jjlustig

You also are going to quickly run into scaling issues. A main sell is that you have a team of “experts” draft the standard terms. But this means a new “expert” team for every new contract-type AND industry. The same type of contract (e.g., an MSA) can look very different in tech (where most of your expert attorneys work) than in pharma, ag, or oil & gas, for example.

Trust is also a big issue. “Standard” is never really standard. Contract language is always going to be biased towards one side of a deal. Take NVCA forms. They claim to be “model” but the language generally is drafted to favor VCs over founders. How can one trust that your “expert” group is creating truly neutral forms?

This also has malpractice / UPL written all over it. You are representing that your standard contracts are fair and balanced, but then are simultaneously attempting to disclaim liability by stating that you don't provide legal advice about the suitability of your standard contracts. Who bears responsibility if a 100M+ deal goes bust because of your standard contract?

Lawyers are bimodal in this regard. Many hate the work with a burning passion. Many love the work and never want to retire. IMO, it really depends on the practice area + role (e.g., M&A work vs. civil rights work or big law attorney vs. AUSA).

Translation: “I realize that Google is behind on the AI race (and on our corporate strategy in general), so I’m going to fear monger you, the investment community, with claims of “AGI soon” to attract investments and prevent our stock from plummeting.”

I've been very interested in this space (political group for AI regulation). And actually, I just recently got an initiative I've been thinking of for awhile off the ground. How can I get in touch with you 00F_? You can reach me at lustig.jj@gmail.com

By contrast, there are a number of things the Supreme Court has simply made up. Conjuring a “right to privacy” from “penumbras” of the other amendments is an example.

If you take the majority view from Griswold, I agree. But if you take the pre-Slaughterhouse view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th amendment (yes, I although I loathe to say it, an originalist view), I don’t think a fundamental right to privacy can be thought of as that far fetched.

Your also forgetting the 16th amendment (federal income tax). This arguably was the critical aspect in increasing federal power.

HN loves to focus on only one of the normative goals of patents - to incentivize innovation. But there is another almost equally important goal of the patent system - to incentivize disclosure. While I agree that the use of vague language in patent publications perverts the public disclosure goal, other forms of public disclosure may arise from it. For example, companies can openly talk about inventions, whether it be with the public, potential business partners, or suppliers, without fear out misappropriation.

I am not a fan of a bright line rule that prohibits software patents. Software is so explicitly tied with most inventions these days that it would be hard to tease out what qualifies for patent eligibility. Is a novel design of a robot arm that contains some software elements patentable? Instead of a bright line rule, I’d prefer to see a strengthening of 112 - written description / enablement requirements and 103 - obviousness requirements. Imagine if 112 required software patent holders to provide a hard copy of the implementation code (or at least a more detailed description of the invention). And as to 103, the policing function of obviousness needs to be ramped up. The USPTO should invest in better prior art searching techniques and hire Examiners that care about enforcement. Currently, the incentives of USPTO Examiner's misalign with the goals of the patent system, as Examiners are evaluated via a point mechanism that rewards churning out patents rather than tightly policing them.

Also, when people on HN argue about the "patent troll" problem, the real issue seems not to be with patents themselves, but with how the U.S. litigation system can be weaponized to extract fees from using patents. Thus, I think the key issue is trying to figure out low cost and effective ways to litigate patent issues. IPRs have helped, but perhaps we can develop other ways for companies to cheaply dispose of garbage patent suits that have no merit.