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eoranged

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Software developer and security specialist.

my public key: https://keybase.io/eoranged; my proof: https://keybase.io/eoranged/sigs/mTLHJDS5ywbnUzobQoxLBA-zslvdqUogd1Y_vK2pTMw

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So you mean that having device with unlimited network, memory and TPM data access with encrypted firmware and separate processor should not be considered as a huge risk factor?

Due to targeted attack or leak from Intel potential malware can use it to elevate privileges, hide from any type of audit, survive complete system reinstall and even be used to silently infect systems by remote entities.

And lack of TPM module allows to steal encryption password by application running with system privileges, which already have all required access anyway.

Nice checklist, signa11. But there are few moments which I should point:

1. TPM on recent Intel hardware is controlled by Intel Management Engine (http://libreboot.org/faq/#intelme) which basically acts as a hardware backdoor which cannot be disabled or controlled in most cases.

2. About firewalling: It's good to filter out even ping from Internet (it's almost always fine to keep it enabled for lan segment) to make automatic detection slightly harder (LOW). BTW, installing coreboot instead of manufacturer-provided firmware (if possible) also could be good improvement (PARANOID).

3. As for browser(and skype and all the rest of Internet applications) It's good thing to block and audit strange actions such as attempts to access ssh or pgp/gpg keys. By audit I mean set up quite visible and persistent notification. (MEDIUM)

4. Also, It would be great to add links to NSA Linux Configuration guide (http://www.nsa.gov/ia/mitigation_guidance/security_configura...) and CIS Security Benchmarks (http://benchmarks.cisecurity.org/downloads/browse/index.cfm?...).