william-newman

"Trimming facts off at the first few levels of details makes everything feel, well, oversimplified."

But it's not just oversimplification of collective action, the plot was overblown even at the level of purely individual events in individual characters' lives. Arguably the greatest theoretical/experimental crossover physicist of the century takes the occasion of accepting his Nobel Prize to escape with his Jewish wife from Il Duce, and a few years later stands musing over a nuclear chain reaction in a secret project in Chicago? Puhleeze.

Good advice would be "so be particularly careful to check whether their arguments are logically sound and properly documented;" the original advice to skip past the quality of arguments and data to "so take their conclusions with a healthy grain of salt" is bad advice. The ad hominem fallacy isn't just unsound in principle, it tends to be pretty useless in practice. It can look reasonable at the time if there's enough groupthink, but would anyone like to nominate some cases where with two or more generations of hindsight we can agree that ad hominem arguments were a better guide to truth than simply addressing the technical arguments? And it can be wrong no matter how impressively much circumstantial evidence suggests that there could easily be a political motive: see, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Conquest .

When I was in high school, I travelled by city bus while holding two different ultra-low-end programming jobs. I think you are underrepresenting the advantages of having a car.

If I expected to be earning and living on less than perhaps $12 an hour for an extended period of time, I would probably choose to go without a car, likely by moving someplace like Dallas TX (where I live now, and where the local wages vs. cost of living seem reasonably favorable) and renting an apartment very close to a bus line on a major suburban business artery. Judging from my high school experience, from many observations of foreigners living off their science grad school stipends, and from everything I've noticed in my years in Dallas, that'd work reasonably well. But doing without a car would constrain my life in important ways (including job options, education options, and general time efficiency) and I'd be very motivated to find economical ways to reduce the problem, e.g. sharing a car, or getting (and probably learning to maintain) an economical motorcycle.

The math in computer science may not be much like the usual idea of science, but neither is it what people ordinarily mean when they say "pure mathematics." It's much more nearly "applied mathematics," like statistics or signal processing or control theory: more likely to be interested in, e.g., the development of wavelets than in a proof of the Poincare conjecture.

Maybe it would've been more logical if the applied math end of the CS field had ended up with an applied-math-y name comparable to "statistics", e.g. "algorithmics" or "algorithmic analysis," and much of the rest of the CS field had ended up "software engineering" or "computer engineering" or "computational engineering" or "information system engineering" by analogy with "electrical engineering." But naming of technical fields is not necessarily systematically logical, sometimes because of old idiosyncratic reasons to avoid ambiguity with other pursuits: "astronomy" vs. "astrology," anyone?

I have no particular sympathy with any anti-vaccine activism that I know of. But I wonder how, other than by not being an important faction in the appropriate big political tent, "anti-vaccine denial" ended up on this article's excrement list along with Holocaust deniers, while "nuclear power denial" and "genetic engineering denial" didn't.

My impression is that political opposition to nuclear power plants, to nuclear waste facilities, and to GM crops have had at least as much economic impact as political opposition to vaccines. Thus, it seems to me that they shouldn't be left off this list because they're unimportant.

Perhaps the columnist thinks that the anti-nuke and anti-GM-crops political movements should be spared because they have achieved their political impact primarily by honestly making valid technical points? Granting for the sake of argument that that is a tenable position, then why ignore them? Wouldn't the anti-nuke and anti-GM movements make useful examples to clarify his position by comparing and contrasting? Wouldn't describing what is healthy and good about the thinking of the anti-GM and anti-nuke coalitions help us understand better what is so characteristically diseased and vile about anti-vaccine folk to justify grouping them with Holocaust deniers?

(I extended this comment, writing on an analogy to criticism of left-wingers as "politically correct," at http://naturalspiritofgoodcompany.blogspot.com/2010/05/on-ha... .)

It depends on what point you think you're making. (And perhaps you should make that point explicitly, so that I don't need to guess it before criticizing it, but if I'm guessing wrong, I apologize in advance.) If you are arguing out that an article from 1996 not timely, your argument is "relevant" but not necessarily correct. Note that the thread http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1062031 was on the front page when I first noticed this article. It contained a comment linking to the 1996 article. I don't know why the the 1996 article became a standalone thread instead of just a comment on the 1062031 thread, but it might be that someone who read the 1062031 comment found the 1996 article surprisingly worthwhile.

IMO, the 1996 article (and even more the 1991ish "Fable of the Keys" academic journal article which preceded it) remain timely because both QWERTY-is-superior and QWERTY-demonstrates-market-failure stories are remarkably hardy perennials, presented as established fact without acknowledging the Liebowitz/Margolis counterargument. (E.g., _Knowledge and the Wealth of Nations_ by David Walsh (2006), carries approving blurbs from _The Financial Times_ and _The Economist_ on its cover, and should be easy to find in a library, maybe even a chain bookstore. "Paul David" and QWERTY appear in the index many times, but Liebowitz and Margolis do not.)

For a more academic-economics-oriented article on the same theme by the same authors, see http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/keys1.html , from _Journal of Law and Economics_.

