Gödel's Ontological Proof

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gödel%27s_ontological_proof

by tosh • 7 years ago

125 120 7 years ago

en.wikipedia.org

triska• 7 years ago

Very interesting, thank you for sharing this!

About this proof, quoting from a talk by John W. Dawson Jr., an internationally recognized authority on the life and work of Kurt Gödel:

"And a final example of this sort of unfashionable pursuit is Gödel's proof of the existence of God, which is a formalization in modal logic of an argument — traces all the way back to Anselm — but in particular an argument due to Leibniz. Gödel was very much interested in Leibniz's philosophy, and so he felt that it would be possible to formalize some of Leibniz's ideas. But because this was a theological subject he was very cautious about this. Said very little about it during his lifetime. And although word of it sort of leaked out, it was only after his death that the details were really made public.

"In fact, when I was cataloging Gödel's papers, I realized that there was some concern among the triumvirate of mathematicians that were in charge of my work [...] that there might be some things in Gödel's Nachlass that needed to be restricted, that scholars would not be allowed access to. And it quickly became apparent that this was the primary thing they were thinking of. And it took some persuasion on my part to convince them that while mathematicians may think it's silly to try to prove that God exists, philosophers certainly don't, and that this was something of real interest in philosophy. And so, eventually, unlike Russell's papers, where — as you may know — large segments are embargoed [...] you can see everything in Gödel's Nachlass, there aren't any restrictions on that."

Source: https://youtu.be/4vpTFZdyjKM?t=2179

neonate• 7 years ago

unlike Russell's papers, where — as you may know — large segments are embargoed

That's surprising. I wonder what was embargoed from Russell's papers.

_Nat_• 7 years ago

From a quick skimming online, it sounds like there's a policy to embargo private correspondence until all involved haven't been around for at least 5 years.

In this case, it seems that Russell took a much younger woman as his third wife: [Patricia Russell, Countess Russell](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patricia_Russell,_Countess_Rus...). Wikipedia lists her as passing in 2004, so presumably there was an embargo on their correspondence until 2009.

faissaloo• 7 years ago

It's really is quite strange that scholars would hesitate to show this, I don't know of many examples of similar behaviour around other subjects.

andrepd4• 7 years ago

Fun fact: the proof is formalised in TPTP (a standard benchmark library for automated theorem provers). It is considered of average difficulty.

http://www.tptp.org/cgi-bin/SeeTPTP?Category=Problems&Domain...

bcaa7f3a8bbc2• 7 years ago

Is it related to the GoedelGod project (which was an open source project on attempting to formalize Godel's Ontological Proof, was in GSoC 2017)?

https://github.com/FormalTheology/GoedelGod

andrepd4• 7 years ago

I believe not. This was the citation given in the problem: https://arxiv.org/abs/1308.4526

spectramax• 7 years ago

Succinct form:

“God, by definition, is that for which no greater can be conceived. God exists in the understanding. If God exists in the understanding, we could imagine Him to be greater by existing in reality. Therefore, God must exist.”

I’m having a hard time following the “modal” logic. I’d appreciate if someone could please expand on it.

bcaa7f3a8bbc2• 7 years ago

See the Wikipedia page of Ontological Argument.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

It belongs to the long tradition in Western Philosophy and has been proposed by many great philosophers in different variations, Godel's proof can simply be seen as the same metaphysical argument rigorously expressed in modal logic. And of course, this argument, like many other issues in philosophy and theology, is not without its controversy. It has been criticized by many people in the past 1000 years, including some high-profile theologians as technically flawed, which is also covered by this Wikipedia article.

Saturn_V2• 7 years ago

Let's separate it up, with this argument, people often do follow the logic, but do not accept the premises.

Premise 1: God is defined as the greatest thing that we can possibly concieve ("that for which no greater can be conceived")

Premise 2: real things are better than imaginary things

We can imagine God (he exists in understanding). A real God is better than an imaginary God (2).

