Prompt Injections are very very rare these days after the Opus 4.6 update
HN user
ashwinr2002
ashwinramachandrang@gmail.com
This is unreachable?
minger's a new word
This is a horrible change! I agree with everything in the article
Apologies for the formatting
Can we not assume that the plan you just said “ok” to came from a user prompts you made earlier in the chat session and hence does influence this decision process.
Another point in the idea is that this trusted context can include even the AI replies up until there hasnt been a tool calls yet that brings back a response an attacker can control
But it’s entirely possible that there are edge cases here, a red teaming dataset to cover these cases shouldn’t be hard to create
I understand that, but how do you come up with the endpoints you want claude to have access to ahead of time?
For example, how do you collect all the endpoints that have access to customer info per your example.
Thought about it and couldn't find a way how
With macaroons you can design the authz scheme that you want for any arbitrary API.
How would you build such an authz scheme? When claude asks permissions to access a new endpoint, if the user allows it, then reissue the macaroons?
This seems like an under-rated comment. You are right, this is a vulnerability and the blog doesn't talk about this.
P.S.: The extension has as many permissions as Claude in Chrome itself. But, the only network requests from the extension are to posthog, just for us to know which features are being used.
Here is a youtube video where I show the network requests of the extension: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J356Nquxmp4
To know what posthog collects and how to disable it (change in a single line of code), please refer to this file: https://github.com/ContextFort-AI/ContextFort/blob/main/POST...
Really cool product! Which email providers do you support?