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Ok. Well, the attack is so rare that i don't believe putting mitigations against the DoS is worth the effort. The mitigations are not that trivial (though it's arguable that just removing the route is kind of trivial, but still not worth it IMO). Better a DoS than a leak in any case :)
Cool! glad we're on the same page finally :)
Yeah, lots of cool stuff you can do with Linux. just wish that the other OSes were half as good, unfortunately most of them require kernel code to do what would be a simple shell script in linux
Yes exactly. It becomes a "denial of service" against the option 121 pushed subnet routes. That's already discussed in the paper, i assumed you knew that already.
There's nothing else you can do in this situation other than detecting and then removing those routes, which is possible. In lieu of deleting the routes the best and most secure option is to block that subnet. A DoS is infinitely better than a LEAK.
There are SOME things you could do (other than just removing the routes) to prevent the DoS i guess if you REALLY wanted - there is some package rewriting capabilties in the mac pf firewall and windows WFP would support this too (though it would require a 'callout' driver (kernel code) at the IP_OUTBOUND layer), and linux allows something like this too with fwmarks and multiple routing tables + a source NAT, but it's not really worth the effort in a rare case like this. Easiest just to let those packets be blocked. The network you're on is controlled by a bad actor with a malicious DHCP server. Best option for you is to GTFO.
Your examples are strange as you're using rfc1918 addresses (i.e private range) rather than public ips. So all your examples are very odd.
10.7.7.7 will get dropped. This is correct behaviour based on the routing rules in your example. The VPN connection will stay up as it has a /32 route setup through the wlan0 interface.
What we're concerned about with TunnelVision is preventing LEAKS, this is what constitutes VPN security. If the DHCP server sends a route that forces traffic through the physical interface instead, then the best you can do is BLOCK it. If you really wanted to you could detect and remove the route, but that's a different question and still has nothing to do with the question we're concerned about which is plugging LEAKS.
Also why on earth are you using rfc1918 addresses as an example, it's more meaningful to be using public ip addresses - i.e the DHCP server pushes a 1.1.1.1/32 route. The issue with rfc1918 addresses is it's totally not clear if they will get routed at all as you didn't specify whether they're on-link or not as you didn't provide a subnet mask.
The rules are: * an ALLOW rule on the vpn endpoint ip + a /32 route for the endpoint * an ALLOW rule on tun0 traffic * a BLOCK rule on EVERYTHING else - i.e just a iptables -I OUTPUT -j DROP
Can we please stop the back and forth now, it's really starting to chew up too much time. I don't want to have a conversation about the specific addressing scheme you're using - you should have used public ips to make things much clearer, i don't want a long argument now about subbets and whether certain addreses in your example are on-link or require a routing hop. This is so tiring. :)
Read my reply to the other poster, i answer exactly this. Actually test it yourself. Stop theorizing. I tested it. It works exactly as I said.
I think i know where you're confused. There is a firewall whitelist on the VPN endpoint route. Also it's impossible for the DHCP server to push a route more specific than this since it's a /32 route, so it's unaffected (together with the firewall rule allowing it) by anything the DHCP server attempts to do.
No, you're wrong again. I just tested this (simulating routes added by a DHCP option 121) and it works exactly as I said.
C is what happens. But it doesn't happen the way you say at all.
Only the traffic heading to the new 121 routes are blocked - why is it blocked? because the routes are on the physical interface, and the firewall rules blocks all off-VPN traffic (except traffic to the VPN endpoint itself)
The tunnel stays up because the tunnel connection is over the physical interface. The VPN endpoint has a physical route from the host to the VPN endpoint which is whitelisted in the firewall. So new physical routes (which option 121 would push) don't impact anything as VPN endpoint route is physical anyway. Also it's impossible for the DHCP server to push a route MORE specific than the endpoint route (which is a /32) that already exists, so it can't be overridden (and it wouldn't matter anyway since it would still be a physical route, which is what is desired here).
