RobinHanson

0.1c isn't slow enough to solve the empirical puzzle that we don't now see alien volumes. That is the fact that pushes for higher speeds in our analysis.

Why think of this as outsiders inferring, as opposed to insiders asking how they should coordinate their activities?

If we've set the fine levels right, someone who can't or won't afford crime insurance is a net liability to the rest of us. The insurance premiums will vary greatly with the conditions one agrees to. Very few people would be unable to afford any such conditions.

I don't recall mentioning anything about consistency or beauty, and I think I'd do pretty well at a test of identifying externalities.

The contract with the insurer could specify prison. The official courts no longer require prison, but the insurer that you've agreed to might.

Maybe this poster does that elsewhere, but this comment seems pretty mild to me.

People have to get insurance to drive on roads today; are you outraged at that too?

I did say explicitly that the one exception to fines as official punishment is failing to arrange for insurance. Your contract with an insurer can specify the court that judges disputes with it, and the forms of punishment available there.

As you say "access to justice" costs lots of money today, it isn't obvious that this gives less such access.

Bounty hunters exist today, avoid shootouts, and are well enough trained when that happens. They would have no special powers, and thus be liable for any damages caused by a shootout.

If an existing system works badly, one shouldn't be too eager to understand and replicate all of its details.

Public enterprise also has many unpredictabl incentives. And many of the more predictable ones are pretty harmful.

As many have long expressed this concern, I and others have long done research into "manipulation" of prediction markets. We've done theory, lab experiments, and field tests. We find prediction markets are especially robust in resisting such influence, compared to other institutions and mechanisms.

Amazon pulled it to pressure Oxford U. Press to give more $.

"confident" is too strong. I think the chance is high enough to make the premise worth considering in this detail.

So it seems that you think that while anarchy would better achieve a true national welfare, it would not do so for any concrete concept of national welfare that one could define and measure. True welfare somehow is intrinsically unmeasurable.

Putting in weights to directly favor specific policy proposals is very different from putting in weights to penalize the kinds of means that people dislike. For example, if we dislike police detaining folks without charging them with a crime, we could count such events and penalize them.

It sounds like you think that while you like private law and anarchy, you don't think that it would actually achieve the ends that most ordinary people want to achieve. And you think speculators will agree with you, and in a futarchy would therefore reject anarchy proposals.

You are talking about the issue of manipulating prices via trades. We have lots of evidence that this isn't much of a problem. Read my papers for details.

Statistics about means can also be included in welfare measures.

But if there is no reason to think that problem is worse in this proposal, and the info aggregation problem would get better, you might still want to support this proposal.

A futarchy could approve a private law anarchy of the sort that Friedman suggests, if market speculators thought it would do better to achieve national welfare as voters have defined it.

GDP is only an initial starting point for developing a measure of national welfare. Using GDP in this system might well be better than our current system, and improvements should make it even better.

It is quite possible to have a decentralized and open system for making proposals. For example, there can be a fee to make a proposal, which is paid back at a multiple of the proposal is approved.