would produce uncorrelated proofs even on reuse. This is not that.

This discussion was already led ad nauseam with the Swiss eID proposal (which is supposed to be EUID compatible) and the reason why the system relies on rotating signatures instead of ZKPs is that the cryptography hardware modules in most phones don't support algorithms such as BBS+. This creates a tradeoff where the states would have to essentially roll their own crypto storage and bank on this being safer than simply rotating through batches of signatures generated by the hardware cryptography modules (which is largely unproblematic in the grand scheme of things). The major advantage of using the hardware module is that it makes it much harder for attackers to extract the actual secret should the device ever fall into someone else's hands, something that happens to phones from time to time.

Overall, as with every digital ID thread, it would help if some of the fearmon gering commentators would read the actually EUDI specs for once in their lives as it already addresses most of the concerns copy-pasted into these threads https://eudi.dev/1.6.0/architecture-and-reference-framework-....