Incidentally, I would be very interested in a pointer to a comparably serious/academic rebuttal of Fable of the Keys. It has been a very long time since Fable of the Keys was published, and it has been a long time since I last tuned into the controversy, and at that time my understanding was that a rebuttal had long been promised but never produced.

You write "first, they are anecdotal." Fictional, in fact: "once upon a time..."

And you write "second, why are the programmers not taking control of management positions if they know so much better?" That question is outside the scope of the fictional dataset of the original post, but see "Jack and the Beancounter" in http://www.skotos.net/articles/BTH_27.shtml for a related fictional study.

And you write "but realistically, I think Alan created the best product for the company." Perhaps I am just being trolled. But at least this was a good excuse to refer to Jack and the Beancounter!

I agree that his point is valid for computers built on the ordinary substrate of classical switches (whether relays, tubes, or transistors). There are two very influential ways of representing computation, the lambda calculus and the Turing machine; when starting from switches, people (roughly) build something that looks like a Turing machine (with procedural programs) and then, if they want lambda calculus (with more functional programs) they use Turing completeness to emulate it.

That said, it's not 100% clear to me that this must be true for all physical models of computation. (And the existence of Shor's algorithm suffices to keep practical people at least a little interested in computational mechanisms which are fundamentally different from classical switches.) Does anyone know if there are any reasonably plausible computational mechanisms for which it'd be natural to start by implementing something that looked more like lambda calculus, so that if you needed a Turing machine you'd emulate it?

I don't think amateur-vs.-scientist-vs.-genius is a very good set of names for the distinctions he is trying to make, especially if you're going to reach back to Herschel's time. To pick some influential folk who fit into that period, consider Babbage, Darwin, Mendel, Pasteur, Boltzmann, Cantor, Semmelweis, the Wright Brothers, and Wegener. Consider also their rivals and critics. (Since I included a number of controversial folk, various of their rivals and critics are still remembered.) We can come up with generalizations about what the influential folk did right, but I don't think it works to say that, e.g., they were scientists while their critics and rivals were amateurs.

Or consider all the advice in an essay at the level of Hamming's "You and your research." It doesn't seem to me to be useful to try to boil down the multiple properties discussed there into boolean predicates "is this person a scientist" or "is this person an amateur," or even to try to choose particular points in those multidimensional property spaces as typifying "scientist" or "amateur" or "genius."

I wholeheartedly approve of people writing about some of the principles in this essay, notable the ones often summarized as "genius is 99% perspiration" and "a month in the lab can often save a day in the library." Those are very important principles, and very often people don't appreciate them enough. But trying to define the amateur/scientist/genius terminology on top of those principles doesn't seem very sensible.

Stepanov (i.e., Mr. C++ Standard Template Library) has said some comparably strong things about the expressiveness of C++ templates for the kinds of things expressed in STL, and he doesn't seem to be guilty of not investigating Lispy alternatives.

e.g., http://www.antiquark.com/escape/public_html/stepanovusa.html

There are various gnarly problems with C++'s model, some of which show up as gnarly problems in STL, even in fundamental stuff like implementing collections of refcounting pointers last time I looked. But as far as I can tell, every language which tries to get this correct within the language has some serious limitations or issues, arguably at least as bad, especially if like Stepanov one of your top priorities is eliminating every last bit of runtime overhead in the generated code. (E.g., implementing arrays of objects only as arrays of fixed-size pointers into variable-sized objects on the heap, as in typical CL and Java, is a no-go given STL priorities, and thus STL constantly wrestles with a bunch of problems that lots of other implementors have dodged by giving up on them.) As far as I know, no one has a comprehensively satisfactory solution for metalanguage facilities within the language.

Getting metalanguage correct by stepping outside the language and upstream from the compiler, writing a separate program to generate the target program, has been a solved problem as long as we've known how to write compilers in Turing-complete languages. That approach is sometimes used for app code in conventional languages, as in FFTW, and to some extent it's what Lispy macros do. But for some applications, including STL as I understand it, stepping upstream is unsatisfactory. Sometimes what you'd really like to do is have your code generator query the compiler about what the compiler knows. STL in particular, IIRC, wants to have its code generation depend on what the compiler knows about types and typedefs and so forth. In an ideal world it would be routine for code generators to be able to ask the compiler about other things, too, like dead code, namespaces, and safety and other pragmas.

It is seldom a good idea, or even sane, to choose to machine something out of titanium (or beryllium). But sometimes there are reasons.

I think C++ does a decent job of being as logically expressive as practical while still supporting C-level memory micromanagement. Typically exposing C-level memory micromanagement issues is a bug, but occasionally it's a feature. So to me, the point of C++ is to express abstractions like polymorphism and exceptions in the same few pages of code as low level memory operations. How often do I want to do that? Not very often, but it can happen.

Also, while C++ is very hairy and I wouldn't want to have to implement it, C++ seems to be implementable enough and standard enough that it may be usefully supported on a platform well before other more expressive languages. Perhaps it's because a lot of the C++ hair is frontend target-independent stuff like parsing and templates, so that once you've ported the C backend you're almost done porting C++ too? Dunno for sure why, but it seems to happen: e.g., it was my impression on my Atari ST many many years ago, and is my casual impression that something similar happened for the Arduino more recently.

