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akdev1l

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hence why passkeys were ideally device specific, non-exportable

Not true. The original concept was always for them to be cloud synced.

This has nothing to do with their anti-phishing capabilities. The anti-phishing capabilities come from the fact that the password manager authenticates the application before handing out the passkey. It doesn’t matter if they are synced across devices or not.

You are correct that other login methods might be weaker than passkeys. I’m not sure how that’s related to passkeys though. In real security sensitive applications the recovery process is “go to the bank’s branch and show them your driver’s license”.

Your master password to your cloud PW manager's vault is also phishable

No, it’s not. You would need to steal my yubikey to get access.

I get my hair cut at a place where it costs $45 and I get a haircut every 1-2 months at best.

I wear my shoes until they break. I wear Vans Sk8 old skool high tops most of the time.

I am also on track to retire by 40 if all goes well. (Which is to say I don’t have THAT much money)

You could still have this 1-click experience with another system.

Like you could set some rule like “this vendor is approved for charges below $50”. We don’t need the legacy system for that.

(I don’t know if any payment systems can do that atm, just that if we wanted we could make them do that)

Visa seemed not to care too much about fraud though so at some level they do prefer ease of use over security

My biology teacher in school once tried to teach us that winds created by God. Not like spiritually or something but that God literally made the wind I guess.

My “earth sciences” teacher also once tried to argue with me against the universal law of gravitation. (no, she was not referring to Special/General Relativity. She didn’t agree two objects in a vacuum fall at the same speed regardless of mass.

As an anecdote, I provided fragnesia.c and the subsequent proposed patch to fix the issue and while it was not able to discover an entirely new vulnerability, I think it was able to find 2 new ways of exploiting the same underlying bug.

This is quite impressive considering I’m just a dumbass with a Claude subscription.

The JVM has nothing to do with Android. There is no JVM running android apps.

There was Dalvik VM at one point but now it’s just the Android Runtime.

A very comprehensive SELinux deployment for one.

SELinux will stop any process in android from loading kernel modules, that’s not allowed. The android permission model as a whole is ultimately backed by SELinux.

The thing is that we could simply split those modules into separate packages

No reason why you couldn’t just `dnf install -y kmod-rxrpc` if for whatever reason you need that.

Without read permissions you cannot execute the binary, that would not make any sense.

To execute the binary it needs to be read from disk and loaded into memory.

In fact if you have read permissions but not executable permissions on a specific binary then you can still execute it by calling the linker directly /bin/ld.so.1 /path/to/binary (the linker will read and load the binary and then jump to the entry point without an exec() call)

Copy Fail 3 months ago

you dont test exploit pocs on your daily driver.

Do you just like making fake points and pretending other people said them?

Copy Fail 3 months ago

what the blog says and what the code does are two different things.

For all I know the blog itself is a honey pot. I need to know what the code does before I run it.

Copy Fail 3 months ago

Disagree because to run the PoC you really ought to understand what it’s doing.

And this code is not readable at all. It is failing at letting people confirm the exploit easily.

Copy Fail 3 months ago

Agreed lmao the PoC itself looks like you’re getting attacked

Which I guess is true but I would like to verify the attack is the intended one

Copy Fail 3 months ago

No, Android doesn’t have suid binaries to exploit like in the PoC