Can you stop just talking and actually TRY it? it's all theoretical for you since you're not actually testing it and your theory is completely wrong.
I am actually testing it, so i know I am correct.
Let's walk through this step by step because there's a lot of confusion on your end.
* Step one - You connect your computer to a network - yes you'll get a DHCP lease, and you'll get an ip address, and a default gateway. This default route will be added to your routing table.
* Step two - If the TunnelVision exploit (DHCP option 121) is at play you'll also get a few MORE SPECIFIC routes than the default gateway. These also get added to your routing table
* Step three - You connect your VPN. The VPN will bring up a firewall. It will also bring up `128/1` and `0/1` routes that point at the VPN tunnel. The VPN tunnel now takes over the default route. This firewall will block all traffic that's not on the tun device (the VPN interface). Further, it will whitelist the VPN endpoint IP and create a route for it (it can do this since it already received the default gateway from the DHCP server)
* Step four - Your host starts sending traffic - either this traffic will go through the VPN tunnel (the default route) OR it will attempt to go through the more specific option 121 pushed malicious routes added by the compromised DHCP server (depending on the destination ip of the outbound packets).
* Step five - All traffic that would go down the malicious option 121 routes are BLOCKED by the firewall rule. Hence nullifying the TunnelVision exploit.
That's all. Done. Where's the complexity in that? As i said before i've done this dozens of times. I'm talking from experience. I know this works.
Further you say:
The point I'm making here is that you can't just configure a firewall rule and have it work properly. What actually needs to happen is that the VPN client software is using one routing table - let's call it "host routing" - and everything else on the system is using a second routing table - let's call that "VPN routing".
You are aware we're talking about consumer VPNs right? The majority of users are on Windows and Mac. Neither of those OSes support multiple routing tables. Only Linux supports multiple routing tables.
You're also just plain wrong - as i demonstrated above - you CAN just configure a firewall rule and it WILL just work properly. Again, i'm talking from experience.
Well said. This is a nothing-burger for all VPNs except the ones that are likely heavily leaking already due to the absence of basic firewall rules.
Their "side channel attack" also made me spit out my drink.
EDIT: looks like NordVPN (at least on mac) doesn't have those basic firewall rules and so IS vulnerable to this exploit.
I'm talking about the specific side channel attack mentioned in their report. Not side channels generally ;)
Yes. I just provided simplified firewall rules in my answer. You also need to whitelist either the VPN endpoint itself (and add a route to that endpoint) or you need to whitelist the process (such as wireguard or openvpn) that hits that endpoint.
Not sure how a DHCP server is relevant in the slightest here except for the initial host network config of course. But the host network should already be configured before the VPN comes up.
Source: i've implemented this dozens of times (and you probably have too, it sounds like) so let's not quibble over the details ;)
"closing specified programs" has to be the silliest thing i've ever heard. By the time you close it, it's probably already leaked thousands of packets. The leak of a SINGLE packet is already too much.
Such an "application killing kill switch" is just marketing fluff, it makes zero sense from a security standpoint.
Mobile is an exception (but they already state android is immune), let's stick to desktop for the sake of discussion, the 3 major desktop platforms: mac, win, linux :)
On mac - just implement a block everything rule with pf and then just allow traffic on the tunnel and whitelist the VPN endpoint. Boom, a kill switch that defends against this exploit. And there's no racey nordvpn-style "control channel" (if nord really works like this i have an even lower opinion of them than i do currently).
On linux - iptables (for example) - just implement a general DROP policy then override with a specific ALLOW on the tunnel interface.
On Windows - Use WFP to implement a block everything rule, then provide a higher priority rule to allow on the tunnel interface.
All three of these techniques are the recommended way to implement a kill switch and it's used heavily in the VPN industry by anyone sensible. It completely defends against this TunnelVision exploit too.