C++ is admittedly a weird mess in various ways, but given the choice of source almost-compatibility with C (which I don't particularly value, but which I can at least understand) and C-level linkers (which I have mixed feelings about) a mess seems inevitable. Thus, I still consider it an impressive design.

Occsionally I've seen IMO-excessively broad claims that higher level languages are the best. It sometimes makes me think I might be able to cook up an example where C++ would be hard to beat: a small backtracking search problem where trailing operations (in the sense of "trailing" that you'll see if you Google "trailing backtracking") are in the inner loop. Take this thought of mine with a generous amount of salt, because I've never boiled it down to a really clean challenge. OTOH, I have at least implemented such search in several languages, and I even did a few casual benchmarks --- but 10+ years ago, when performance tradeoffs were rather different.

That's a particular case of a general theme where C-level programming could win: performance dominated by a very simple memory allocation regularity (LIFO, in this case) that the GC doesn't know about. (This theme also involves the precondition that you should care more about a factor of 2 in performance than a factor of 2 in programmer time, which often doesn't hold.) In many instances of this theme, the accreted featuritis bloat of C++ would be overkill, so you'd prefer C. In this instance, though, placement new() of polymorphic objects into LIFO-allocated raw memory is more expressive than anything I can see how to do in C.

Now, we should not forget that many programmers can go all year without running into a single problem where a factor of 2 in performance is worth a factor of 2 in programmer time. And we should not forget that even the ones who need to care deeply about performance often find it's not determined by a few low-level hotspots where low-level tweaking helps. But in some subfields, it's not too unusual to rationally choose to micromanage stuff at the level of C/C++. (I nominate the subfields of embedded programming and compute-heavy search from personal experience, and Quake/Unreal-like engine programming by reputation; I also explicitly do not nominate implementing web browsers, ow ow ow.)

It's harder to think of reasons I'd choose to write sizable programs in C++ (other than the compelling but unsatisfying accidental-seeming reason of early availability on a platform). One reason, though, is that there are many subproblems for which the choice of language doesn't matter all that much. E.g., Fortran is adequately expressive for a lot of the stuff in a book like _Numerical Recipes_, and you can famously write Fortran in (almost) any language. Because of this, I sometimes encounter a program where some key subproblem really cries for a particular style of language, possibly C++, and then I can be language-agnostic about solving the other subproblems, not minding writing it in whatever language I chose for the key part.

You write "in mathematics, Andrew Wiles and Gregory Perelman solved more vexing problems than Einstein did in physics."

Wiles and Perelman are rightly honored for solving problems that had been posed long ago and resisted any number of efforts to solve them. But Einstein is honored not only for that, but also for being the one who posed some of the startling questions that he also answered. E.g., is the speed of light an absolute bound on causal interactions, with all coordinates and other measures being bent as necessary (and quantum phase information being hidden as necessary) to keep that bound from being passed?

Einstein's technical achievement in solving problems that everyone else recognized was very impressive: see General Relativity especially. But if that was all Einstein did, we might (only!) compare him to Maxwell or Dirac. To appreciate Einstein's achievements in terms of analogous achievements of mathematicians, you can't just compare to the achievements of people like Wiles or Perelman, you also need to compare to the achievements of people like Goedel, who is famous for both stating and proving a fundamentally important out-of-the-blue conjecture.

Skip lists seem to be a powerful way of thinking about the problem, anyway. Note that they lead nicely to the very nifty multidimensional generalization, skip quadtrees, www.ics.uci.edu/~goodrich/pubs/skip.pdf .

And, FWIW, they also lead to my algorithms for hash-consing digraphs, which I put up as rough preprints and and prototype code at http://www.wryttyndyffyryntly.com/preprint/. Those algorithms are unreviewed, and I made a bad mistake in an early version, so who knows? (I sent email about them to other people who had cited the Mauborgne papers that I cited, and got no response. I don't know whether it's worth trying to bang them into shape for submission to a journal, and whether or not it's worth it in principle, in practice last year I was too tired of working on them to consider it very objectively.)

"Pretty is good. Ugly is bad. It has always, and will always be this way."

Pretty is often good. Ugly is even more often bad. It has often been that way, and it will often be that way.

"If you don't make beautiful products, its probably because you can't."

Or because your product is wooden pencils, or bulldozers, or parachutes, or test tubes, or transistors, or pillows, or ammunition. Various things resist beauty enough that all you get is the elegance of something that's efficient and reliable, which is not the usual meaning of beauty.

(Yes, I remember our host's SR-71 example. And good sailboats look nice too. But efficient submarines and high speed rockets aren't particularly pretty. Once simple design constraints become too extreme --- streamlining in this case --- it can become hard to satisfy the constraints in an interesting way.)

Various other things like books are borderline cases. A well-done book may have more appealing aesthetic touches than a well-done wooden pencil. But not so many more, because mostly its presentation should keep out of the way of the words. A particularly beautiful fire alarm or fire extinguisher is not necessarily a good idea, either.

