HN user
I was talking about the signed recovery shell the article is talking about. Sadly most business laptops still use dtpms. Also if they use ftpms you can simply use a ram scraper. The attack surface is huge either way.
I just digged into the exploit a little bit more and what it does it targets BitLocker in TPM only mode. That means that there is no preboot authentication or anything. What happens is secure boot validates the boot chain and the TPM gives out the encryption keys by itself. When you have physical access, it doesn't really make a difference. If there is a stick you can boot from and drop into an emergency shell or if you have to buy a $5 microcontroller and solder it to certain pins on the main board to sniff the TPM keys. What Microsoft is doing here in general they are selling something that is not secure. They are selling it as as full disk encryption but it's not. Someone who can flash a flash drive with an exploit and drop to a shell and use it to browse and copy files. Can also just buy that microcontroller and watch your YouTube with you How to solder. So the "exploit" isn't The problem here the problem is the false sense of security that Microsoft is selling.