supernetworks

Another favorite, https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/cool-vulns-dont-live-...

the router sniffed plaintext http to grab HTTP User agents to put them into a curl bash command line string. Nice RCE from the browser.

Not a bot. Anyway if you have questions about router security rather than moderation happy to "delve" into that.

Supernetworks -- ill update. Our initial comment got moderated for too much self promotion so also apologies there and again for anyone who is offended

You can check our comment history https://news.ycombinator.com/threads?id=supernetworks

Thanks Tom. This whole comment thread is a bit of a dumpster fire of opinions however we have been working on the wifi security problem for a long time and we have a lot to say about it. Router manufacturers competing into involution that ship RCE (much of which is triggerable from a web page) have created a substantial risk to consumers, in this case with a lens on the US market. We tackle hardware & software and prioritized network isolation as the first thing to resolve. We have tons on our blog and page about network security and have open source software.

Yep, unfortunately fuzzy. For enterprise wifi deployments, one amusing thing to do when configuring 802.1X is to test ARP spoofing the upstream radius server after associating, and self-authenticate.

It might be interesting to go and apply some of the sneaky packet injection mechanisms in this paper actually to try to bypass ARP spoofing defenses.

Some 802.1x have inherent mitm attacks that have been called out since 2004 and never got the v2 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6677.html). EAP-TLS however is the best practice here + VLANs.

Hostapd now has support for multi pass SAE /WPA3 password as well. We have an implementation of dynamic VLAN+per device PSK with WPA3 (https://github.com/spr-networks/super) we've been using for a few years now.

Ironically one of the main pain points is Apple. keychain sync means all the apple devices on the same sync account should share a password for wireless. Secondly the MAC randomization timeouts require reassignment.

The trouble with SAE per device passwords is that the commit makes it difficult to evaluate more than one password per pairing without knowing the identity of a device (the MAC) a-priori, which is why it's harder to find this deployed in production. It's possible for an AP to cycle through a few attempts but not many, whereas in WPA2 an AP could rotate through all the passwords without a commit. The standard needs to adapt.

This attack exploits multi PSK networks precisely. If it's all one PSK the attacker can already throw up a rogue AP for WPA3 or just sniff/inject WPA2 outright. The back half of a secure multi PSK setup is deploying VLANs for segmentation, to block these attacks.

WiFi provides half-way measures with client isolation features that break down when the packets hit L3, or in some cases the broadcast key implementations are deficient allowing L2 attacks. The paper is about all of the fun ways they could pivot across networks, and they figured out how to enable full bidirectional MITM in a wider class of attacks than commonly known or previously published.

This is mostly accurate, to clarify the association IDs tie into what VLANs will be assigned and that does block all of the injection/MITM attacks. This also assumes that the VLAN segments are truly isolated from one another, as in they do not route traffic between each other by default including for broadcast and multicast traffic.

However client isolation should be a tool people have at their disposal. Consider the need for people to buy cloud IOT devices and throw them on a guest network (https://arstechnica.com/security/2024/09/massive-china-state...). It's also about keeping web-browsers away from these devices during regular use, because there are paths for malicious web pages to break into IOT devices.

EAP TLS provides strong authentication, is much better than the other enterprise authentication options, but will not block these lateral attacks from other authenticated devices. The second half of the deployment is putting each identity into a VLAN to defend against the L2/L3 disconnects that can occur.

I work on https://supernetworks.org/. We propose a solution to these flaws with per-device VLANs and encourage per-device passwords as well.

More practically the risk for these attacks is as follows. A simple password makes sense for easy setup on a guest network, that's treated as untrusted. These passwords can probably be cracked from sniffing a WPA2 key exchange -- who cares says the threat model, the network is untrusted. But this attack lets the insecure network pivot out into the secure one.

yes understood, the first article isn't the main subject of the article.

by complexity class that would be consensus, although the argument for building BPP systems is about the energy cost being orders of magnitude less and perhaps also some polynomial speedup

yes, this paper is the main subject of the article

A direct equivalent, no, as stated in the introduction.