I am not as sure as giardini that the money is ill-spent --- poking around in a new regime is an interesting gamble, not necessarily an albatross. But the article does seem unusually asinine. "Leadership in the branch of science that delivered just about every major technology of the past hundred years?" Physics, broadly defined, has delivered major technologies, yes. (Just about every major technology! Don't be distracted by minor technologies like antibiotics, restriction enzymes, pesticides, fertilizers, plastics, etc.) But once you define physics so broadly that it includes transistors and lasers and satellites, the US is still doing fairly well under that definition. Massive spending in the subfield of high-energy physics doesn't give you leadership in the entire broad field of physics, and there's no particular reason to expect major technologies will come primarily from from the high energy subfield in the future. Granting for the sake of argument the silly apparent assumption that outspending is outdoing, CERN still doesn't deliver leadership in subfields like condensed matter physics that may still have a few technologies left in them.

I think the EM field properties are somewhat peculiar even before you get to experimental results that force you to quantize the field. Granted, the EM field is not so weird that understanding the general properties of more tangible waves isn't helpful. E.g., I learned a lot from the ripple tank experiments and demonstrations in my high school physics classes, demonstrating properties like diffraction and the tendency not to scatter from too-small obstacles. That kind of stuff applies nicely to EM waves. But that general familiarity with waviness didn't prepare me for things like relativistic invariance. And historically, I'm in good company there: various sharp 19th century physicists were misled about EM by pursuing the analogy with the more tangible waves they were familiar with.

It is not sufficient simply not to target growth. But not targeting growth removes what is otherwise one helluva tough design constraint for a filter system. Imagine writing a spam filter when you're being paid by beancounters whose bottom line is maximizing the number of messages. Even, sometimes, beancounters who face strong temptation to maximize the number of bytes of email this quarter and worry about the longer-than-a-month-term consequences later.

Also, some kinds of filtering (and related things, like informal community norms) don't scale, so if the community hasn't grown too much, the problem might tend to be easier. Hacker-oriented mailing lists with 100 posters don't seem to be too hard to moderate, but I'm not eager to try 10,000 posters.

Of course since I didn't take offense at being accused of making a "major strawman" argument, I won't mind being accused of another dishonest rhetorical tactic. At least it's not major ad hominem, yay.

When a discussion is devoted to trying to resolve a technical question, it is indeed bad to get distracted by personalities and sociology. But Crichton's article is not a technical article, it's an article on some meta-level like sociology. Not every thread has to resolve technical questions, and it is not a fallacy to talk about sociology in a thread started by a sociological analogy. There is a technical question underneath, certainly. But there are also entire websites (and professional journals, and other things) devoted to the underlying technical question. This thread doesn't need to be devoted to the underlying technical question too.

Imagine if the thread had started from an article analogizing Singularity attitudes today to Christian millenarian attitudes ca. 1000 AD. (Riffing on the "rapture for nerds" idea.) On such a thread, it would not be off topic to talk about personalities and behavior. Sociological discussion isn't necessarily trumped by the question of whether Singularity ideas are technically correct.

Of course, it would be bad if some reader got confused and thought that sociological considerations settle technical questions. If someone correctly perceived that was a major danger, it might even be OK to remind people: "let's remember not to delude ourselves into thinking that talk of personalities and sociology trumps the underlying physical truth." But it would be bad if a reader started firing off accusations of attempted rhetorical trickery at selected nontechnical/sociological remarks. Such a reader would himself be falling prey to the fallacy of being a major twit.

"What are you trying to say, Anti-GW people are nice people and GW-people are rude, therefore we should believe the Anti-GW? I highly doubt such a generalization, sorry." You have willfully misunderstood my argument and then attacked the misstated version. Do you know any technical terms for that?

I stated explicitly some of the things I was trying to say. One thing I was trying to say is that martythemaniak's remark "the horrible politicization by GW opponents is perhaps the second-best example of politicized science being overshadowed only by the disbelief in evolution by creationists" looks like a repetition of a common ad hominem attack on AGW skeptics. I remain unconvinced by your analysis that it is merely an appropriate response given Crichton's provocation.

("It's as if you say 'AGWs are like Creationists', then AGWs reply 'no we are not' and you claim victory by saying 'see, AGWs think their opponents are creationists'." Indeed? It looks to me like someone wrote an article saying AGWs are like creationists, and the top-ranked response was "the irony is overwhelming, because the truth is that AGWs are the modern eugenicists." Though neither analogy is quite fair to martythemaniak, since both make it sound like he was merely posting an ad hominem attack. At least he had the good grace to back up his general rhetorical slam with a paragraph of actual technical information.)

Have a selectively outraged day.

If I had misrepresented Myers as making the most best arguments the AGW folk have, and knocked his arguments down and proclaimed victory, you could honestly say "major strawman." But I am not playing that rhetorical trick. I already acknowledge more level-headed arguments for AGW, when I acknowledged martythemaniak's cite of IPCC as the highbrow case for AGW, and nominated McIntyre as a critic that I think makes solid criticisms. (And I note you aren't impressed with historical buckets, fine, they don't float my boat either. Try bristlecone pines, taking note of how heavily they were weighted in the famous hockey stick temperature reconstruction, and how prominently that reconstruction figured in the Gore/IPCC case for global warming. McIntyre is also a persistent critic of data not being archived, and of records like tree rings ending decades ago and not being brought up to date, and IMHO he's dead right on those things, and the relative incuriosity of the pro-AGW people is curious.)