Then, if God does not exist, we can concieve a greater thing (a real God) this leads to a contradiction with respect to (1). Therefore by proof of contradiction, God must exist

tcgv• 7 years ago

Very interesting. I was trying to think on how to refute premise 2, and came up with:

- A real catastrophe is worse than an imaginary catastrophe

Then not all real things are better than imaginary things

- An imaginary outcome in which my country's team wins the world cup is greater than a real outcome in which it doesn't

Then not all real things are greater than imaginary thins

Not sure if these are valid, since I'm not familiar with philosophical reasoning.

justinpombrio2• 7 years ago

Premise 1: Pennywise The Dancing Clown is defined as the scariest clown that could possibly exist ("that for which no greater horror can be conceived" EDIT: "that clown for which no more horrifying clown could be conceived").

("Pennywise the Dancing Clown" is usually defined as "the clown from It". I'm repurposing the name for the sake of this argument. We need a name for "scariest possible clown"; I'm choosing "Pennywise".)

Premise 2: real things are scarier than imaginary things.

We can imagine Pennywise The Dancing Clown (he exists in understanding---you're welcome). A real Pennywise is scarier than an imaginary Pennywise (2).

Then, if Pennywise The Dancing Clown does not exist, we can conceive a scarier clown (a real Pennywise). This leads to a contradiction with respect to (1). Therefore by proof of contradiction, Pennywise the Dancing Clown must exist.

Where's the flaw in this argument? Does the same flaw apply in the theological argument?

AgentME• 7 years ago

How does defining God a certain way lead to the idea that God must exist? That doesn't work for any other definitions. A lot is being packed into the words "greatest" and "better".

Premise 1: I define "Foo" to refer to the "blorgest" possible thing: a real situation where I'm the richest person alive.

Premise 2: A real "Foo" would be even "blorger" than a hypothetical "Foo".

We can imagine a hypothetical Foo, but a real Foo is blorger than an imaginary Foo, so if you accept the existence of hypothetical Foos, you also accept the even blorger real Foo. QED I'm the richest person alive.

The ability to conceive of something more extreme in some quality than what exists in reality can't obligate reality to change at all.

TomMckenny3• 7 years ago

The argument blurs two things:

1. "in order to imagine the most powerful thing possible then you must imagine it exists"

and 2. "anything which exist is more powerful than anything which is just imagined"

In the case of number 1, there is nothing requiring it to exist just how you are allowed to imagine it.

For number 2, even very simple objects will be stronger than the most powerful thing you can imagine.

To rescue the argument a third interpretation is often given: god is the most powerful thing in existence. But this provides no details and could be a very uninteresting but powerful natural phenomenon.

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

Premise 1: God is defined as the greatest thing that we can possibly concieve ("that for which no greater can be conceived")

The problem starts here though. Aristotle/Aquinas showed by God could not be a thing, even the largest thing. God is not a being but rather Being Itself (ipsum esse subsistens).

* https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1zMf_8hkCdc

myrryr• 7 years ago

I think the issue is premise 2. Real things implies it is possible for it to exist.

The moment you can concieve of a thing which can't be real, 2 is invalid.

elihu• 7 years ago

Couldn't one satisfy the argument simply by believing that God is real, regardless of whether he does or not?

reggehid• 7 years ago

That’s not Gödel’s ontological argument. You’re confusing it with something else.

13415• 7 years ago

There is a nice book by Melvin Fitting: Types, Tableaus, and Gödel’s God, Kluwer 2002. It introduces some fairly standard typed higher order logic and then formalizes Gödel's proof in it. Although I personally like it a bit less than Mendelsohn and Fitting's book on first order modal logic, it's a good read (if you like logic and have had some basic course in logic sometime).

andrepd4• 7 years ago

That is not Godel's ontological argument, that's Saint Anselm's.

zwkrt• 7 years ago

Here is my favorite snarky rebuttal to Anselm’s ontological argument:

“The worst proof, by definition, is worse than any other proof that could possibly be conceived. If such a proof exists in understanding, then surely it must be an even worse proof if it exists in reality. Therefore, the worst proof must already exist in reality”

gjm112• 7 years ago

My preferred version of this (which so far as I know is original to me; see http://www.mccaughan.org.uk/g/log/2009/ontological.html):

Consider a proof of God's existence than which no worse can be conceived. Proofs that are merely wrong (bad logic, false premises, etc.) are two a penny; clearly the worst possible proof would in fact have to conclusively refute the proposition it was trying to prove.

