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YokoSix

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“Dates and times when a file or object was modified are used to sort a user’s information, and checksums of file and photo data are used to help Apple de-duplicate and optimize the user’s iCloud and device storage—all without having access to the files and photos themselves.”

https://support.apple.com/guide/security/advanced-data-prote...

So Apple only encrypts the files but not the metadata? If that's true the encryption is basically worthless because Apple is still able to "see" what files you upload and scan them for CSAM, copyright infringement or videos of 1989 Tiananmen Square.

That's really cool. I'm shifting my digital life from my MacBook to my iPhone right now - and blogging from my notes app sounds like an easy way to stay in touch with the world.

Axel Springer's biggest newspaper is BILD - and it's like the German version of The Sun in Great Britain. The reception section in BILD's Wikipedia article has some interesting "highlights" from the paper's history:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bild#Reception

BILD recently launched their own TV channel. Critics call it the German version of Fox News:

https://uebermedien.de/63042/wie-fox-news-wird-bild-live/

Even Axel Springer's other big newspaper Die Welt is more or less like BILD but with a more serious layout:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Die_Welt

* Apple should be fined to impose such a huge internet traffic for... nothing: each iOS or here macOS minor update weighs hundreds of megabytes, sometimes even gigabytes*

Most YouTube videos and Netflix movies I watch use more bandwidth than Apple‘s updates. Do you want to fine them too?

The question is why Apple implemented this feature in the first place. There was no reason for them to suddenly expand their image scanning to the devices themselves and risk their position as the self-proclaimed saviors of privacy - and still they did exactly that. There had to be some push from the government behind all of that, otherwise this debacle just doesn't make any sense.

Apple’s Mistake 5 years ago

The same set of hashes is stored in the operating system of every iPhone and iPad user, so targeted attacks against only specific individuals are not possible under our design.

The problem with this sentence is that Apple assumes that they can't target specific individuals because every iPhone and iPad user has the exact same database in their iOS device.

But what if they have a hash in the database where they know that only one person has this exact image on their device? This way you could single out one individual with the same database.

Apple’s Mistake 5 years ago

They also could embed the whole database into iOS and activate certain hashes only for certain iCloud accounts. No one would know because the database is encrypted multiple times.

Apple’s Mistake 5 years ago

I thought about that as well. They rushed to publish some unpolished PR pieces and FAQs right after the announcement and at very unusual times (3am in Cupertino) trying to damage control so my guess would be as well that they didn't even consider the backlash. Maybe they were really proud about the technology they implemented. It's a little bit sad if you think about it.

Apple’s Mistake 5 years ago

My guess is that they're going to put it into the macOS Photos app. Those images are already scanned for people, animals and objects so it should be easy for them to implement the child protection database there.

Apple’s Mistake 5 years ago

It's the same as with parents photographing their naked babies in the bathtub. Those images won't be flagged because they aren't in the database provided to Apple. Only verified illegal photos should be in the database. So you and your girlfriend will be fine.

Can non-CSAM images be “injected” into the system to flag accounts for things other than CSAM?

Our process is designed to prevent that from happening. The set of image hashes used for matching are from known, existing images of CSAM that have been acquired and validated by child safety organizations. Apple does not add to the set of known CSAM image hashes.

The problem is not that Apple can't add images to the database but that organizations from the outside can inject any hashes to the new, constantly sniffing system at the heart of iOS, padOS and macOS. Apple has no way to verify those or any hashes before they get injected into the database.

If the system detects any matches only some overworked and underpaid content checker from Bangladesh is there to stop your life from being destroyed by some SWAT team crashing through your front door at 3am, killing your barking dog. And who knows if those foreign sweatshops are even trustable.

For now, yes. But people are worried that that's just the first step to get the snooping service onto your phone. Because why stop here? Soon it maybe scanning photos not just destined for iCloud.

And why draw the line at photos? Videos, music, text files, anything could be interesting for governments, film studios and record companies. Why do you have an MP4 of the latest Spider-Man movie on your phone? Did you legally buy this Miles Davis album? Is this an image of a rainbow flag on your phone, my dear Russian citizen?

It's just a small step from here to constantly scanning all your local files on iOS, padOS and macOS because someone, somewhere might want to take a look at them.

That's the big point they don't address. Apple can't possibly check every hash of every file some obscure organization is sending to their database, especially in foreign countries.

If some men in black walk into the offices of some nice little child protecting service in Ohio and demand that they put some additional hashes into the database because otherwise something bad could happen to them or their families, does Apple really think they would decline?

It doesn't matter how secure the system is, the vulnerability is that virtually anyone can input virtually anything into the database without Apple even knowing and expose selected users that way.

This failure point is now at the heart of iOS and macOS and it's baffling that Apple doesn't see that or doesn't want to see it.

My guess is that they're somehow forced to implement this and try to talk their way out of it with some strange PR pieces which are only convincing their most naive users.

My problem is: Where do I put the line? When I install Linux, should I still use Spotify, Steam and Reddit? No, because none of them are open source? Can I still use Google services? YouTube, search, mail? No? DuckDuckGo? But how do I know they're not invading my privacy? Do I have to use an open source email provider? Is that even a thing? Should I install a VPN? Do I constantly have to use Tor? Do I need to live boot Tails from my USB stick so I my usage can't be tracked and buy a prepaid Nokia 3210 that I put into a metal bag when I don't use it? And even if I go all the way down the rabbit hole: How do I know that my hardware isn't compromised? And do I constantly have to revaluate my privacy choices because one component of them could be compromised? What kind of life would that be?

Even if I switch macOS for open source alternatives I still have to rely on closed source software for important parts. And let’s be honest: It’s almost impossible to recreate Apple’s ecosystem with open source components. It’s even harder with iOS. I could switch to Android or sone obscure alternative operating software where I don’t even know if if’s still there next year.

The problem is I never could verify the code of every Pop!_OS release - that’s why I'm a Mac user. I’d have to rely on other users to check if everything is okay. The good thing with Apple is that all eyes are put onto them and every minor step they’re doing is well commented around the world. The smaller the companies and projects, the quieter the voices if something turns bad.