I didn't knock down Myers to dishonestly imply that that shows I can refute the most valid arguments that AGW has to offer. I used Myers' post as an example to support two of my previous claims about AGW arguments. (1) The way martythemaniak casually compared AGW critics to creationists is not, as you argued, just an isolated instance provoked by Crichton's use of a point-by-point analogy to eugenics. (2) The controversy is uncivil. Crichton's choice of an emotionally-charged historical examples may not be a good thing, but it is not a case of AGW critics dragging a previously high-minded discussion into the emotional mud.

(And once I reread the article, I noticed that passage which seemed so ripely reminiscent of the emotional arguments of a B-movie eugenicist, making it a dramatic example of my other point, the tendency to defend AGW with arguments suitable to defend pseudoscience. You may say picking on a grouchy professor with a well-read blog is unsuitable. Do you suppose the "very cranky right now" professor thought better of his words a few days later, and qualified them and/or apologized for them? I doubt it: usually that's done by adding some kind of text on the web page itself, like "UPDATE: foo," and I didn't see anything like that. So I think you're trying to hold me to an unreasonable standard: most people would agree that a professor of science with a well-read blog is a pretty solid choice as an example of argument tactics used by AGW supporters.)

You wrote "they find some ancient bone ... ridiculous, and too much detail indeed." It's true that an actual important failing of creationists is blowing up some irrelevant detail, often exaggerating or outright misrepresenting it. It's also true that Myers might have been trying, in a dimwitted but virtuously vigorously partisan way, to allude to an important failing of Intelligent Design: unfalsifiability. Either failing could be used as a starting point for a complete rewrite, building something intellectually honest over the rubble of Myers' indignation at creationists for too stubbornly criticizing one of his favorite theories. But would the resulting valid criticism of creationists be applicable as a valid criticism of McIntyre? McIntyre is obviously guilty of what Myers accuses the creationists of, stubbornly criticizing one of Myers' favorite theories. But I don't consider that a sin, and it doesn't seem to me that McIntyre is guilty of the actual sins of the creationists, like being vastly sloppier with details than those they criticize, or claiming a vacuous theory is an improvement over a theory with considerable predictive power.

(And why are you comparing the AGW defenders to people making remarks against QM? My point was that an awful lot of AGW arguments don't look like the arguments characteristic of correct theories. If AGW advocates make remarks that resemble QM skeptics, that doesn't weaken my point, it sorta strengthens it. It is true that in politically charged controversies like Darwinism, flaky arguments were made both on the correct side and on the incorrect side. But that doesn't excuse invalid arguments "on the correct side." I don't know the intellectual history, but I'd guess that Darwin supporters who honored the flaky arguments for Darwinism might have been a contributing factor to the rise of politicized pseudoscientific knockoffs like social Darwinism and eugenics.)

Here's a nice example of equating AGW skeptics to creationists, one that I vaguely remembered, but had trouble digging up: http://scienceblogs.com/pharyngula/2007/11/hello_stan_palmer... .

As I said, the controversy long ago became uncivil.

Besides illustrating the creationist comparison, I think it illustrates my point about AGW advocacy resembling eugenics advocacy. If a lazy screenwriter wanted rhetoric for a 1920s eugenicist scorning a prominent critic, he could do worse than "the myopic little nitpickers, people who scurry about seeking little bits of garbage in the fabric of science (and of course, there are such flaws everywhere), and when they find some scrap of rot, they squeak triumphantly and hold it high and declare that the science everywhere is similarly corrupt." But wouldn't those words sound out of place in a defense of a successful theory like quantum mechanics or of the germ theory of disease?

Admittedly, those words are here in the mouth of a defender of the successful theory of natural selection. But he seems to be a sadly devolved specimen of the breed. Some years ago I read Darwin's reaction to Lord Kelvin's criticisms (in some webbed version of Origin of Species). Darwin just didn't declare victory because Darwin had assembled a "rational synthesis" and Kelvin had not: Darwin reacted as though addressing criticism on the details was important in and of itself.

(I myself tend to dismiss modern creationists, but certainly not because I think that details are unimportant compared to one's "coherent picture on a scientific issue." Details are very important, and one of my beefs with creationists is that they tend to be stubbornly spectacularly wrong on the details. E.g., ICR continues to misstate the second law of thermodynamics http://www.icr.org/article/456/ . It is easy for evolution to be consistent with the second law, because so much entropy is carried by food and O2 and CO2, or by sunlight and IR. In that particular article, the main sleight of hand seems to be ignoring the outgoing IR.)

The creationist comparison shows up other places, too. I've encountered it several times before, and you can Google "denialist creationist" to find more.

Me trying to refute martythemaniak may not impress you, but if when you first read that topmodded post you nodded vaguely, might there be some validity in Crichton's implication that the arguments invoked for AGW could be arguments for eugenics if you filed off the serial numbers? It's an offensive charge, but it's not a goofy one IMHO: it is far more true of the arguments for AGW than of the arguments for actual "settled science" like quantum mechanics or natural selection or antibiotics or the Big Bang.

"What are good sources to read, that are not opinionated?"