"Notably, while probabilistic computers can emulate quantum interference with polynomial resources, their convergence is in general believed to require exponential time [10]. This challenge is known as the signproblem in Monte Carlo algorithms [11]."

Some of the properties of fil-c managed heaps are very similar to what CHERI can do with Cornucopia by the way: see https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3620665.3640416

tragically, this is exactly what it is

"given that destroying the correlation between two entangled particles" i think this is the assumption that is easy to make without digging deeper into entanglement.

i am still in the process of reading this article (https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.06418) however entanglement witnesses can be realized in several ways and are one of the underlying aspects of how quantum networking can be made reliable.

under the category of heralded entanglement, one realization uses photons striking photo detectors after they meet in a beamsplitter under the hong-ou-mandel effect scenario. for type 1 entanglement with HOM: if the photons at the two input modes are identical, they always bunch due to quantum interference, and if the photons resulted from emissions in the respective quantum nodes those nodes are now entangled, and the detection is the classical signal that the entangled link was created. the nodes can now transmit information unidirectionally into the entangled qubits. for type 2 entanglement with HOM it's a little bit more complicated although the underlying concept of indistinguishability is what results in the entanglement just the same.

heres one experiment from oxford, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-024-08404-x, where they achieved this with high fidelity although the particular details of the beam splitter experiment are not as well detailed.

We have a similar container @juhovh, for a plugin for the router we work on. in case this is helpful for you, feel free to to review https://github.com/spr-networks/spr-tailscale/blob/main/Dock...

A particularly tricky exploit in the linux futex implementation from 2014, by Pinkie Pie, https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40079619

"The requeue-once rule is enforced by only allowing requeueing to the futex previously passed to futex_wait_requeue_pi as uaddr2, so it's not possible to requeue from A to B, then from B to C - but it is possible to requeue from B to B.

When this happens, if (!q.rt_waiter) passes, so rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock is never called. (Also, AFAIK, free_pi_state is never called, which is true even without this weird requeue; in the case where futex_requeue calls requeue_pi_wake_futex directly, pi_state will sit around until it gets cleaned up in exit_pi_state_list when the thread exits. This is not a vulnerability.) futex_wait_requeue_pi exits, and various pointers to rt_waiter become dangling. "

encrypted DNS goes a long way towards mitigating this as well.

Novel or not, this seems like it can be actively exploited?

It is a book, "Underground: Hacking, madness and obsession on the electronic frontier". I seem to recall cross it hosted under mit.edu/~hacker/underground.txt or something like that

This is not unlike the surprise in underground.txt when mendax & co discover that curiosity is not the only state of existence for being a hacker. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4686/pg4686.txt

"Riffling through other files, Mendax found mail confirming that the attack had indeed come from inside MILNET. His eyes grew wide as he read on. US military hackers had broken into MILNET systems, using them for target practice, and no-one had bothered to tell the system admin at the target site.

Mendax couldn't believe it. The US military was hacking its own computers. This discovery led to another, more disturbing, thought. If the US military was hacking its own computers for practice, what was it doing to other countries' computers? "

Yes -- except for limited wireguard support, usability for multicast is mostly solved. SPR services mDNS and Zeroconf/SSDP with a udp proxy[1].

[1] https://github.com/spr-networks/super/blob/main/multicast_ud...

We designed SPR to address problems with wifi isolation. Every wifi device runs in an isolated subnet and individual VLAN. Mac spoofing is not possible since a device's MAC identity is combined with a device-specific PSK. You can check out the project here: https://www.supernetworks.org/

While we were not aware of these protocol flaws specifically, the project was inspired by fundamental weaknesses in secure wifi isolation. One of the attacks that's demonstrated in the scripts but not in the academic paper -- is that most routers will route UDP/IP packets between devices even when they are "isolated", so there are problems with most guest wifi networks even before mac stealer type attacks come into play.