Technology in Hostile States: Ten Principles for User Protection

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/technology-hostile-states-ten-principles-user-protection

177 17 10 years ago

blog.torproject.org

EwanG• 10 years ago

The ten principles are a key principle (number 1), and the nine principles that follow (according to the post):

1. Do not rely on the law to protect systems or users. 2. Prepare policy commentary for quick response to crisis. 3. Only keep the user data that you currently need. 4. Give users full control over their data. 5. Allow pseudonymity and anonymity. 6. Encrypt data in transit and at rest. 7. Invest in cryptographic R&D to replace non-cryptographic systems. 8. Eliminate single points of security failure, even against coercion. 9. Favor open source and enable user freedom. 10. Practice transparency: share best practices, stand for ethics, and report abuse.

ch4s3• 10 years ago

even against coercion I'd be interested to know more about how to protect against this threat vector.

EvilTerran• 10 years ago

Using end-to-end encryption might be a good example: if done right, you won't give away your users' secrets even if someone's got a gun to your head - because you can't.

nickpsecurity3• 10 years ago

An old one was RubberhoseFS albeit with assumption the user would be tortured possibly to dead.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubber-hose_cryptanalysis

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_(file_system)

I wrote two on these things. First is general stuff for both security and stopping legal reach of LEO's. Second is incrementally designing something like Tor with assurance against a NSA-level opponent using methods that stopped them in the past and then some overkill on top of it. The latter is to cover any advances they might be making.

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/a_court_order...

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/09/identifying_d...

patcheudor4• 10 years ago

11. Validate your controls through extensive code review and testing. Don't expect that just because something is open source that this has happened. Don't just take security "best practices" as the truth.

To principle 11, this year we were once again reminded why regurgitating security advice without looking into the actual implementation can be a problem. For years security and privacy advocates told users to use proxies in combination with HTTPS to protect their privacy and security, yet it turns out that this advice as applied to iOS and macOS allowed full middling of HTTPS connections by any bad actor with access to the users network. For all other operating systems, as covered in the CERT advisory, it lead to the ability to phish for authentication credentials:

http://www.falseconnect.com/

dublinben• 10 years ago

Which security and privacy advocates have told users to use proxies to protect their privacy and security? Free proxies are widely recognized to be a threat to both.

patcheudor4• 10 years ago

This has been pretty common guidance over the last two decades. It goes something like this: use a proxy along with HTTP to protect your privacy and security. Here's just one example of the guidance from the EFF:

"Use web proxies and anonymizing software like Tor (advanced)..."

On top of that, there are vendors like BlueCoat who've built a business on selling proxies to government agencies corporations.

https://www.eff.org/wp/six-tips-protect-your-search-privacy

nickpsecurity3• 10 years ago

Security requires a combination of things. Only proxies that worked were VPN's and protocol guards since their job can be handled almost totally at that layer. Doing native or web app security only relying on that layer is asking for it unless you trust everyone you're connected to. Doesn't stop companies from doing it.

The original criteria for high-assurance security, TCSEC's A1 class, said you must secure the endpoints, network connections, databases, and application-layer software. Those systems resisted penetration by NSA's hackers during evaluation. Then, there's the mainstream "security" recommendations that said use low-assurance firewalls + insecure endpoints + bandaid software on them + optionally security- or privacy-oriented proxies. This was to get the benefits of those beautiful, fast-moving, COTS OS's without investing anything in real security. It came with the detriment you mentioned among many, many others that won't go away for some time if ever.

patcheudor4• 10 years ago

The key thing which FalseCONNECT demonstrated was that HTTPS in combination with a web proxy wasn't sufficient. This was a case where everyone assumed that using HTTPS via a web proxy would be safe to the point Microsoft even enabled auto-proxy support by default in Windows. Unfortunately, a few mistakes made in the implementation and the assumption that HTTPS was safe when using a web proxy no longer held true.

pducks32• 10 years ago

On "give users full control over their data." What about if a third party could use that user's account to gain access to their data? What are best practices around that?

comex• 10 years ago

Sandboxing, modularization, vulnerability surface reduction, and least privilege are already established as best practices for improving software security.

And yet Tor Browser Bundle still uses Firefox, which is going to get sandboxing Real Soon Now (8 years after Chrome released with it). Just two weeks ago, we heard about another FBI malware discovered in the wild exploiting a Firefox 0-day to deanonymize Tor users; who knows how long it was used before being discovered, or what other exploits may be lurking out there.

To be fair, I'm not sure whether the Chromium sandbox protects against 'mere' IP address disclosure, but still...

swiley• 10 years ago

To be honest, I would only feel safe using tor over ssh or with curl -H "". Firerox almost feels anti privacy because it's so difficult to disable the headers and javascript.

Technology in Hostile States: Ten Principles for User Protection

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