One non-opinionated source as background both for my exasperation about the Darwinist analogy, and for my claims about the flabbiness of 10-year-old climate predictions, which also happens to be interesting reading for hackers interested in machine learning: _The Minimum Description Length Principle_. Lots of math to help you think precisely about questions like "by how many bits did this hypothesis reduce the surprisingness of the world compared to alternative hypotheses?"

For sources more specific to the AGW controversy, good luck finding someone unopinionated. The controversy long ago became uncivil, and all sides are indignant about various scummy folk who have lined up on other sides. But I can point you to sources that seem (opinionated but) sound. As far as I know, the IPCC reports (see martythemaniak's URL) are a reasonably good presentation of the highbrow case for crisis AGW (high CO2 climate sensitivity, low natural variation): I've never seen an advocate claim that vital parts of the pro-crisis case were overlooked or horribly poorly presented there. And I think McIntyre's critiques of the IPCC reports --- mostly centered on the historical climate record reconstruction I mentioned --- are generally sound. He has a website, Climate Audit; he has also written the Mann critique up as at least one traditional journal paper. Besides his Mann critique, he has also done things like catching a Y2K bug in temperature records. (Of course that's not impressive as virtuoso rocket science, but I think it's pretty convincing evidence that he's a careful guy who does a lot of homework.) It is natural for AGWists to find him irritating, but it is inexcusable to try to dismiss him as a ignorant closedminded crank by analogy with modern disbelievers in natural selection.

And besides the math and technical background, some academic sociology background: McIntyre is not the only opinionated grouchy outsider who has torpedoed a politically correct prestigious academic consensus in the last decade or so, Cramer did too: http://law.bepress.com/nwwps/lep/art9/ .

"Why choose any examples at all? The only point of the comparisons is to make an emotional argument, which has no foundations in logic whatsoever."

The only point? I think not.

One other point which Crichton makes explicitly is "The past history of human belief is a cautionary tale." Bad science can be very expensive, people mouthing bad science can do extremely nasty things in its name. I think he hammers on this point too much in the essay. It seems to me that most people are already predisposed to believe that policies based in bad science can be really bad: bandwidth is cheap, but why waste it on flogging this dead horse when it could be better used for porn about flogging dead horses? I also think bringing in Lysenkoism is a bad idea because even though it is a valid illustration of bad science being expensive, it comes with the non-parallel of being enforced by world-class murderous repression of dissent, which is too much of a distraction. But whether or not my criticisms are valid, I think it's clearly a point.

Another point which I don't think Crichton makes explicitly, but which seems to motivate various of his examples, is illustrating that a form of argument could be used to justify horrid and stupid eugenic claims and policies. That's both a vivid way of making the point that that form of argument is logically invalid style, and a way of demonstrating that that form of argument dangerous in political practice, and shouldn't be taken lightly.

Look at martythemaniak's post...

"I really don't have the ego to claim I magically know better than thousands of scientists and decades of research, ..." Adjust that for the smaller 1920 scientific population, s/thousands/hundreds/ perhaps, and you have a right-thinking person wisely avoiding being branded as a eugenics denier.

AGW advocates like martythemaniak delight in comparing themselves to Darwinists and their critics to creationists. Very well, then: why stoop to use arguments which were used to defend Sanger? Think of valid arguments like the ones which worked to defend Darwin but not Sanger, and use them in preference to flaky arguments which can be used to defend any old garbage. Especially, Darwin and his followers found all sorts of extensive patterns of species and population which, to the best of my knowledge, defy explanation any other way. So why not use arguments like that? They can be extremely convincing.

bad example 2: "the fact that CO2 Levels are higher today than anytime in the last 800000 years, or the fact of the 40% increase since the 1800s, my conclusion is pretty obvious." s/CO2/non-Aryan/, s/the last 800000 years/our nation's history/.

Unfortunately, banging on one superficial correlation and declaring victory is a classic pro-Sanger style of argument, not the kind of characteristically pro-Darwin argument that I was referring to. It might seem like good clean fun if you are a true believer and haven't thought about it, but think about it now. Or, if you still don't realize how dysfunctional it is, start by imagining trying to dissuade someone who thinks he has found revealed inconvenient truth in "all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours - whereas all the testing says not really."

After that, feel free to copy the Darwinists by blasting away with all those independent detailed observed patterns which match AGW. Or pick some other style of argument which worked for Darwin and not for Sanger, and use that.

Or, alternatively, perhaps no such arguments exist, and instead the comparison to Darwinists is self-flattery on such a cosmic scale that AGW does have enormous explanatory power --- in that the gravitational effect of the vast self-flattery cloud explains what the cosmologists call "dark matter". That's roughly my opinion: possibly the Gore/IPCC version of AGW (only very small non-CO2-driven global climate fluctuations, and large positive feedback in climate response to CO2) is correct, but certainly it is not a glaringly obvious truth about the world like Darwin's natural selection. Instead it's like the Philips Curve question I wrote about elsewhere: the answer should become clearer over time, and you can make valid arguments now about what it will turn out to be, but it's not a routine matter to convince an honest skeptic by direct appeals to observation. Darwinists could sample a near-endless supply of independent ecosystems to determine whether a pattern holds or not, and they delighted in charging into the details. AGWists start with a naturally data-poor problem like the Philips Curve arguers, and then many of them make it poorer by retreating from the details, refusing to commit themselves to anything sharper than decadal averages over the entire globe.