As St Anselm has taught us, clearly a worst-possible proof "exists in the understanding". But a proof so bad that it actually refutes its intended conclusion is clearly much worse if it actually exists in reality. Hence such a proof that exists only in the understanding is not worst-possible after all.

Hence, there exists (in reality, not merely "in the understanding") a proof of God's existence so bad that it conclusively proves that there is no God.

And, of course, if there is a conclusive proof that there is no God, there is in fact no God. Hence, there is no God. Thanks, St Anselm!

dvt4• 7 years ago

Modal logic adds two new operators: ◻ -- necessity; and ◇ -- possibility. For example, a triangle's angles necessarily add up to 180, but it's merely a possibility that it will rain tomorrow.

That's all there is to it, but things can get very complex when you start adding negations and the other logical connectives.

danharaj• 7 years ago

This sort of thing casts doubt on the formal logic in question more than it makes a case for God.

goto119• 7 years ago

It it not really the formal logic that is at fault. In logic you are basically allowed to make any assumption or definition you want.

The problem is thinking a proof can tell you anything about reality which isn't already implicit in those premises.

If we define that X exists, then it is logically true X exists. But this doesn't prove that X exist in the real world.

a13692099932• 7 years ago

I think God is the greatest jelly donut in existence.

Mmm, applied theology.

0: http://machall.com/view.php?date=2003-04-21

simplesleeper• 7 years ago

For Polish speakers, I highly recommend this book:

https://www.ccpress.pl/produkt/Dowody_ontologiczne._W_900._r...

It has multiple formalisations of both Anselm's and Gaunilo's arguments, and critiques of each approach

SAI_Peregrinus2• 7 years ago

Ontological argument for the nonexistence of God.

1. It is more great to do something with a greater handicap.

2. Not existing is the greatest possible handicap.

3. The greatest possible being is thus one who could create the universe despite not existing.

ars2• 7 years ago

You have not proved step 1 or step 2. In fact I'm quite sure your step two is false, and your step one would be quite hard to prove.

4810922• 7 years ago

Did Gödel even prove step 1?. In Gödel's argument, it's relying on very arbitrary definitions of what many have defined as a god and that their god is "great". OP defined what is "great" to him, it's not necessarily what's great to you or me.

I think OP here is meaning "great" in some intellectual capacity, that you are just as powerful or great if you can make up your lack of greatness in one area with another form of greatness, something I don't see as greater but equally great. Is it greater to be successful by bootstrapping off the success of your forebearer or greater to be as successful when starting from nothing? It's a classical argument but to me it stands on just as rational ground as Gödel's argument.

gjm112• 7 years ago

This (very nice) argument is due to Douglas Gasking: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Douglas_G....

SAI_Peregrinus2• 7 years ago

Thanks, I'd never found the original source! I'll add that to my saved version.

shkkmo6• 7 years ago

2. Not existing is the greatest possible handicap.

I would argue that impossiblity, rather than non-existence is the greatest handicap.

knowThySelfx• 7 years ago

Well, what is existence and nonexistence in this sense? Something which we can measure and see or something which we do not know of because we cannot measure it?

dvt4• 7 years ago

Whenever this makes top of HN, it remains one of the most contentiously misunderstood pieces of formal logic -- much like some of Gödel's other famous results. The proof is basically a formalizing of Anselm's Ontological Argument[1]. The proof doesn't "prove" there is a God, it just shows that the argument, written in S5[2] (a type of modal logic), is correct -- more specifically, that if the premises are true, then the conclusion follows.

