Software dark matter is the enemy of software transparency

https://www.chainguard.dev/unchained/software-dark-matter-is-the-enemy-of-software-transparency

by kiyanwang • 4 years ago

77 25 4 years ago

chainguard.dev

pabs3• 4 years ago

Another tool for identifying software dark matter on a Debian based system is cruft-ng:

https://github.com/a-detiste/cruft-ng/

Eventually it will enable a Debian system to account for (in some way) every single file visible on the live system.

pudo• 4 years ago

After reading this I’m fully confused by how they define dark matter. Stuff that doesn’t come from the distro package manager? Everything installed via other mechanisms? Assets copied into the container as part of the build mechanism?

Wouldn’t it make more sense to define dark matter as all the stuff that is installed in a container but never activated (unless exploited?)

nerdponx• 4 years ago

I have the exact same confusions and questions as you. I think maybe they consider "dark matter" to be anything for which the source is not publicly available and so cannot be analyzed by security tools that don't have access to the private sources.

I also agree with your "wouldn't it make more sense" definition. From the perspective of a developer concerned about the security and robustness of their own deployment, "dark matter" would be anything that ends up in my container that I don't actually need to run the app in the container.

rst• 4 years ago

That's their explicit definition: "Software dark matter refers to files that are not tracked by operating system (OS) package managers (like `apt` or `apk`), which renders these files and the packages they represent invisible—or at least complicated to find—to software composition analysis and security scanning tools."

That seems to specifically exclude software installed by, say, language-specific package managers (Cargo, Rubygems, npm and derivatives) -- which on the whole seems pretty perverse. Dealing with those does indeed complicate SBOM maintenance -- but people use them anyway for very good reasons (which sometimes include getting more secure versions of the packaged code!), and having tools that work in the real world requires dealing with that complexity, not wishing it away.

hakre4• 4 years ago

This is good to underline, but I found this confusing or contradicting as well.

Also because of as they write about containers. In a container all files are tracked. That's the container.

RobotToaster• 4 years ago

I guess the point is you could have an open source program in the package manager, that then downloads a closed source binary blob component, that could be doing something undesirable.

hakre4• 4 years ago

I also had problems to learn more about that. For me the article creates more confusion than has some theoretic or practical value.

dlor2• 4 years ago

This is basically the definition we used. It's practically important because scanners really do miss software copied in via other mechanisms, and most of them give zero indication about it. For a few basic examples, try running your favorite scanner on the wordpress, node, or busybox images on DockerHub and see what the scanner finds.

For Wordpress, most scanners will miss that PHP or Wordpress are even installed in the image. The scanners spit out lots of data, but it's only about what they can find, offering the illusion of completeness or transparency.

rob74• 4 years ago

Well then I guess scanners need to improve... I mean, the current version of Wordpress (and other software) is being made available as a Docker image because this is faster and more convenient than making it available via the package system, so it kinda makes sense that they are not available (or available much later) via apt/apk/whatever. Calling all other methods of distribution (pulling software from Github or via the various language-specific package managers) "dark matter" expresses the desire of not wanting to deal with that stuff, but surely won't make the "problem" go away.

choeger• 4 years ago

So a container that, say, builds nginx from source and doesn't delete the source tree is considered full of dark matter because so many files are not installed from the package manager?

That appears to be a difficult definition.

Programmatic• 4 years ago

The answer to that would be to make a builder image and copy out the installed files. That makes a smaller container anyhow so has several advantages.

dlor2• 4 years ago

Basically yes - unless you also keep enough metadata around somewhere for a scanner to know what version of nginx is installed. This can be done out-of-band with an SBOM, or in-band by using package manager metadata.

williamcotton• 4 years ago

I’ve used an approach to copy only the shared libs from the build container to the production container. This not only gets rid of most of this “dark matter” but results in much smaller containers!

https://github.com/williamcotton/express-c/blob/master/demo/...

vitiral• 4 years ago

So the answer is "use bazel" or "use Nixpkg" since then every input is not only known by the build system, but is hashed in the dependency tree?

lumberjack24• 4 years ago

“dark matter” sounds like marketing speak.

thenoblesunfish• 4 years ago

A concrete example of files appearing in the "dark matter" would make this clearer.

henrydark• 4 years ago

Except that dark matter might not actually exist, and it's a change in equations that is needed.

I'm not sure what the software analogy is, except that there's no software dark matter, just people not familiar with their tools.

topaz0• 4 years ago

Odd metaphor, given that one of the defining features of dark matter is that it is transparent.

peter_d_sherman• 4 years ago

A long time ago, I wrote a program for personal use which I called "FileHasher", or something like that.

FileHasher (or whatever I called it) -- was basically a "poor man's antivirus utility" -- that is, it didn't scan memory, didn't check boot blocks, didn't scan system [E|EE]PROMS like BIOS, and it knew nothing about rootkits -- or how to detect them.

But what FileHasher did do was to take a point-in-time "metadata snapshot" -- of all of the files on my PC -- their path, their filename, their size, their date, and a custom 16 or 32 byte hash of their contents. This data was put into a single simple space or tab or comma delimited text file (a "poor man's database" <g>) which contained in its filename the date and time (as a string) when this file was generated.

The idea was, I'd run a completely fresh OS install. Then, as the absolute first thing I'd do after the OS install, I'd copy "FileHasher" onto my PC via USB drive, and run it to generate a metadata snapshot file of all of the system's files...

FileHasher could then be run at any time subsequent -- to generate an additional "point-in-time" metadata snapshot information file.

Once two such files were created from two points in time -- FileHasher could compare them -- and list ALL files that had been created, deleted, or modified -- since the initial or previous run.

The idea was, that a virus, if it were to exist, would probably create/modify/delete at least one file -- and FileHasher in reporting mode (if used with diligence, say, before and after software installs, and at various other dates/times) -- would help a person with a keen eye -- in finding/identifying/fixing what the problem was, based on the list of created/deleted/modified files...

Tracking the Software Dark Matter in the various layers of container(ized) images -- sounds like a very similar (and good!) idea!

Will it solve every possible container security problem?

Probably not -- but it's a good step in the right direction!

(Was my "virus checker" perfect? No! But it was better than no virus checker! <g> ("A Little Bit Of Something" > "Nothing" -- you know, from Philosophy 101! <g>))

Software dark matter is the enemy of software transparency

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