I agree that Crichton's analogy to eugenics is really inflammatory and offensive, and even that that's likely part of his reason for choosing it. But in his defense, it might not be the main reason. Consider: How many examples of bogus expert consensus are still remembered today? It seems to me that in order to be remembered, such examples need to be pretty horrific in one way or another. For example, we still remember that doctors bled patients for centuries. If Crichton had tried to draw an analogy between global warming and the long history of bleeding medical patients, wouldn't that've been offensive too?

So what about choosing less-well-known examples, then? E.g., in principle he could have talked about the 1960-era political and academic bogus consensus that the long-run Philips curve allowed governments to reduce unemployment in a usefully stable and predictable way by printing more money. (short form of the last chapter of that story: 1970s stagflation) That analogy would probably've been less offensive than eugenics or bleeding, but it also would've required teaching most people the whole story from scratch. That's a pretty high practical price to pay for being able to use a less offensive example. He might increase his audience by not giving his audience the "he's just being offensive" excuse to ignore him, certainly. But people who disagree with him are unlikely to want to trust him, which makes it hard to tell the story convincingly. With the eugenics story he can keep appealing to things that people already know independently, and so can convey his points about the story even to people who're looking for excuses to ignore him.

It is true that objections to global warming are all over the map, including some embarrassingly silly objections. E.g., it's not just anonymous trolls on internet who claim not to believe the Earth was in a warming trend over the 20th century. Sadly, there were high profile nonanonymous people who held onto that position for much longer than I think was reasonable. It's also true that the anthropogenic global warming crisis camp succeeded in reaching more consensus, converging pretty strongly on its two flagships, Gore and IPCC. But are you really impressed with the consensus? How much do you know about it?

A lot of the CO2 climate technical controversy turn on two subcontroversies, historical climate (how exceptional the 20th century trend was, roughly) and theoretical climate modelling/simulation. I judge the 10-year hindsight score on modelling to be a somewhat vague Gore 0, ranters without consistent disproof of global warming 0. On historical climate , though, it's a much sharper Gore -1, ranters 1.

It seems to me that by your standards of 10-year stability, the modelling controversy is a clear stalemate today. In decades to come, as CO2 levels continue to rise and the model predictions diverge from back-of-the-envelope calculations, the predictions of 1998-era models should be dramatically confirmed or falsified. Today, though, they aren't precise enough to distinguish strongly.

Incidentally, convincing people of controversial stuff by modelling is not easy in any field. If you become sufficiently concerned with CO2 that you decide it's important to support nuclear power, you might find it educational to argue reactor safety models or radwaste disposal geological models with nuclear skeptics. And my Ph. D. work was related to modelling electron transfer reactions, and I'm very glad that cytochromes are not politically controversial.

On the historical climate argument, I think the crisis camp did achieve a medium-term political victory by the way that they achieved and rhapsodized about consensus on the famous Mann "hockey stick" graph, showing stable centuries of natural climate followed by a zoom upward somewhat correlated with global rise in CO2. But because their 2000-era consensus turned out to be technically bogus, I judge their political victory to be a long-term embarrassment for them, in part because it makes it harder to maintain a straight face while solemnly refuting analyses like Crichton's.

"Technically bogus?" I hear some of you say. Chiefly I mean that Mann's statistical methods were screwed up. For the mathematically-minded among you, one noteworthy point is that they were shown to reconstruct the temperature as a hockey stick even when the experimental temperature proxy data were replaced with purely random red noise. For those whose tastes run more to sociology more than math, in the spirit of the Crichton essay, two noteworthy points are first that this analysis reaching a politically convenient but technically surprising conclusion was widely accepted by insiders despite such technical flaws, and second that when it was eventually shot down, it was by a pretty extreme example of "outsider".

(And "technically surprising?" Well, I appreciate the mathematical tractability of nice long uninterrupted time series. And I realize that famous historical extreme data points like the Little Ice Age and Medieval Warm period aren't so easy to accommodate in the same formal statistical analysis with uninterrupted time series. But when your formal analysis based on long continuous time series of proxies for temperature gives results that sit uneasily with the grab bag of well-known datapoints on historical extremes of temperature itself, it should be surprising and call for some checks (of the statistical analysis, of the actual temperature dependence of the proxies, on the grotty realities of how the data were collected, on whether the proxies have tracked temperature since then, etc.). It seems that this first occurred to an outsider named McIntyre.:-)

(There are still arguments about whether Mann's general conclusion of stable stable ever-so stable global climate might turn out to be correct after all: there are lots of ways to choose from the available temperature proxy data and lots of ways to analyze them, and with some modern choices people have arrived at conclusions similar to those of the approximately-10-year-old papers. But even if the politically correct conclusion somehow turns out to follow from a more modern technically correct analysis, it'll be a sort of happy accident: not a vindication of the 1999ish published work, but at most a vindication of Mann's unpublished intuition or simple luck.)