Alvin Plantinga also did a lot of work refining these kinds of modal ontological arguments in the 70s and 80s; of note is his famous "victorious" ontological argument[3] -- still hotly cited to this day. Modal logic, for the uninitiated, essentially adds two new operators to the "usual" logical operators we might have seen in college (negation, implication, conjunction, disjunction, quantifiers):

    Necessity: ◻P -- P is true in all worlds
    Possibility: ◇Q -- Q is true in some (or no) worlds

It's a very fun and surprising type of logic! A very intuitive result (and one of the first you'd learn) is what happens when you negate a necessary proposition.

    ~◻P -- P cannot be true in any world!

What Gödel's proof shows is that God -- as defined by the premises (basically, as maximally "everything positive") -- is necessary; which is why his last line includes a ◻. I don't want to get too bogged down, so this was purposefully a very surface-level comment. If I piqued your interest, I strongly suggest you check out some of the linked resources!

The historical context is also very interesting. It was somewhat unknown how valid Anselm's argument was, and it took almost a millennium before we could satisfactorily formalize the ontological argument (although many non-modal and Aristotelian proofs had been written).

What does it mean for non-logicians? Well, if you buy the premises (which is key!), it shows that it's not irrational to believe in God (as defined by the argument). Again, it doesn't prove the existence of God, but it does show that the logic of the argument makes sense.

[1] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#St...

[2] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-modal-origins/

[3] https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ontological-arguments/#Pl...

shkkmo6• 7 years ago

What does it mean for non-logicians? Well, if you buy the premises (which is key!), it shows that it's not irrational to believe in God (as defined by the argument). Again, it doesn't prove the existence of God, but it does show that the logic of the argument makes sense.

This understates what the proof shows. It shows that if you buy the premises it's not rational to believe God doesn't exist (as defined by the argument).

dvt4• 7 years ago

"Rationality" is not a (meta-)logical property. You're right that the proof shows that, logically speaking, if one buys the premises, God must exist. But more colloquially, it shows that by accepting some premises that are reasonable, one reaches the conclusion that God exists. Ergo, there's an argument a rational person would accept whose conclusion is the necessity of God.

roenxi• 7 years ago

The proof shows precisely that a conclusion follows from axioms.

That doesn't settle anything though, all it means is that anyone disagreeing with the conclusion must also disagree with one or more of the axioms. Particularly, if someone believes it is irrational to believe in God they would also believe it is irrational to accept all the axioms of the proof.

My personal complaint is that "for each positive property, either it or its negation must be positive". Assuming that a property is uniquely positive or negative requires the assumption of a universal moral value system, which in turn really would require require something godlike to set the standards. I accept that there are properties that are sometimes positive and sometimes negative, so I don't agree with the argument.

b_tterc_p2• 7 years ago

Something I like about this is that whatever number you imagine as the greatest number signifying god, your conception is still much lower than Graham’s number. Graham’s number is the terrifying giant that reminds you that the limits of your conception are that of a weak human mind.

No I don’t care to debate technicalities :)

shkkmo6• 7 years ago

If you are postulating that "greatness" is infinitely conceivable, then defining "God is the greatest thing that can be conceived" would mean that god, like the largest number, does not exist.

b_tterc_p2• 7 years ago

No actually the opposite. I’m saying we have a finite capacity to imagine magnitude, though it’s not readily apparent. Infinite is easy conceptually, but most people’s pragmatic place holder for “basically infinite” is going to be a really big number. Very big to be sure. But Graham’s number is so large it’s beyond the scope of numbers you’re likely to have conceived could exist. It’s not something you can quite fit in your head even reading about it, like something out of Lovecraft.

Whatever you imagined in imagining God as the greatest thing, Graham’s number is inconceivably larger still.

And that is why Cthulhu wins.

ukj• 7 years ago

This proof exploits an edge case in dualistic human reasoning which occurs at the intersection of ontology and epistemology.

Lets do some term re-writing, so we can move away from the emotional trigger that is the God-word.

1. God, by definition, is that for which no greater can be conceived.

This conception of God is equivalent to what we call 'The Universe'.

Rewritten: The Universe, by definition, is that for which no greater can be conceived.