The way that you suggest kill switch is implemented (reactive and monitoring the connection?) is very fragile, racey and prone to leak, i absolutely would not trust it and it shouldn't even be called a kill switch. It's an embarrassment. :)
The side channel attack is silly and impractical. You know it's silly. I know it's silly. Let's quit pretending.
The firewall rule is 100% sufficient to defend against this exploit. All good VPNs already provide it by default. It's not deep. They're just routes.
Please stop the FUD.
They don't know what they're talking about. Kill switches are not "tripped" there is no "control channel".
A kill switch is just a firewall rule that is ALWAYS engaged and all it does is blocks off-VPN traffic.
It 100% will defend against this exploit.
The "side channel" is silly. You assume someone is hitting the same endpoint over and over and over and with significantly high traffic that it rises above the noise.
Did u even do any of the math required to demonstrate it can actually work in a reasonable time frame? Did u clearly list the very onerous assumptions required to pull it off?
This whole thing is silly.
Most decent VPNs are already protected against it. It's a simple firewall rule known as leak protection or a kill switch which blocks all off-VPN traffic including on option 121 routes.
This article is 99% FUD IMO.
I looked at this in detail. This exploit is a nothing-burger for most decent VPNs.
A simple "leak protection" (aka Killswitch) firewall rule completely negates this attack.
All decent VPNs implement such a rule by default.
Dealing with undesirable routes (whether pre existing or pushed by a DHCP server) is nothing new or in the slightest bit hard to defend against.
If a VPN does not implement such a firewall rule already then it's likely already leaking so all this exploit demonstrates is that "A VPN without leak protection, leaks".
(I won't even mention the "side channel" attack as it's completely ridiculous)
I liked your write-up and option 121 is a little known option, so it's good to know about. But let's not pretend this thing is bigger than it is.
Mullvad does not have split tunneling, so it's a no-go from me. Also their client looks like ass and is a RAM hungry electron app.
whose
Why are you talking about rape? I thought rape required penetrative sex, this is a sexual assault isn't it?
which features is pry missing?
``` If methods were first-class functions, this would work — > method_a would return method_b, which would then execute when x() was called. This doesn't work because Ruby methods aren't objects. ```
Seems the OP is just confused by syntax? we use obj.method(:method_a) instead of obj.method_a, i dont see why requiring a different syntax changes the semantics on this point.
REPL requires [binding_of_caller](https://github.com/banister/binding_of_caller) anyway, which i doubt rails would include any time soon ;)
Just curious but why does singleton classes/singleton methods in Ruby make it "so there's no guarantee that a change made in code and evaluated in the runtime will have the desired effect" ?
Possibly :) tab-completion will be substantially improved in an upcoming release :)
hmm, weird. Aside from tab-completion what else is slow? I've never had responsiveness issues with Pry, even tab completion is snappy.
Not sure it's quite the same. My understanding is that `ipython --pdb` would run the entire program in debugging mode, causing a dramatic slow-down in performance of the app. The approach taken by pry-rescue in contrast is to check for exceptions in a bounded portion of code (as many bounded portions as you want), so the slow-down is constrained to hot spots. This potentially makes pry-rescue OK for production use, something perhaps not suitable for ipython --pdb afaict.
Definitely check out Pry (http://pry.github.com). It's designed specifically for your use case... Just start Pry, load the gems you want, and then navigate to the method/class you want to know about using Pry's `ls` and `cd` commands. Once you find what you want, either use `show-source` to view the source directly in Pry, or use `edit-method` to open it in an editor.
If you use Pry's `edit-method some_object.some_method`[1] you can actually open the method in an editor and it'll even fast forward the cursor to the first line of the method.
[1] https://github.com/pry/pry/wiki/Editor-integration#wiki-Edit...
Pry knows its place, it doesn't pretend its a nice environment for writing real code - instead when you want to edit a method definition you type "edit-method my_method"[1] and pry will open the source file of that method in an editor and take you to the exact line where the method is found.