"until then your just ranting" Hey, I love you too, but only conditionally. I will love you if you have any 10 year model with 10 year evidence that is validated and consistently proves the crisis variant of anthropogenic global warming. Not just that we've warmed over the past century or more, which is now completely uncontroversial (and about time). Not just that the expected CO2 sensitivity is likely to be about what we'd expect from a back of the envelope calculation, which is not terribly controversial. Instead, the Gore/IPCC version: that we can be pretty confident that the CO2 sensititivity is several times greater than the back of the envelope value, enough to be the main explanation of the warming trend in the 20th century and enough to have more dramatic effects in this century.)

"But, I now have a burning desire to learn it from the ground-up. What are the 'canonical' sources for math, both online and offline?"

It'd be easy to spend multiple lifetimes studying math, so you'll have to set some priorities. Applied vs. pretty, pragmatic vs. rigorous, discrete vs. continuous, and various subfields within "applied," e.g. So presently, when you have a better idea what your priorities are, you'll probably want to pose a variant of the question again.

(E.g., not "what are the 'canonical' sources for math" but something as specific as "what are the 'canonical' sources for math leading up to what I'd need to understand X" where X is something like "the cryptanalysis of the Data Encryption Standard" or "the proof of Fermat's last theorem [good luck:-]" or "why people think Y's work was important" where Y is Galois or Hilbert or Ramanujan or Noether or Erdos or Matiyasevic or whoever.)

Meanwhile, if you just want to see what the fuss is about before trying to formulate a more specific question, I can recommend any of four kinds of samplers.

1. For about 80-90% of ways of analyzing the physical world, one really wants to know calculus. Get _A Concept of Limits_ (cheap from Dover), the three most promising calculus books from your local library (and/or webbed tutorials), and a basic dealing-with-the-physical-world book which assumes you know calculus (e.g., just about any serious physics text, or _The Art of Electronics_, or something acoustics or signal processing or whatever). Keep fiddling with them, and doing exercises as necessary, 'til the pieces fit together.:-| Expect it to be quite a lot of work --- by my estimate, freshmen and sophomores at Caltech in the 1980s generally spent at least 250 hours on it, sometimes more like 1000. And it will probably be much easier if, like them, you can arrange to get at least 1 hour of feedback every 20 hours of study from someone who already understands the stuff.

2. For anything in computers, getting familiar with the basic math of reasonably serious algorithms is really useful. I, like many people, like _Introduction to Algorithms_. Get it and study it; understand at least a representative number of chapters. My estimate is that this is a lot easier than option #1, maybe five times easier. It isn't anywhere near as big a hammer for dealing with the physical world, but it can be extremely handy for dealing with the software world.

3. If you want to see what all the fuss is about in some representative areas of less-physical, less-computer-y math, I know of two Dover books which try to drag you from advanced high school math to a famous math result. _Abstract Algebra and Solution by Radicals_ drags you through (the modern, cleaned up and rigorous version of) Galois' proof that there is no closed-form formula for solving polynomials of fifth order. _Computability and Unsolvability_ drags you up to Matiyasevic's proof that Hilbert's tenth problem is insoluble. Working through either of them in detail would be a lot of work, almost certainly more than you want to do if your interest turns out to lie in something else like graph theory or algorithms or topology or statistics. But you could probably learn a lot about roughly how things are done merely by skimming either of them a few times. (And if just seeing broadly how things are done is your priority, you might prefer _AAaSbR_, since showing broadly how things are done seems to be one of its priorities too.)

4. Peter Winkler's newish (2004) _Mathematical Puzzles_ book is also very good and very math-y and well worth looking at as a sort of inspiration. However, if you ever get tempted to think that the extreme elegance of puzzle solutions is representative of how math gets done, look back at section 3 before jumping to conclusions.

"I am lost as to where I should start. I want to have a fundamental, intuitive understanding of it."

My closest thing to a literal answer to that would be: read _AAaSbR_. Like it very, very much.:-) Like it so much, in fact, that you are motivated to really study something like _Algebra_ by MacLane and Birkhoff (which is like a big watershed in which _AAaSbR_ is but one stream). After you get your mind around a good chunk of that (enough that you feel no great fear of an open-book exam composed of exercises from your choice of 20% of the chapters, say), do some variant of the calculus stuff I described in section 1 to see how abstract math ties into the stuff people analyze in the physical world. But I doubt in fact this is what you want. I suspect it'd be more than a full-time year of work for most people. And even if you had the time and energy, well before you finished I think you'd probably prefer to stop studying the foundational stuff so deeply and start to climb up some shortcut to some application or subspecialty.

Incidentally, mooneater's advice "algebra [...] Be very comfy with that before proceeding" is good... but note that it's referring to a high school algebra which has rather different priorities from something like what MacLane and Birkhoff mean. Don't try to follow mooneater's advice by going to a university library, taking down a book titled "Algebra," and running away screaming "math is not for me." I learned a lot of useful math, did my Ph. D. on quantum mechanical Monte Carlo simulations, and only understand a little of MacLane and Birkhoff (but have looked parts of it in order to try to understand a little bit about "categories" and some other stuff, and would consider more time spent understanding it to be time well spent).