2. God exists in the understanding.

The Universe itself doesn't exist in the same way a planet, or a galaxy exists. The Universe is ALL things that exist. Conceptually it's the set of all sets.

Planets, stars and galaxies exist ontologically as members of the set. The Universe exists only epistemologically as a category in your head.

Rewritten: The Universe exists in the understanding.

3. If God exists in the understanding, we could imagine Him to be greater by existing in reality.

Rewritten: If The Universe exists in the understanding, we could imagine The Universe to be greater by existing in reality.

Uh what? We could imagine The Universe to exist within The Universe?

From a contradiction anything follows.

It's simply a case of Equivocation fallacy. Godel uses the word 'exists' in multiple senses throughout the argument.

The premises could have been about anything.

elwell• 7 years ago

If God wanted to be 'provable', we wouldn't we have anything left to prove (it would already be proved...). The option to doubt (or to believe) the existence of God, leaves an opportunity for love. Choice is essential to love. If we saw God, we would lose that choice. Though it's interesting to attempt to prove God; I'm currently reading "The Physics of Christianity" [0]. I can't say I stand behind it completely, but it's a fascinating effort.

[0] https://www.amazon.com/Physics-Christianity-Frank-J-Tipler/d...

dang2• 7 years ago

Thread from 2014: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=8806293

2009: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=417917

Others?

ARandomerDude2• 7 years ago

Seems like it's made the rounds a few times. Still, 2014 was 5 years ago and 2009 was 10 years ago. It's likely that many of us either weren't on HN at the time or several years is sufficient for us to have forgotten.

dang2• 7 years ago

Oh yes, reposts are fine after about a year—this is in the FAQ: https://news.ycombinator.com/newsfaq.html. The reason for linking to past discussions is just that some readers find them interesting.

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

I'll take the First Way of Aristotle/Aquinas:

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/07/first-way-some-backgroun...

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/08/first-way-moving-tale.ht...

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/09/first-way-part-ii-two-le...

Some things in the world are changing. (Observation)
Whatever is changing is being changed by another. (Lemma 1) See Part I.
There cannot be an infinite regress of instrumental changers. (Lemma 2) See Part II.
Therefore, there must be a changer that is not itself being changed by another.

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/10/first-way-part-iii-big-k...

zzo38computer3• 7 years ago

I have seen Aquinas's proof written somewhere. It is like what you wrote: Something that is moved is moved by someone else, but there cannot be a infinite regress, therefore God is the unmoved mover. But that is illogical: The conclusion contradicts the premise. Rather, if something that is moved is moved by someone else that is before it (rather than a loop), then it necessarily is a infinite regress (and this infinite regress is like what is God, I suppose).

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

Rather, if something that is moved is moved by someone else that is before it (rather than a loop), then it necessarily is a infinite regress (and this infinite regress is like what is God, I suppose).

Read the series posts. The use of the word "motion" in the day-to-day colloquial sense is not the way "motion" is being used in the technical/philosophical sense in these arguments:

What's in a name? If "motion" is more than the thin concept used in modern physics, that raises the question³ of whether we ought to call it "motion" anymore. Because motion is defined as "the reduction potency to act," we might call it "actualization," but this would earn blank stares [see left]. So would kinesis, although that sounds agreeably scientificalistic. The word change captures the greater scope of kinesis, but comes off as rather bland. It's kinetic change, after all.

[...]

3. "Motion" begins when the many potencies a thing possesses collapse onto a single potency (the "actual" potency). The act of building commences.
4. "Motion" ceases when the potency has been fully actualized (or the actualizing force has been removed!) The building has been completed (or abandoned).
5. "Motion" means that a thing is both what it is now and what it is going to be, as of now.
6. "Motion" is a change to something a thing already possesses. If the thing already possesses motion, then it would be a change in that motion (i.e., an acceleration)

[...]

8. "Inertia" (lit. "laziness") is a principle of resistance to change, not a principle of motion. "Motion" ["Change"] must overcome this resistance. A body does not continue to move because of inertia, but because of momentum. If friction changes the motion, it must overcome resistance to change.
9. "Motion" that is continuous and unchanging is actually "rest" (equilibrium). This includes orbiting planets, Belousov–Zhabotinsky reactions, etc.

