mythrowaway0

Speaks for not being able to find the charging point in the parking lot, perhaps? Don't forget that Musk formulated his assertion of Broder's motivation based on a data log of the car traveling between 5mph and 15mph for 0.6 miles. That sounds almost exactly like my average journey to find a parking spot at the mall.

But no, you're right, let's assume a long-term New York Times veteran lied in the paper, intentionally. That's a safer explanation in the face of your call for Occam's Razor...

> I'm not sure what a reviewer driving in circles at a charging station proves?

Perhaps that he couldn't find it, since it was his first visit?

Based on the rest of this thread, though, Occam is not going to be making an appearance and we're going to be questioning the journalistic integrity of someone who's worked at the New York Times since most commenters here were in diapers. It totally makes sense that he'd write a completely false story at the behest of big oil. That's the logical explanation.

...or trying to find the charging point, since it was potentially his first visit there? While we're speculating on rationale, why don't we include possibilities fair to both sides?

Indeed, one of its finest defeats. Vietnam was extremely complicated, both on the battlefield and off, and it's not my area of expertise; that being said, a lot of modern maneuvers planted their seeds in that soil.

Americans grew tired of Iraq when insurgents kept picking off a soldier every other day and there was little to show for their loss. Similar themes presented in the latter years of Vietnam, combined with a complicated political picture stateside. That's the success of an insurgency: attrition not of materiel, but the minds, resolve, and fortitude of a belligerent. That was certainly evident in Vietnam, as well, and it's a great parallel.

No, you're on point, in my opinion. And yes, you're correct, what we're seeing today in Iraq and Afghanistan is simply the extreme evolution of maneuver warfare. There's no delicate way to say this, so: it's pretty clear that 'terrorism' is simply extreme maneuver warfare, evolved to its apex (maybe) and designed to break the opposition in nontraditional ways, and what we would consider 'bad guys' simply began perfecting it first.

The theory of the 'good guys' (the scare quotes aren't hedging, they're just being careful to avoid ideological framing of the discussion), Lind in particular, is rapidly adjusting to the new threat model. That was the thrust of my point to the other commenter here. There's an interesting parallel in that countering terrorism and counterinsurgency are largely reactionary by their very nature, and the 'good guys' have been left reacting to the new model of warfare in itself in, say, the last decade. People do disagree with Lind on fourth-generation warfare, for what it's worth.

We're "catching up," not "innovating" on the battlefield today. That's the big lesson here.

Notice how your quote includes the phrase "large-scale" behind it? That's because of what I, you know, wrote in my original comment about maneuver warfare not implying a certain scale or strategy in particular. You're proving my point and disagreeing with me at the same time, which is rather remarkable. Lind's equivalence of third-generation warfare to being called "maneuver warfare" is a definition that I happen to disagree with, as I think maneuvers in general evolve as war itself does. Terrorism itself is another evolution of a maneuver, in my opinion.

Maneuver warfare isn't the specific strategy on a general's table. It's an ethos of war. In particular, maneuver warfare embraces decentralized command, as you're so vociferously citing in your defense; Iraqi Freedom was a war of colonels, not generals, as discussed in a link I shared with you earlier.

I tried to be kind in my reply since you share a passion for military theory, and it's a topic I happen to be extremely versed in (as in, my entire adult life to this day). I hope one day you realize that there are people out there in the world that know more about a topic than you do, don't feel like justifying that authority to you, and that you should appreciate that they took some time out of their day to try to inform you rather than attack them belligerently because they dared to disagree with you.

I see this is fruitless, so, best of luck debating with other laypersons on the Internet.

Very much so. There's a study of 1MD in Iraqi Freedom specifically here[1].

[1] http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_WAR_0104,00.ht...

There's a bibliography near the end with interesting things to read. That's generally where things to read if you're interested in a topic will appear, and there's no need to be harsh to the guy pointing you toward useful information.

No amount of buzzwords can conceal that you don't understand what "maneuver warfare" is, either; fourth-generation warfare pretty much is maneuver warfare. Your dilution of your point by introducing United States themes and specific tactical situations makes me question why you're putting so much skin in this discussion if you're as lay as your questions indicate. I'm not criticizing you, for what it's worth, just wondering why you're cloaking not knowing something with extra buzzwords -- you should be happy to learn, not apt to show off.

Terrorism and insurgency are forms of maneuver warfare, and the term "maneuver" doesn't imply scale (and certainly not armor, for that matter). Since you're quite obviously American, the Marine Corps' definition of "maneuver warfare" should interest you:

"Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope."

That's from Warfighting[1]. Seriously, read up, you sound interested but misguided, and I made a throwaway just to spite you. :)

[1] http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/mcdp1.pdf