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/08/first-way-moving-tale.ht...

hota_mazi• 7 years ago

Whatever is changing is being changed by another
Therefore, there must be a changer that is not itself being changed by another.

A proof that contains its own refutation :-)

state_less• 7 years ago

Whatever is changing is being changed by another

It started off good :)

Makes me wonder about the technical details of what hardware God runs on and how that was created?

I got interested in Sethianism, since Seth is my given name, and it has a fun creation mythos. You get a little backstory leading up to the garden of eden.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sethianism

eximius• 7 years ago

Eh, if there are problems with the proof, it isnt because of that. All proofs by contradiction eventually claim the negation of their premise must be true. That's the point.

nicolodavis• 7 years ago

I think you're misunderstanding "changing" here. It is being applied to the object of change, not the subject that is effecting the change.

Whatever is changing is being changed by another. God is not changing, therefore does not need to be changed by another. Immutability is one of the Divine Attributes (Aquinas talks about this as well).

nabla9• 7 years ago

The weaknesses in these proofs are in the premises.

For example:

Whatever is changing is being changed by another

Asian philosophers would have pointed out that self causation seems to be true. Most things that appear persistent cause themselves to change state. They even had the concepts of two things changing or creating each other at the same time "dependent co-arising". "conditioned existence". Thing might exist conditionally. When condition arises thing starts to exist, when it goes away it ceases to to exist.

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

Asian philosophers would have pointed out that self causation seems to be true.

This is more along the lines of the Second Way:

1. Everything which has come to exist has been caused to come to exist.
2. Nothing which has come to exist can be the cause of its own existence.
3. Everything which has come to exist is caused to exist by something other than itself. (follows from 1,2)
4. It is impossible for a chain of causes of this kind to go on to infinity.
C. There must be a first cause, which causes other things to come into existence but did not itself come into existence. (follows from 3,4)

* https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/201/aquinas-cosm...

Note that Aquinas has not (just|necessarily) talking about 'horizontal' causes (going back in time), but 'vertical' causes.

Up until the Big Bang Theory was formulated (by a Belgian priest no less)†, the accepted cosmology was that the universe had always existed eternally with no beginning. So Aquinas talking about what caused things (to continue) to exist in the here and now.

A sequence is ordered essentially if each changer in the sequence possesses the power to change another only if a preceding changer is acting concurrently upon it. For example, a clarinet does not have the power to play Mozart's Clarinet Concerto in A in and of itself. It will only play if Sharon Kam is playing upon it concurrently.

* http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2014/09/first-way-part-ii-two-le...

For a fuller treatment on the subject, I highly recommend the book Aquinas by Edward Feser.

† The fact that it was initially put forward by a priest supposedly stunted its spread a bit, because folks thought that he just wanted to give "scientific" grounding to the Biblical account of creation in the book of Genesis.

zzo38computer3• 7 years ago

I think that it is difficult to define what is meant by "God"; and maybe even by "exists" in such a context, too. So, many people will disagree. Also, even if a proof may be mathematically valid, it may be misapplied, or have invalid premises, or misuse of words (which can be a kind of misapplication, I suppose).

ozy• 7 years ago

Now do the same for the devil:

"The devil, by definition, is that for which no greater evil can be conceived. The devil exists in the understanding. If the devil exists in the understanding, we could imagine him to be greater by existing in reality. Therefore, the devil must exist."

From which it also follows that:

"If the devil doesn't destroy god, we could imagine him to be a greater evil by destroying god. Therefore, the devil must have destroyed god."

At which point we must conclude that it is a shame that theology has captured the minds of so many brilliant people.

antonvs• 7 years ago

You could just as easily adjust the axioms to require that both a god and devil must exist in perfect balance.

In any case, your argument is an informal one - turn it into a formal refutation of Goedel's modal logic proof, and it'd be more relevant to this post.

nurettin• 7 years ago

He doesn't have to. He can use the same argument to prove that a formal logical proof exists.

Conjoiner2• 7 years ago

I am not aware of any claim that the devil is the largest evil that could be imagined. Further, such a definition would not make sense in for example traditional Christianity where evil is defined as a privation on good, not something that exists in itself.

Having God and the devil as evenly matched but opposite powers is not something you would find in theology. Learn the basics of it before thinking you have created a proper critique.

maze-le2• 7 years ago

That sounds as if it were a fact that can be measured. Everything can be conjured into existence by false assumptions.

"The spaghetti monster, by definition, is that for which no more delicious thing can be conceived. The spaghetti monster exists in the understanding. If the spaghetti monster exists in the understanding, we could imagine it to be even more delicious by existing in reality. Therefore, the spaghetti monster must exist."

goto119• 7 years ago

I am not aware of any claim that the devil is the largest evil that could be imagined.

That is completely irrelevant. The ontological proof claims to deduce the existence of an entity from a definition of that entity. It does not matter whether this definition happen to match some current religious dogma or not.

coldtea7• 7 years ago

If the devil exists in the understanding, we could imagine him to be greater by existing in reality.

That, like with God, is a logical jump. Who said reality > understanding? Reality could be == understanding (e.g. all, including what we conceive as matter, is just thought), or understanding could be discreet but greater than reality (and e.g. reality being a fossilized, realized, and constrained version of one path in the realm of understanding).

At which point we must conclude that it is a shame that theology has captured the minds of so many brilliant people.

What you cited is based philosophy and logical argumentation, one of the cornerstones of civilization. And theology had quite a role in shaping it, along with the rest of civilization. Just because the starting points and assumptions are bad, it doesn't make the mechanism bad. For that matter, just because a mechanism is bad, it doesn't make it less useful (e.g. a population could be more agreeable, civilized, and moral when believing in a higher power, even if that higher power is BS, not to mention other benefits at the civic and personal level. See [1] for an example of such thinking).

[1] https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129528...

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

At which point we must conclude that it is a shame that theology has captured the minds of so many brilliant people.

Or that the brilliant people whom it captured were more brilliant than arm chair philosophers of the modern age. Even Aquinas didn't like Godel/Anselm's argument:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Thomas_Aq...

And this is not specifically theology, but philosophy generally. Aristotle espoused these views in 300 BC:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle#Metaphysics

And I think you'd be hard pressed to call Aristotle "religious", and yet the (Catholic) Church took up worldview with few qualms:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Five_Ways_(Aquinas)

When universities were established in the middle ages, they certainly had theology as a specific course of study, but a good portion of the curriculum was about Aristotle's view of the natural world:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corpus_Aristotelicum

coldtea7• 7 years ago

Hence, it must follow from Godlikeness. Moreover, Godlikeness is an essence of God, since it entails all positive properties, and any non-positive property is the negation of some positive property, so God cannot have any non-positive properties.

Counter argument: Of course he can.

God isn't constrained by formal logic constraints -- in fact God created logic and can break it at will (e.g. by being two contradicting things at once).

We, as humans (or even as all of the universe), might not be able to conceive these, but then again, why should why? We're not gods!

In other words: when one is considering a God-like figure, there's no reason to consider one bound by the same restrictions we have, our Kantian "a prioris", or even basic consistency. If you do give your God such restrictions you might be able to prove this or that theorem, but only as regards to that lesser God, not the concept of God in general.

goto119• 7 years ago

The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definition of "God".

Your "God" can be two contradictory things at once which seems fundamentally different than the "God" defined in the ontological proof. So basically you are talking about two different things. (But OK, if logic doesn't exist then who cares?)

coldtea7• 7 years ago

The ontological argument is about a specific definition of "God" as having certain properties. You cannot counter that argument by assuming a different definition of "God".

Of course you can.

The ontological argument arrived at the "specific definition" (of axioms about God) under the assumption that those are required and true attributes of any entity that can be called God.

If those are just a random selection of attributes merely thought necessary by Anselm (or Godel here), and not inherently necessarily tied to the notion of God in general, then the whole argument is moot, nothing more than a logical deduction based on some arbitrary axioms that tells us nothing about God existing or not.

The purpose of Anselm and Godel is not to show that (a) "a specific definition of God having [those] certain properties exists".

It is to assert that "those certain properties" are necessary properties of a God entity, and (b) "a God having those properties must exist", (c) "God exists".

Your "God" can be two contradictory things at once which seems fundamentally different than the "God" defined in the ontological proof. So basically you are talking about two different things.

No, we're just talking about two different assertions of what properties God can and cannot have. God as a notion pre-exists any attributes assigned to it in a specific logical argument (for example, Godel and Anselm have both heard about the notion of God before they've picked their axioms).

When trying to match an existing notion it's not enough that one picks axioms: they should also make sure those axioms are the proper ones to capture the notion properly.

Else it's just a new arbitrary definition of an entity, which they called "God" but could just as easily have called "Bob" or "Jane".

vinceguidry10• 7 years ago

You've left the realm of rationalism and are firmly seated in theology. The correct theological interpretation here isn't that God can't do something illogical, but rather that God can remain strictly logical, and still be God. God isn't constrained by formal logic, but chooses to be because it suits Him. In fact, the entire field of theology is built on this. Theologies are imagined descriptions of God, these imaginations are accepted by God because God wants us to believe in Him.

The problem of evil is the same way, ascribing a kind of logic to God. Theologians think a lot about theodicy, and have broken away from their churches over it.

One interesting way to think about it is that God has three basic attitudes about the things humans do. God either wills a thing, accepts it, or tolerates it. If God wills it, it creates more goodness in the world than it takes away. If God accepts it, then the balance is roughly equal. If He tolerates it, then that means God has to balance the scales personally. This can happen through the mechanism we call karma.

A rationally-aware theologian would state that God accepts any rational regime you want to put on him, and the Book of Job puts this into story form. Just because God is rational and good doesn't mean He's going to appear that way all the time to all the people.

coldtea7• 7 years ago

You've left the realm of rationalism and are firmly seated in theology.

Nope, except in the sense that I'm talking about God. But assuming God exists (or can exist) it's perfectly rational to consider him unbounded by logical or physical constraints.

The correct theological interpretation here isn't that God can't do something illogical, but rather that God can remain strictly logical, and still be God.

There's no "correct theological interpretation". That's just one interpretation (e.g. augustinian). Orthodox Christianity, for one, as many other religions, doesn't bound God to be "strictly logical".

So, this "God [that] can remain strictly logical, and still be God" is just one constrained conception of God. One can also argue for a God that can be illogical or beyond logic (such us that logical and illogical make no sense as restrictions to him).

throw0101a7• 7 years ago

God isn't constrained by formal logic constraints -- in fact God created logic and can break it at will (e.g. by being two contradicting things at once).

Not in the (Catholic) Christian tradition:

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omnipotence_paradox#Other_vers...

goto119• 7 years ago

A lot of comments here are making counter-arguments by showing that some other improbable entity would exist by the same logic. This is fine, but be aware that Gödel was just formalizing a 1000 year old argument, and the first counter-argument using this form is also 1000 years old: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument#Gaunilo

The argument basically comes down to if you can define something into existence. If the definition of X implies that X exists...then X must exist?

antisemiotic• 7 years ago

Also, it looks like those who don't understand Kant are doomed to reinvent him haphazardly.

jfengel• 7 years ago

Is that such a bad thing? It's like a framework: if it's not necessary to download a thousand pages of Kant in order to arrive at the correct conclusion, is it really all that important to get the rigorous version instead?

username90• 7 years ago

God, by definition, is that for which no greater can be conceived.

This axiom is very questionable to people who don't already believe in God, so the proof is worthless. For example, I'd define God as a social construct created to cope with existential dread. By that definition God doesn't exist.

contravariant• 7 years ago

By your definition God does exist.

Gödel's Ontological Proof

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